U.S. looks to OPG for helium 3 from tritium

Clean Electricity Standard (CES) sets utility emissions targets, uses tradable credits, and advances decarbonization via technology-agnostic benchmarks, carbon capture, renewable portfolio standards, upstream methane accounting, and cap-and-trade alternatives in reconciliation policy.

Key Points

CES sets utility emissions targets using tradable credits and benchmarks to drive power-sector decarbonization.

✅ Annual clean energy targets phased to 2050

✅ Tradable credits for compliance across utilities

✅ Includes upstream methane and lifecycle emissions

The Biden Administration and Democratic members of Congress have supported including a clean electricity standard (CES) in the upcoming reconciliation bill. A CES is an alternative to pricing carbon dioxide through a tax or cap-and-trade program and focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions produced during electricity generation by establishing targets, while early assessments show mixed results so far. In principle, it is a technology-agnostic approach. In practice, however, it pushes particular technologies out of the market.

The details of the CES are still being developed, but recent legislation may provide insight into how the CES could operate. In May, Senator Tina Smith and Representative Ben Ray Luján introduced the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2019 (CESA), while Minnesota's 100% carbon-free mandate offers a state-level parallel, and in January 2020, the House Energy and Commerce Committee released a discussion draft of the Climate Leadership and Environmental Action for our Nation’s (CLEAN) Future Act. Both bills increase the clean energy target annually until 2050 in order to phase out emissions. Both bills also create a credit system where clean sources of electricity as determined by a benchmark, carbon dioxide emitted per kilowatt-hour, receive credits. These credits may be transferred, sold, and auctioned so utilities that fail to meet targets can procure credits from others, as large energy customers push to accelerate clean energy globally.

The bills’ benchmarks vary, and while the CLEAN Future Act allows natural gas-fired generators to receive partial credits, CESA does not. Under both bills, these generators would be expected to install carbon capture technology to continue meeting increasing targets for clean electricity generation. Both bills go beyond considering the emissions resulting from generation and include upstream emissions for natural gas-fired generators. Natural gas, a greenhouse gas, that is leaked upstream of a generator during transportation is to be included among its emissions. The CLEAN Future Act also calls for newly constructed hydropower generators to account for the emissions associated with the facility’s construction despite producing clean electricity. These additional provisions demonstrate not only the CES’s inability to fully address the issue of emissions but also the slippery slope of expanding the program to include other markets, echoing cost and reliability concerns as California exports its energy policies across the West.

A majority of states have adopted clean energy, electricity, or renewable portfolio standards, with some considering revamping electricity rates to clean the grid, leaving legislators with plenty of examples to consider. As they weigh their options, legislators should consider if they are effectively addressing the problem at hand, economy-wide emissions reductions, and at what cost, drawing on examples like New Mexico's 100% clean electricity bill to inform trade-offs.

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Manitoba Crypto Mining Electricity Pause signals a moratorium to manage grid strain, Manitoba Hydro capacity, infrastructure costs, and electricity rates, while policymakers evaluate sustainable energy demand, and planning for data centers and blockchain operations.

Key Points

A temporary halt on mining power hookups in Manitoba to assess grid impacts, protect rates, and plan sustainable use.

✅ Applies only to new service requests; existing sites unaffected

✅ Addresses grid strain, infrastructure costs, electricity rates

✅ Enables review with Manitoba Hydro for sustainable policy

The Manitoba government has temporarily suspended approving new electricity service connections for cryptocurrency mining operations, a step similar to BC Hydro's suspension seen in a neighboring province.

The Original Pause

The pause was initially imposed in November 2022 due to concerns that the rapid influx of cryptocurrency mining operations could place significant strain on the province's electrical grid. Manitoba Hydro, the province's primary electric utility, which has also faced legal scrutiny in the Sycamore Energy lawsuit, warned that unregulated expansion of the industry could necessitate billions of dollars in infrastructure investments, potentially driving up electricity rates for Manitobans.

The Extended Pause Offers Time for Review

The extension of the pause is meant to provide the government and Manitoba Hydro with more time to assess the situation thoroughly and develop a long-term solution addressing the challenges and opportunities presented by cryptocurrency mining, including evaluating emerging options such as modular nuclear reactors that other jurisdictions are studying. The government has stated its commitment to ensuring that the long-term impacts of the industry are understood and don't unintentionally harm other electricity customers.

What Does the Pause Mean?

