Former Enron officer negotiating plea bargain

Finland Shadow Fleet Cable Investigation details suspected Russia-linked sabotage of Baltic Sea undersea cables, AIS dark activity, and false-flag tactics threatening critical infrastructure, prompting NATO and EU vigilance against hybrid warfare across Northern Europe.

Key Points

Finland probes suspected sabotage of undersea cables by a Russia-linked vessel using flag of convenience and AIS off.

✅ Undersea cable damage in Baltic Sea sparks security alerts

✅ Suspected shadow fleet ship ran AIS dark under false flag

✅ NATO and EU boost maritime surveillance, critical infrastructure

In December 2024, Finland launched an investigation into a ship allegedly linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet” following a series of incidents involving damage to undersea cables. The investigation has raised significant concerns in Finland and across Europe, as it suggests possible sabotage or other intentional acts related to the disruption of vital communication and energy infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region. This article explores the key details of the investigation, the role of Russia’s shadow fleet, and the broader geopolitical implications of this event.

The "Shadow Fleet" and Its Role

The term “shadow fleet” refers to a collection of ships, often disguised or operating under false flags, that are believed to be part of Russia's covert maritime operations. These vessels are typically used for activities such as smuggling, surveillance, and potentially military operations, mirroring the covert hacker infrastructure documented by researchers in related domains. In recent years, the "shadow fleet" has been under increasing scrutiny due to its involvement in various clandestine actions, especially in regions close to NATO member countries and areas with sensitive infrastructure.

Russia’s "shadow fleet" operates in the shadows of regular international shipping, often difficult to track due to the use of deceptive practices like turning off automatic identification systems (AIS). This makes it difficult for authorities to monitor their movements and assess their true purpose, raising alarm bells when one of these ships is suspected of being involved in damaging vital infrastructure like undersea cables.

The Cable Damage Incident

The investigation was sparked after damage was discovered to an undersea cable in the Baltic Sea, a vital link for communication, data transmission, and energy supply between Finland and other parts of Europe. These undersea cables are crucial for everything from internet connections to energy grid stability, with recent Nordic grid constraints underscoring their importance, and any disruption to them can have serious consequences.

Finnish authorities reported that the damage appeared to be deliberate, raising suspicions of potential sabotage. The timing of the damage coincides with a period of heightened tensions between Russia and the West, particularly following the escalation of the war in Ukraine, with recent strikes on Ukraine's power grid highlighting the stakes, and ongoing geopolitical instability. This has led many to speculate that the damage to the cables could be part of a broader strategy to undermine European security and disrupt critical infrastructure.

Upon further investigation, a vessel that had been in the vicinity at the time of the damage was identified as potentially being part of Russia’s "shadow fleet." The ship had been operating under a false flag and had disabled its AIS system, making it challenging for authorities to track its movements. The vessel’s activities raised red flags, and Finnish authorities are now working closely with international partners to ascertain its involvement in the incident.

Geopolitical Implications

The damage to undersea cables and the suspected involvement of Russia’s "shadow fleet" have broader geopolitical implications, particularly in the context of Europe’s security landscape. Undersea cables are considered critical infrastructure, akin to electric utilities where intrusions into US control rooms have been documented, and any deliberate attack on them could be seen as an act of war or an attempt to destabilize regional security.

In the wake of the investigation, there has been increased concern about the vulnerability of Europe’s energy and communication networks, which are increasingly reliant on these undersea connections, and as the Baltics pursue grid synchronization with the EU to reduce dependencies, policymakers are reassessing resilience measures. The European Union, alongside NATO, has expressed growing alarm over potential threats to this infrastructure, especially as tensions with Russia continue to escalate.

The incident also highlights the growing risks associated with hybrid warfare tactics, which combine conventional military actions with cyberattacks, including the U.S. condemnation of power grid hacking as a cautionary example, sabotage, and disinformation campaigns. The targeting of undersea cables could be part of a broader strategy by Russia to disrupt Europe’s ability to coordinate and respond effectively, particularly in the context of ongoing sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

Furthermore, the suspected involvement of a "shadow fleet" ship raises questions about the transparency and accountability of maritime activities in the region. The use of vessels operating under false flags or without identification systems complicates efforts to monitor and regulate shipping in international waters. This has led to calls for stronger maritime security measures and greater cooperation between European countries to ensure the safety and integrity of critical infrastructure.