The pause does not affect existing cryptocurrency operations but prevents the establishment of new ones.  It applies specifically to requests for electricity service that haven't yet resulted in agreements to construct infrastructure or supply electricity, and it comes amid regional policy shifts like Alberta ending its renewable moratorium that also affect grid planning.

Concerns About Energy Demands

Cryptocurrency mining involves running high-powered computers around the clock to solve complex mathematical problems. This process is incredibly energy-intensive. Globally, the energy consumption of cryptocurrency networks has drawn scrutiny for its environmental impact, with examples such as Iceland's mining power use illustrating the scale. In Manitoba, concern focuses on potentially straining the electrical grid and making it difficult for Manitoba Hydro to plan for future growth.

Other Jurisdictions Taking Similar Steps

Manitoba is not alone in its cautionary approach to cryptocurrency mining. Several other regions and utilities have implemented restrictions or are exploring limitations on how cryptocurrency miners can access electricity, including moves by Russia to ban mining amid power deficits. This reflects a growing awareness among policymakers about the potentially destabilizing impact this industry could have on power grids and electricity markets.

Finding a Sustainable Path Forward

Manitoba Hydro has stated that it is open to working with cryptocurrency operations but emphasizes the need to do so in a way that protects existing ratepayers and ensures a stable and reliable electricity system for all Manitobans, while recognizing market uncertainties highlighted by Alberta wind project challenges in a neighboring province. The government's extension of the pause signifies its intention to find a responsible path forward, balancing the potential for economic development with the necessity of safeguarding the province's power supply.

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Offshore Wind Cost Competitiveness is rising as larger turbines boost megawatt output, cut LCOE, and trim maintenance and installation time, enabling projects in New England to rival natural gas pricing while scaling reliably.

Key Points

It describes how larger offshore turbines lower LCOE and O&M, making U.S. projects price competitive with natural gas.

✅ Larger turbines boost MW output and reduce LCOE.

✅ Lower O&M and faster installation cut lifecycle costs.

✅ Competes with gas in New England bids, per BNEF.

Massive offshore wind turbines keep getting bigger, as projects like the biggest UK offshore wind farm come online, and that’s helping make the power cheaper — to the point where developers say new projects in U.S. waters can compete with natural gas.

The price “is going to be a real eye-opener,” said Bryan Martin, chairman of Deepwater Wind LLC, which won an auction in May to build a 400-megawatt wind farm southeast of Rhode Island.

Deepwater built the only U.S. offshore wind farm, a 30-megawatt project that was completed south of Block Island in 2016. The company’s bid was selected by Rhode Island the same day that Massachusetts picked Vineyard Wind to build an 800-megawatt wind farm in the same area, while international investors such as Japanese utilities in UK projects signal growing confidence.

#google#

Bigger turbines that make more electricity have cut the cost per megawatt by about half, a trend aided by higher-than-expected wind potential in many markets, said Tom Harries, a wind analyst at Bloomberg New Energy Finance. That also reduces maintenance expenses and installation time. All of this is helping offshore wind vie with conventional power plants.

“You could not build a thermal gas plant in New England for the price of the wind bids in Massachusetts and Rhode Island,” Martin said Friday at the U.S. Offshore Wind Conference in Boston. “It’s very cost-effective for consumers.”

The Massachusetts project could be about $100 to $120 a megawatt hour, according to a February estimate from Harries, though recent UK price spikes during low wind highlight volatility. The actual prices there and in Rhode Island weren’t disclosed.

For comparison, a new U.S. combine-cycle gas turbine ranges from $40 to $60 a megawatt-hour, and a new coal plant is $67 to $113, according to BNEF data.

A new power plant in land-constrained New England would probably be higher than that, and during winter peaks the region has seen record oil-fired generation in New England that underscores reliability concerns. More importantly, gas plants get a significant portion of their revenue from being able to guarantee that power is always available, something wind farms can’t do, said William Nelson, a New York-based analyst with BNEF. Looking only at the price at which offshore turbines can deliver electricity is a “narrow mindset,” he said.

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BC-Alberta Transmission Intertie enables clean hydro to balance wind and solar, expanding transmission capacity so Site C hydro can dispatch power, cut emissions, lower costs, and accelerate electrification across provincial grids under federal climate policy.

Key Points

A cross-provincial grid link using BC hydro to firm Alberta wind and solar, cutting emissions and costs.

✅ Balances variable renewables with dispatchable hydro from Site C.

✅ Enables power trade: peak exports, low-cost wind imports.

✅ Lowers decarbonization costs and supports electrification goals.