Finland’s Response and Ongoing Investigation

In response to the cable damage incident, Finnish authorities have mobilized a comprehensive investigation, seeking to determine the extent of the damage and whether the actions were deliberate or accidental. The Finnish government has called for increased vigilance and cooperation with international partners to identify and address potential threats to undersea infrastructure, drawing on Symantec's Dragonfly research for insights into hostile capabilities.

Finland, which shares a border with Russia and has been increasingly concerned about its security in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has ramped up its defense posture. The damage to undersea cables serves as a stark reminder of the vulnerabilities that come with an interconnected global infrastructure, and Finland’s security services are likely to scrutinize the incident as part of their broader defense strategy.

Additionally, the incident is being closely monitored by NATO and the European Union, both of which have emphasized the importance of safeguarding critical infrastructure. As an EU member and NATO partner, Finland’s response to this situation could influence how Europe addresses similar challenges in the future.

The investigation into the damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, allegedly linked to Russia’s "shadow fleet," has significant implications for European security. The use of covert operations, including the deployment of ships under false flags, underscores the growing threats to vital infrastructure in the region. With tensions between Russia and the West continuing to rise, the potential for future incidents targeting critical communication and energy networks is a pressing concern.

As Finland continues its investigation, the incident highlights the need for greater international cooperation and vigilance in safeguarding undersea cables and other critical infrastructure. In a world where hybrid warfare tactics are becoming increasingly common, ensuring the security of these vital connections will be crucial for maintaining stability in Europe. The outcome of this investigation may serve as a crucial case study in the ongoing efforts to protect infrastructure from emerging and unconventional threats.

Related News

• Electricity Forum News

• Grid Technologies News

ESCC COVID-19 Response coordinates utilities, public power, and cooperatives to protect the energy grid and electricity reliability, aligning with DOE, DHS, CDC, FERC, and NERC on continuity of operations, mutual assistance, and supply chain resilience.

Key Points

An industry government effort ensuring reliability, operations continuity and supply chain stability during COVID-19.

✅ Twice weekly ESCC calls align DOE, DHS, HHS, CDC, FERC, NERC priorities.

✅ Focus on control centers, generation, quarantine access, mutual aid.

✅ Resource Guide supports localized decisions and supply chain resilience.

The nation’s investor-owned electric companies, public power utilities, and electric cooperatives are working together to protect the energy grid as the U.S. grid addresses COVID-19 challenges and ensure continued access to safe and reliable electricity during the COVID-19 global health crisis.

The electric power industry has been planning for years, including extensive disaster planning across utilities, for an emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as countless other types of emergencies, and the industry is coordinating closely with government partners through the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) to ensure that organizations have the resources they need to keep the lights on.

The ESCC is holding high-level coordination calls twice a week with senior leadership from the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. These calls help ensure that industry and government work together to resolve any challenges that arise during this health emergency and that electricity remains safe for customers.

“Electricity and the energy grid are indispensable to our society, and one of our greatest strengths as an industry is our ability to convene and adapt quickly to changing circumstances and challenging events,” said Edison Electric Institute President Tom Kuhn. “Our industry plans for all types of contingencies, with examples such as local response planning, and strong industry-government coordination and cross-sector collaboration are critical to our planning and response. We appreciate the ongoing leadership and support of our government partners as we all respond to COVID-19 and power through this crisis together.”

The ESCC quickly mobilized and established strategic working groups dedicated to identifying and solving for short-, medium-, and long-term issues facing the industry during the COVID-19 pandemic, with utilities implementing necessary precautions to maintain service across regions.

The five current areas of focus are:

1. Continuity of operations at control centers, including on-site staff lockdowns when needed
2. Continuity of operations at generation facilities
3. Access to, and operations in, restricted or quarantined areas
4. Protocols for mutual assistance
5. Supply chain challenges

“The electric power industry has taken steps to prepare for the evolving coronavirus challenges, while maintaining our commitment to the communities we serve, including customer relief efforts announced by some providers,” said National Rural Electric Cooperative Association CEO Jim Matheson. “We have a strong track record of preparing for many kinds of emergencies that could impact the ability to generate and deliver electricity. While planning for this situation is unique from other business continuity planning, we are taking actions to prepare to operate with a smaller workforce, potential disruptions in the supply chain, and limited support services for an extended period of time.”