By Mark Jaccard

Lost in the news and noise of the federal government's newly announced $170-per-tonne carbon tax was a single, critical sentence in Canada's updated climate plan, one that signals a strategy that could serve as the cornerstone for a future free of greenhouse gas emissions.

"The government will work with provinces and territories to connect parts of Canada that have abundant clean hydroelectricity with parts that are currently more dependent on fossil fuels for electricity generation — including by advancing strategic intertie projects."

Why do we think this one sentence is so important? And what has it got to do with the controversial Site C project Site C electricity debate under construction in British Columbia?

The answer lies in the huge amount of electricity we'll need to generate in Canada to achieve our climate goals for 2030 and 2050. Even while we aggressively pursue energy efficiency, our electric cars, buses and perhaps trucks in Canada's net-zero race will need a huge amount of new electricity, as will our buildings and industries. 

Luckily, Canada is blessed with an electricity system that is the envy of the world — already over 80 per cent zero emission, the bulk being from flexible hydro-electricity, with a backbone of nuclear power largely in Ontario, a national electricity success and rapidly growing shares of cheap wind and solar. 

Provincial differences
Yet the story differs significantly from one province to another. While B.C.'s electricity is nearly emissions free, the opposite is true of its neighbour, Alberta, where more than 80 per cent still comes from fossil fuels. This, despite an impressive shift away from coal power in recent years.

Now imagine if B.C. and Alberta were one province.

This might sound like the start of a bad joke, or a horror movie to some, but it's the crux of new research by a trio of energy economists who put a fine point on the value of such co-operation.

The study, by Brett Dolter, Kent Fellows and Nic Rivers, takes a detailed look at the economic case for completing Site C, BC Hydro's controversial large hydro project under construction, and makes three key conclusions.

First, they argue Site C should likely not have been started in the first place. Only a narrow set of assumptions can now justify its total cost. But what's done is done, and absent a time machine, the decision to complete the dam rests on go-forward costs.

On that note, their second conclusion is no more optimistic. Considering the cost to complete the project, even accounting for avoiding termination costs should it be cancelled, they find the economics of completing Site C over-budget status to be weak. If the New York Times had a Site C needle in the style of the newspaper's election visual, it would be "leaning cancel" at this point.

In Alberta, more than 80 per cent of the electricity still comes from fossil fuels, despite an impressive shift away from coal power in recent years. (CBC)
But it is their third conclusion that stands out as worthy of attention. They argue there is a case for completing Site C if the following conditions are met:

B.C. and Alberta reduce their electricity sector emissions by more than 75 per cent (this really means Alberta, given B.C.'s already clean position); and

B.C. and Alberta expand their ability to move electricity between their respective provinces by building new transmission lines.

Let's deal with each of these in turn.

On Condition 1, we give an emphatic: YES! Reducing electricity emissions is an absolute must to meet climate pledges if Canada is to come even close to achieving its net-zero goals. As noted above, a clean electricity grid will be the cornerstone of a decarbonized economy as we generate a great deal more power to electrify everything from industrial processes to heating to transportation and more. 

Condition 2 is more challenging. Talk of increasing transmission connections across Canada, including Hydro-Québec's U.S. strategy has been ongoing for over 50 years, with little success to speak of. But this time might well be different. And the implications for a completed Site C, should the government go that route, are profound.

Wind and solar costs rapidly declining
Somewhat ironically, the case for Site C is made stronger by the rapidly declining costs of two of its apparent renewable competitors: wind and solar.

The cost of wind and solar generation has fallen by 70 per cent and 90 per cent, respectively, a dramatic decline in the past 10 years. No longer can these variable sources of power be derided as high cost; they are unequivocally the cheapest sources of raw energy in electricity systems today.

However, electricity system operators must deal with their "non-dispatchability," a seemingly complicated term that simply means they produce electricity only when the sun shines and the wind blows, which is not necessarily when electricity customers want their electricity delivered (dispatched) to them. And because of this characteristic, the value of dispatchable electricity sources, like a completed Site C, will grow as a complement to wind and solar. 

Thus, as Alberta's generation of cheap wind and solar grows, so too does the value of connecting it with the firm, dispatchable resources available in B.C.

Rather than displacing wind and solar, large hydro facilities with the ability to increase or decrease output on short notice can actually enable more investment in these renewable sources. Expanding the transmission connection, with Site C on one side of that line, becomes even more valuable.

Many in B.C. might read this and rightly ask themselves, why should we foot the bill for this costly project to help out Albertans? The answer is that it won't be charity — B.C. will get paid handsomely for the power it delivers in peak periods and will be able to import wind power at low prices from Alberta in other times. B.C. will benefit greatly from these gains of trade.