The ESCC has developed a COVID-19 Resource Guide linked here and available at electricitysubsector.org. This document was designed to support electric power industry leaders in making informed localized decisions in response to this evolving health crisis. The guide will evolve as additional recommended practices are identified and as more is learned about appropriate mitigation strategies.

“The American Public Power Association (APPA) continues to work with our communityowned public power members and our industry and government partners to gather and share upto-date information, best practices, and guidance to support them in safely maintaining operational integrity,” said APPA CEO Joy Ditto.

Related News

• Electricity Forum News

• Energy Policy News

Rolls-Royce SMR UK Approval underscores nuclear innovation as regulators review a 470 MW factory-built modular reactor, aiming for grid power by 2029 to boost energy security, cut fossil fuels, and accelerate decarbonization.

Key Points

UK regulatory clearance for Rolls-Royce's 470 MW modular reactor, targeting grid power by 2029 to support clean energy.

✅ UK design approval expected by mid 2024

✅ First 470 MW unit aims for grid power by 2029

✅ Modular, factory-built; est. £1.8b per 10-acre site

A Rolls-Royce (RR.L) design for a small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) will likely receive UK regulatory approval by mid-2024, reflecting progress seen in the US NRC safety evaluation for NuScale as a regulatory benchmark, and be able to produce grid power by 2029, Paul Stein, chairman of Rolls-Royce Small Modular Reactors.

The British government asked its nuclear regulator to start the approval process in March, in line with the UK's green industrial revolution agenda, having backed Rolls-Royce’s $546 million funding round in November to develop the country’s first SMR reactor.

Policymakers hope SMRs will help cut dependence on fossil fuels and lower carbon emissions, as projects like Ontario's first SMR move ahead in Canada, showing momentum.

Speaking to Reuters in an interview conducted virtually, Stein said the regulatory “process has been kicked off, amid broader moves such as a Canadian SMR initiative to coordinate development, and will likely be complete in the middle of 2024.

“We are trying to work with the UK Government, and others to get going now placing orders, echoing expansions like Darlington SMR plans in Ontario, so we can get power on grid by 2029.”

In the meantime, Rolls-Royce will start manufacturing parts of the design that are most unlikely to change, while advancing partnerships like a MoU with Exelon to support deployment, Stein added.

Each 470 megawatt (MW) SMR unit costs 1.8 billion pounds ($2.34 billion) and would be built on a 10-acre site, the size of around 10 football fields, though projects in New Brunswick SMR debate have prompted questions about costs and timelines.

Unlike traditional reactors, SMRs are cheaper and quicker to build and can also be deployed on ships and aircraft. Their “modular” format means they can be shipped by container from the factory and installed relatively quickly on any proposed site.

Related News

• Electricity Forum News

• Power Generation News

Ukraine's EU Energy Integration aims for ENTSO-E synchronization, electricity market liberalization, EU Green Deal alignment, energy efficiency upgrades, hydrogen development, and streamlined grid connections to accelerate reform, market pricing, and sustainable growth.

Key Points

Ukraine's EU Energy Integration syncs with ENTSO-E, liberalizes power markets, and aligns with the EU Green Deal.

✅ ENTSO-E grid synchronization and cross-border trade readiness

✅ Electricity market liberalization and market-based pricing

✅ EU Green Deal alignment: efficiency, hydrogen, coal regions

Ukraine's goal in the energy sector is to ensure the maximum integration of energy markets with EU markets, and in line with the EU plan to dump Russian energy that is reshaping the region, synchronization of Ukraine's integrated energy system with ENTSO-E while leaning on electricity imports as needed to maintain stability. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal emphasized in his statement at the Fourth Ukraine Reform Conference underway through July 7-8 in Vilnius, the Republic of Lithuania.

The Head of Government presented a plan of reforms in Ukraine until 2030. In particular, energy sector reform and environmental protection, according to the PM, include the liberalization of the electricity market, with recent amendments to the market law guiding implementation, the simplification of connection to the electrical grid system and the gradual transition to market electricity prices, alongside potential EU emergency price measures under discussion, and the monetization of subsidies for vulnerable groups.