Turning to Alberta, why should Albertans support B.C. reaping these gains? The answer is two-fold.

First, Site C will actually enable more low-cost wind and solar to be built in Alberta due to hydro's ability to balance these non-dispatchable renewables. Jobs and economic opportunity will occur in Alberta from this renewable energy growth.

Second, while B.C. imports won't come cheap, they will be less costly than the decarbonization alternatives Alberta would need without B.C.'s flexible hydro, as the economists' study shows. This means lower overall costs to Alberta's power consumers.

A clear role for Ottawa
To be sure, there are challenges to increasing the connectedness of B.C. and Alberta's power systems, not least of which is BC Hydro being a regulated, government-owned monopoly while Alberta is a competitive market amongst private generators. Some significant accommodations in climate policy and grids will be needed to ensure both sides can compete and benefit from trade on an equal footing.

There is also the pesky matter of permitting and constructing thousands of kilometres of power lines. Getting linear energy infrastructure built in Canada has not exactly been our forte of late.

We are not naive to the significant challenges in such an approach, but it's not often that we see such a clear narrative for beneficial climate action that, when considered at the provincial level, is likely to be thwarted, but when considered more broadly can produce a big win.

It's the clearest example yet of a role for the federal government to bridge the gap, to facilitate the needed regulatory conversations, and, let's be frank, to bring money to the table to make the line happen. Neither provincial side is likely to do it on their own, nor, as history has shown, are they likely to do it together. 

For a government committed to reducing emissions, and with a justified emphasis on the electricity sector, the opportunity to expand the Alberta-B.C. transmission intertie, leveraging the flexibility of B.C.'s hydro with the abundance of wind and solar potential on the Prairies, offers a potential massive decarbonization win for Western Canada that is too good to ignore.

Mark Jaccard, a professor at Simon Fraser University, and Blake Shaffer, a professor at the University of Calgary

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Germany Energy Transition faces offshore wind expansion, grid bottlenecks, and North-South transmission delays, while Nord Stream 2 boosts Russian gas reliance and lignite coal persists amid a nuclear phaseout and rising re-dispatch costs.

Key Points

Germanys shift to renewables faces grid delays, boosting gas via Nord Stream 2 and extending lignite coal use.

✅ Offshore wind grows, but grid congestion curtails turbines.

✅ Nord Stream 2 expands Russian gas supply to German industry.

✅ Lignite coal persists, raising emissions amid nuclear exit.

On a blazing hot August day on Germany’s Baltic Sea coast, a few hundred tourists skip the beach to visit the “Fascination Offshore Wind” exhibition, held in the port of Mukran at the Arkona wind park. They stand facing the sea, gawking at white fiberglass blades, which at 250 feet are longer than the wingspan of a 747 aircraft. Those blades, they’re told, will soon be spinning atop 60 wind-turbine towers bolted to concrete pilings driven deep into the seabed 20 miles offshore. By early 2019, Arkona is expected to generate 385 megawatts, enough electricity to power 400,000 homes.

“We really would like to give the public an idea of what we are going to do here,” says Silke Steen, a manager at Arkona. “To let them say, ‘Wow, impressive!’”

Had the tourists turned their backs to the sea and faced inland, they would have taken in an equally monumental sight, though this one isn’t on the day’s agenda: giant steel pipes coated in gray concrete, stacked five high and laid out in long rows on a stretch of dirt. The port manager tells me that the rows of 40-foot-long, 4-foot-thick pipes are so big that they can be seen from outer space. They are destined for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, a colossus that, when completed next year, will extend nearly 800 miles from Russia to Germany, bringing twice the amount of gas that a current pipeline carries.

The two projects, whose cargo yards are within a few hundred feet of each other, provide a contrast between Germany’s dream of renewable energy and the political realities of cheap Russian gas. In 2010, Germany announced an ambitious goal of generating 80 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2050. In 2011, it doubled down on the commitment by deciding to shut down every last nuclear power plant in the country by 2022, as part of a broader coal and nuclear phaseout strategy embraced by policymakers. The German government has paid more than $600 billion to citizens and companies that generate solar and wind power. As a result, the generating capacity from renewable sources has soared: In 2017, a third of the nation’s electricity came from wind, solar, hydropower and biogas, up from 3.6 percent in 1990.