"Ukraine shares and fully supports the EU's climate ambitions and aims to synchronize its policies in line with the EU Green Deal, including awareness of Hungary's energy alignment with Russia to ensure coherent regional planning. The interdepartmental working group has determined priority areas for cooperation with the European Union: energy efficiency, hydrogen, transformation of coal regions, waste management," said the Prime Minister.

According to Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine has supported the EU's climate ambitions to move towards climate-neutral development by 2050 within the framework of the European Green Deal and should become an integral part of it in order not only to combat the effects of climate change in synergy with the EU but, as the country prepares for winter energy challenges and strengthens resilience, within the economic strategy development aimed to enhance security and create new opportunities for Ukrainian business, with continued energy security support from partners bolstering implementation.

Related News

• Electricity Forum News

• Energy Policy News

Ontario IESO COVID-19 Control Room Measures detail how essential operators safeguard the electricity grid with split shifts, backup control centres, real-time balancing, deep cleaning, social distancing, and shelter-in-place readiness to maintain reliable power.

Key Points

Measures that protect essential grid operators with split shifts, backup sites, and hygiene to keep power reliable.

✅ Split teams across primary and backup control centres

✅ 12-hour shifts with remote handoffs and deep cleaning

✅ Real-time grid modeling to balance demand and supply

A group of personnel key to keeping Ontario's electricity system functioning may end up locked down in their control centres due to the COVID-19 crisis, according to the head of the province's power operator.

But that has so far proven unnecessary with a change-up in routine, Independent Electricity System Operator CEO Peter Gregg said.

While about 90 per cent of staff were sent to work from home on March 13, another 48 control-room operators deemed essential are still going into work, Gregg said in an interview.

"We identified a smaller cohort of critical operations room staff that need to go in to operate the system out of our control centres," Gregg said. "My biggest concern is to maintain their health, their safety as we rely on them to do this critical work."

Some of the operators manage power demand and supply in real time as Ontario electricity demand shifts, by calling for more or less generation and keeping an eye on the distribution grid, which also allows power to flow to and from Ontario's neighbours. Others do scenario planning and modelling to prepare for changes.

The essential operators have been split into eight teams of six each working 12-hour shifts. The day crew works out of a control centre near Toronto and the night shift out of a backup centre in the city's west end, Gregg said.

"That means that we're not having physical hand-off between control room operators on shift change -- we can do it remotely -- and it also allows us to do deep cleansing," Gregg said. "We're fortunate that the way the room is set up allows us to practice good social distancing."

Should it become necessary, he said, bed, food and other on-site arrangements have been made to allow the operators to stay at their workplaces as a similar agency in New York has done.

"If we do need to shelter these critical employees in place, we've got the ability to do so."

IESO is responsible for ensuring a balance between supply and demand for electricity across the province. Because power cannot be stored, the IESO ensures generators produce enough power to meet peak demand while making sure they don't produce too much.

"You're seeing, obviously, commercial demand drop, some industrial demand drop," Gregg said. "But you're also seeing a shift in the demand curve as well, where normally you have people heading off to work and so residential demand would go down. But obviously with them staying home, you're seeing an increase in residential electricity use across the province."

Some utilities have indicated no cuts to peak rates for self-isolating customers, with Hydro One peak pricing remaining in place for now.

IESO also runs and settles the wholesale electricity markets. Market prices are set based on accepted offers to supply electricity, while programs supporting stable electricity pricing for industrial and commercial users can affect costs against forecast demand.

With the pandemic forcing many businesses to close and people to stay home, and provincial electricity relief for families and small businesses in place, typical power needs fallen about seven per cent at a time of year that would normally see demand soften anyway. It remains to be seen whether, and how much, power needs shift further amid stringent isolation measures and the ongoing economic impact of the outbreak.

Gregg said the operator is constantly modeling different possibilities.

"What we do normally is prepare for all of these sort of emergency scenarios, as reflected in the U.S. grid response coverage, and test and drill for these," he said. "What we're experiencing over the last few weeks is that those drills come in handy because they help us prepare for when the real-time situation actually happens."

Related News

• Electricity Forum News

• Utility Operations News

Duke Energy Clean Energy Strategy advances renewables, battery storage, grid modernization, and energy efficiency to cut carbon, retire coal, and target net-zero by 2050 across the Carolinas with robust IRPs and capital investments.

Key Points

Plan to expand renewables, storage, and grid upgrades to cut carbon and reach net-zero electricity by 2050.

✅ 56B investment in renewables, storage, and grid modernization

✅ Targets 50% carbon reduction by 2030 and net-zero by 2050

✅ Retires coal units; expands energy efficiency and IRPs

Duke Energy says that the company will continue advancing its ambitious clean energy goals without the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) by investing in renewables, battery storage, energy efficiency programs and grid projects that support U.S. electrification efforts.

Duke Energy, the nation's largest electric utility, unveils its new logo. (PRNewsFoto/Duke Energy) (PRNewsfoto/Duke Energy)

Duke Energy's $56 billion capital investment plan will deliver significant customer benefits and create jobs at a time when policymakers at all levels are looking for ways to rebuild the economy in 2020 and beyond. These investments will deliver cleaner energy for customers and communities while enhancing the energy grid to provide greater reliability and resiliency.

"Sustainability and the reduction of carbon emissions are closely tied to our region's success," said Lynn Good, Duke Energy Chair, President and CEO. "In our recent Climate Report, we shared a vision of a cleaner electricity future with an increasing focus on renewables and battery storage in addition to a diverse mix of zero-carbon nuclear, natural gas, hydro and energy efficiency programs.

"Achieving this clean energy vision will require all of us working together to develop a plan that is smart, equitable and ensures the reliability and affordability that will spur economic growth in the region. While we're disappointed that we're not able to move forward with ACP, we will continue exploring ways to help our customers and communities, particularly in eastern North Carolina where the need is great," said Good.

Already a clean-energy leader, Duke Energy has reduced its carbon emissions by 39% from 2005 and remains on track to cut its carbon emissions by at least 50% by 2030, as peers like Alliant's carbon-neutral plan demonstrate broader industry momentum toward decarbonization. The company also has an ambitious clean energy goal of reaching net-zero emissions from electricity generation by 2050. 

In September 2020, Duke Energy plans to file its Integrated Resource Plans (IRP) for the Carolinas after an extensive process of working with the state's leaders, policymakers, customers and other stakeholders. The IRPs will include multiple scenarios to support a path to a cleaner energy future in the Carolinas, reflecting key utility trends shaping resource planning.

Since 2010, Duke Energy has retired 51 coal units totaling more than 6,500 megawatts (MW) and plans to retire at least an additional 900 MW by the end of 2024. In 2019, the company proposed to shorten the book lives of another approximately 7,700 MW of coal capacity in North Carolina and Indiana.

Duke Energy will host an analyst call in early August 2020 to discuss second quarter 2020 financial results and other business and financial updates. The company will also host its inaugural Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investor day in October 2020.

Duke Energy

Duke Energy is transforming its customers' experience, modernizing the energy grid, generating cleaner energy and expanding natural gas infrastructure to create a smarter energy future for the people and communities it serves. The Electric Utilities and Infrastructure unit's regulated utilities serve 7.8 million retail electric customers in six states: North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky. The Gas Utilities and Infrastructure unit distributes natural gas to 1.6 million customers in five states: North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Ohio and Kentucky. The Duke Energy Renewables unit operates wind and solar generation facilities across the U.S., as well as energy storage and microgrid projects.

Duke Energy was named to Fortune's 2020 "World's Most Admired Companies" list and Forbes' "America's Best Employers" list. More information about the company is available at duke-energy.com. The Duke Energy News Center contains news releases, fact sheets, photos, videos and other materials. Duke Energy's illumination features stories about people, innovations, community topics and environmental issues. Follow Duke Energy on Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram and Facebook.

Forward-Looking Information

This document includes forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Forward-looking statements are based on management's beliefs and assumptions and can often be identified by terms and phrases that include "anticipate," "believe," "intend," "estimate," "expect," "continue," "should," "could," "may," "plan," "project," "predict," "will," "potential," "forecast," "target," "guidance," "outlook" or other similar terminology. Various factors may cause actual results to be materially different than the suggested outcomes within forward-looking statements; accordingly, there is no assurance that such results will be realized. These factors include, but are not limited to:

• The impact of the COVID-19 electricity demand shift on operations and revenues;
• State, federal and foreign legislative and regulatory initiatives, including costs of compliance with existing and future environmental requirements, including those related to climate change, as well as rulings that affect cost and investment recovery or have an impact on rate structures or market prices;
• The extent and timing of costs and liabilities to comply with federal and state laws, regulations and legal requirements related to coal ash remediation, including amounts for required closure of certain ash impoundments, are uncertain and difficult to estimate;
• The ability to recover eligible costs, including amounts associated with coal ash impoundment retirement obligations and costs related to significant weather events, and to earn an adequate return on investment through rate case proceedings and the regulatory process;
• The costs of decommissioning nuclear facilities could prove to be more extensive than amounts estimated and all costs may not be fully recoverable through the regulatory process;
• Costs and effects of legal and administrative proceedings, settlements, investigations and claims;
• Industrial, commercial and residential growth or decline in service territories or customer bases resulting from sustained downturns of the economy and the economic health of our service territories or variations in customer usage patterns, including energy efficiency and demand response efforts and use of alternative energy sources, such as self-generation and distributed generation technologies;
• Federal and state regulations, laws and other efforts designed to promote and expand the use of energy efficiency measures and distributed generation technologies, such as private solar and battery storage, in Duke Energy service territories could result in customers leaving the electric distribution system, excess generation resources as well as stranded costs;
• Advancements in technology;
• Additional competition in electric and natural gas markets and continued industry consolidation;
• The influence of weather and other natural phenomena on operations, including the economic, operational and other effects of severe storms, hurricanes, droughts, earthquakes and tornadoes, including extreme weather associated with climate change;
• The ability to successfully operate electric generating facilities and deliver electricity to customers including direct or indirect effects to the company resulting from an incident that affects the U.S. electric grid or generating resources;
• The ability to obtain the necessary permits and approvals and to complete necessary or desirable pipeline expansion or infrastructure projects in our natural gas business;
• Operational interruptions to our natural gas distribution and transmission activities;
• The availability of adequate interstate pipeline transportation capacity and natural gas supply;
• The impact on facilities and business from a terrorist attack, cybersecurity threats, data security breaches, operational accidents, information technology failures or other catastrophic events, such as fires, explosions, pandemic health events or other similar occurrences;
• The inherent risks associated with the operation of nuclear facilities, including environmental, health, safety, regulatory and financial risks, including the financial stability of third-party service providers;
• The timing and extent of changes in commodity prices and interest rates and the ability to recover such costs through the regulatory process, where appropriate, and their impact on liquidity positions and the value of underlying assets;
• The results of financing efforts, including the ability to obtain financing on favorable terms, which can be affected by various factors, including credit ratings, interest rate fluctuations, compliance with debt covenants and conditions and general market and economic conditions;
• Credit ratings of the Duke Energy Registrants may be different from what is expected;
• Declines in the market prices of equity and fixed-income securities and resultant cash funding requirements for defined benefit pension plans, other post-retirement benefit plans and nuclear decommissioning trust funds;
• Construction and development risks associated with the completion of the Duke Energy Registrants' capital investment projects, including risks related to financing, obtaining and complying with terms of permits, meeting construction budgets and schedules and satisfying operating and environmental performance standards, as well as the ability to recover costs from customers in a timely manner, or at all;
• Changes in rules for regional transmission organizations, including FERC debates on coal and nuclear subsidies and new and evolving capacity markets, and risks related to obligations created by the default of other participants;
• The ability to control operation and maintenance costs;
• The level of creditworthiness of counterparties to transactions;
• The ability to obtain adequate insurance at acceptable costs;
• Employee workforce factors, including the potential inability to attract and retain key personnel;
• The ability of subsidiaries to pay dividends or distributions to Duke Energy Corporation holding company (the Parent);
• The performance of projects undertaken by our nonregulated businesses and the success of efforts to invest in and develop new opportunities;
• The effect of accounting pronouncements issued periodically by accounting standard-setting bodies;
• The impact of U.S. tax legislation to our financial condition, results of operations or cash flows and our credit ratings;
• The impacts from potential impairments of goodwill or equity method investment carrying values; and
• The ability to implement our business strategy, including enhancing existing technology systems.
• Additional risks and uncertainties are identified and discussed in the Duke Energy Registrants' reports filed with the SEC and available at the SEC's website at sec.gov. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the events described in the forward-looking statements might not occur or might occur to a different extent or at a different time than described. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and the Duke Energy Registrants expressly disclaim an obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Related News

• Electricity Forum News

• Energy Policy News