But Germany’s lofty vision has run into a gritty reality: Replacing fossil fuels and nuclear power in one of the largest industrial nations in the world is politically more difficult and expensive than planners thought. It has forced Germany to put the brakes on its ambitious renewables program, ramp up its investments in fossil fuels, amid a renewed nuclear option debate over climate strategy, and, to some extent, put its leadership role in the fight against climate change on hold.

The trouble lies with Germany’s electricity grid. Solar and wind power call for more complex and expensive distribution networks than conventional large power plants do. “What the Germans were good at was getting new technology into the market, like wind and solar power,” said Arne Jungjohann, author of Energy Democracy: Germany’s ENERGIEWENDE to Renewables. To achieve its goals, “Germany needs to overhaul its whole grid.”

The North-South Conundrum

The boom in wind power has created an unanticipated mismatch between supply and demand. Big wind turbines, especially offshore plants such as Arkona, produce powerful, concentrated gusts of energy. That’s good when the factory that needs that energy is nearby and the wind kicks up during working hours. It’s another matter when factories are hundreds of miles away. In Germany, wind farms tend to be located in the blustery north. Many of the nation’s big factories lie in the south, which also happens to be where most of the country’s nuclear plants are being mothballed.

Getting that power from north to south is problematic. On windy days, northern wind farms generate too much energy for the grid to handle. Power lines get overloaded. To cope, grid operators ask wind farms to disconnect their turbines from the grid—those elegant blades that tourists so admired sit idle. To ensure a supply of power, operators employ backup generators at great expense. These so-called re-dispatching costs ran to 1.4 billion euros ($1.6 billion) last year.

The solution is to build more power transmission lines to take the excess wind from northern wind farms to southern factories. A grid expansion project is underway to do exactly that. Nearly 5,000 miles of new transmission lines, at a cost of billions of euros, will be paid for by utility customers. So far, less than a fifth of the lines have been built.

The grid expansion is “catastrophically behind schedule,” Energy Minister Peter Altmaier told the Handelsblatt business newspaper in August. Among the setbacks: citizens living along the route of four high-voltage power lines have demanded the cables be buried underground, which has added to the time and expense. The lines won’t be finished before 2025—three years after Germany’s nuclear shutdown is due to be completed.

With this backlog, the government has put the brakes on wind power, reducing the number of new contracts for farms and curtailing the amount it pays for renewable energy. “In the past, we have focused too much on the mere expansion of renewable energy capacity,” Joachim Pfeiffer, a spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union, wrote to Newsweek. “We failed to synchronize this expansion of generation with grid expansion.”

Advocates of renewables are up in arms, accusing the government of suffocating their industry and making planning impossible. Thousands of people lost their jobs in the wind industry, according to Wolfram Axthelm, CEO of the German Wind Energy Association. “For 2019 and 2020, we see a highly problematic situation for the industry,” he wrote in an email.

Fueling the Gap

Nord Stream 2, by contrast, is proceeding according to schedule. A beige and black barge, Castoro 10, hauls dozens of lengths of giant pipe off Germany’s Baltic Sea coast, where a welding machine connects them for lowering onto the seabed. The $11 billion project is funded by Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom and five European investors, at no direct cost to the German taxpayer. It is slated to cross the territorial waters of five countries—Germany, Russia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. All but Denmark have approved the route. “We have good reason to believe that after four governments said yes, that Denmark will also approve the pipeline,” says Nord Stream 2 spokesman Jens Mueller.

Construction of the pipeline off Finland began in September, and the gas is expected to start flowing in late 2019, giving Russia leverage to increase its share of the European gas market. It already provides a third of the gas used in the EU and will likely provide more after the Netherlands stops its gas production in 2030. President Donald Trump has called the pipeline “a very bad thing for NATO” and said that “Germany is totally controlled by Russia.” U.S. senators have threatened sanctions against companies involved in the project. Ukraine and Poland are concerned the new pipeline will make older pipelines in their territories irrelevant.

German leaders are also wary of dependence on Russia but are under considerable pressure to deliver energy to industry. Indeed, among the pipeline’s investors are German companies that want to run their factories, like BASF’s Wintershall subsidiary and Uniper, the German utility. “It’s not that Germany is naive,” says Kirsten Westphal, an energy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. It’s just pragmatic. “Economically, the judgment is that yes, this gas will be needed, we have an import gap to fill.”

The electricity transmission problem has also opened an opportunity for lignite coal, as coal generation in Germany remains significant, the most carbon-intensive fuel available and the source for nearly a quarter of Germany’s power. Mining companies are expanding their operations in coal-rich regions to strip out the fuel while it is still relevant. In the village of Pödelwitz, 155 miles south of Berlin, most houses feature a white sign with the logo of Mibrag, the German mining giant, which has paid nearly all the 130 residents to relocate. The company plans to level the village and scrape lignite that lies below the soil.

A resurgence in coal helped raise carbon emissions in 2015 and 2016 (2017 saw a slight decline), maintaining Germany’s place as Europe’s largest carbon emitter. Chancellor Angela Merkel has scrapped her pledge to slash carbon emissions to 40 percent of 1990 levels by the year 2020. Several members have threatened to resign from her policy commission on coal if the government allows utility company RWE to mine for lignite in Hambach Forest.

Only a few years ago, during the Paris climate talks, Germany led the EU in pushing for ambitious plans to curb emissions. Now, it seems to be having second thoughts. Recently, the European Union’s climate chief, Miguel Arias Cañete, suggested EU nations step up their commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 45 percent of 1990 levels instead of 40 percent by 2030. “I think we should first stick to the goals we have already set ourselves,” Merkel replied, even as a possible nuclear phaseout U-turn is debated, “I don’t think permanently setting ourselves new goals makes any sense.”

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SM-1A Nuclear Plant Decommissioning details the US Army Corps of Engineers' removal of the Fort Greely reactor, Cold War facility dismantling, environmental monitoring, remote-site power history, and timeline to 2026 under a deactivated nuclear program.

Key Points

Army Corps plan to dismantle Fort Greely's SM-1A reactor and complete decommissioning of remaining systems by 2026.

✅ Built for remote Arctic radar support during the Cold War

✅ High costs beat diesel; program later deemed impractical

✅ Reactor parts removed; residuals monitored; removal by 2026

The US Army Corps of Engineers has begun decommissioning Alaska’s only nuclear power plant, SM-1A, which is located at Fort Greely, even as new US reactors continue to take shape nationwide. The $17m plant closed in 1972 after ten years of sporadic operation. It was out of commission from 1967 to 1969 for extensive repairs. Much of has already been dismantled and sent for disposal, and the rest, which is encased in concrete, is now to be removed.

The plant was built as part of an experimental programme to determine whether nuclear facilities, akin to next-generation nuclear concepts, could be built and operated at remote sites more cheaply than diesel-fuelled plants.

"The main approach was to reduce significant fuel-transportation costs by having a nuclear reactor that could operate for long terms, a concept echoed in the NuScale SMR safety evaluation process, with just one nuclear core," Brian Hearty said. Hearty manages the Army Corps of Engineers’ Deactivated Nuclear Power Plant Program.

#google#

He said the Army built SM-1A in 1962 hoping to provide power reliably at remote Arctic radar sites, where in similarly isolated regions today new US coal plants may still be considered, intended to detect incoming missiles from the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. He added that the programme worked but not as well as Pentagon officials had hoped. While SM-1A could be built and operated in a cold and remote location, its upfront costs were much higher than anticipated, and it costs more to maintain than a diesel power plant. Moreover, the programme became irrelevant because of advances in Soviet rocket science and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Hearty said the reactor was partially dismantled soon after it was shut down. “All of the fuel in the reactor core was removed and shipped back to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for them to either reprocess or dispose of,” he noted. “The highly activated control and absorber rods were also removed and shipped back to the AEC.”

The SM-1A plant produced 1.8MWe and 20MWt, including steam, which was used to heat the post. Because that part of the system was still needed, Army officials removed most of the nuclear-power system and linked the heat and steam components to a diesel-fired boiler. However, several parts of the nuclear system remained, including the reactor pressure vessel and reactor coolant pumps. “Those were either kept in place, or they were cut off and laid down in the tall vapour-containment building there,” Hearty said. “And then they were grouted and concreted in place.” The Corps of Engineers wants to remove all that remains of the plant, but it is as yet unclear whether that will be feasible.

Meanwhile, monitoring for radioactivity around the facility shows that it remains at acceptable levels. “It would be safe to say there’s no threat to human health in the environment,” said Brenda Barber, project manager for the decommissioning. Work is still in its early stages and is due to be completed in 2026 at the earliest. Barber said the Corps awarded the $4.6m contract in December to a Virginia-based firm to develop a long-range plan for the project, similar in scope to large reactor refurbishment efforts elsewhere. Among other things, this will help officials determine how much of the SM-1A will remain after it’s decommissioned. “There will still be buildings there,” she said. “There will still be components of some of the old structure there that may likely remain.”

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