GermanyÂ’s renewable myth

By Financial Post


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An aggressive policy of generously subsidizing and effectively mandating “renewable” electricity generation in Germany has led to a doubling of the renewable contribution to electricity generation in recent years.

This preference came primarily in the form of a subsidy policy based on feed-in tariffs, established in 1991 by the Electricity Feed-in Law, requiring utilities to accept and remunerate the feed-in of “green” electricity at 90 percent of the retail rate of electricity, considerably exceeding the cost of conventional electricity generation.

A subsequent law passed in 2000 guaranteed continued support for 20 years. This requires utilities to accept the delivery of power from independent producers of renewable electricity into their own grid, paying technology-specific feed-in tariffs far above their production cost of ¢2.9-10.2 per kilowatt hour (kWh).

With a feed-in tariff of ¢59 per kWh in 2009, solar electricity generated from photovoltaics (PV) is guaranteed by far the largest financial support among all renewable energy technologies.

Currently, the feed-in tariff for PV is more than eight times higher than the wholesale electricity price at the power exchange and more than four times the feed-in tariff paid for electricity produced by on-shore wind turbines.

Even on-shore wind, widely regarded as a mature technology, requires feed-in tariffs that exceed the per-kWh cost of conventional electricity by up to 300% to remain competitive.

By 2008 this had led to Germany having the second-largest installed wind capacity in the world, behind the United States, and largest installed PV capacity in the world, ahead of Spain. This explains the claims that GermanyÂ’s feed-in tariff is a great success.

Installed capacity is not the same as production or contribution, however, and by 2008 the estimated share of wind power in GermanyÂ’s electricity production was 6.3%, followed by biomass-based electricity generation (3.6%) and water power (3.1%). The amount of electricity produced through solar photovoltaics was a negligible 0.6% despite being the most subsidized renewable energy, with a net cost of about $12.4 billion for 2008.

The total net cost of subsidizing electricity production by PV modules is estimated to reach $73.2 billion for those modules installed between 2000 and 2010. While the promotion rules for wind power are more subtle than those for PV, we estimate that the wind power subsidies may total US $28.1 billion for wind converters installed between 2000 and 2010.

Consumers ultimately bear the cost of renewable energy promotion. In 2008, the price mark-up due to the subsidization of green electricity was about ¢2.2, meaning the subsidy accounts for about 7.5% of average household electricity prices.

Given the net cost of ¢41.82/kWh for PV modules installed in 2008, and assuming that PV displaces conventional electricity generated from a mixture of gas and hard coal, abatement costs are as high as $1,050 per ton.

Using the same assumptions and a net cost for wind of ¢3.10/kWh, the abatement cost is approximately $80. While cheaper than PV, this cost is still nearly double the ceiling of the cost of a per-ton permit under Europe’s cap-and-trade scheme. Renewable energies are thus among the most expensive GHG reduction measures.

There are much cheaper ways to reduce carbon dioxide emissions than subsidizing renewable energies. CO2 abatement costs of PV are estimated to be as high as $1,050 per ton, while those of wind power are estimated at $80 per ton. By contrast, the current price of emissions certificates on the European emissions trading scheme is only 13.4 (Euro) per ton. Hence, the cost from emission reductions as determined by the market is about 53 times cheaper than employing PV and 4 times cheaper than using wind power.

Moreover, the prevailing coexistence of the EEG and emissions trading under the European Trading Scheme (ETS) means that the increased use of renewable energy technologies generally attains no additional emission reductions beyond those achieved by ETS alone. In fact, since the establishment of the ETS in 2005, the EEGÂ’s net climate effect has been equal to zero.

While employment projections in the renewable sector convey seemingly impressive prospects for gross job growth, they typically obscure the broader implications for economic welfare by omitting any accounting of offsetting impacts. These impacts include, but are not limited to, job losses from crowding out of cheaper forms of conventional energy generation, indirect impacts on upstream industries, additional job losses from the drain on economic activity precipitated by higher electricity prices, private consumersÂ’ overall loss of purchasing power due to higher electricity prices, and diverting funds from other, possibly more beneficial investment.

Proponents of renewable energies often regard the requirement for more workers to produce a given amount of energy as a benefit, failing to recognize that this lowers the output potential of the economy and is hence counterproductive to net job creation. Significant research shows that initial employment benefits from renewable policies soon turn negative as additional costs are incurred. Trade-and other assumptions in those studies claiming positive employment turn out to be unsupportable.

In the end, GermanyÂ’s PV promotion has become a subsidization regime that, on a per-worker basis, has reached a level that far exceeds average wages, with per-worker subsidies as high as $240,000.

It is most likely that whatever jobs are created by renewable energy promotion would vanish as soon as government support is terminated, leaving only GermanyÂ’s export sector to benefit from the possible continuation of renewables support in other countries such as the United States.

Due to their backup energy requirements, it turns out that any increased energy security possibly afforded by installing large PV and wind capacity is undermined by reliance on fuel sources — principally gas — that must be imported to meet domestic demand. That much of this gas is imported from unreliable suppliers calls energy security claims further into question.

Claims about technological innovation benefits of GermanyÂ’s first-actor status are unsupportable. In fact, the regime appears to be counterproductive in that respect, stifling innovation by encouraging producers to lock into existing technologies.

In conclusion, government policy has failed to harness the market incentives needed to ensure a viable and cost-effective introduction of renewable energies into GermanyÂ’s energy portfolio. To the contrary, GermanyÂ’s principal mechanism of supporting renewable technologies through feed-in tariffs imposes high costs without any of the alleged positive impacts on emissions reductions, employment, energy security, or technological innovation. Policymakers should thus scrutinize GermanyÂ’s experience, including in the U.S., where there are currently nearly 400 federal and state programs in place that provide financial incentives for renewable energy.

Although Germany’s promotion of renewable energies is commonly portrayed in the media as setting a “shining example in providing a harvest for the world” (The Guardian, 2007), we would instead regard the country’s experience as a cautionary tale of massively expensive environmental and energy policy that is devoid of economic and environmental benefits.

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Trump's Vision of U.S. Energy Dominance Faces Real-World Constraints

U.S. Energy Dominance envisions deregulation, oil and gas growth, LNG exports, pipelines, and geopolitical leverage, while facing OPEC pricing power, infrastructure bottlenecks, climate policy pressures, and accelerating renewables in global markets.

 

Key Points

U.S. policy to grow fossil fuel output and exports via deregulation, bolstering energy security, geopolitical influence.

✅ Deregulation to expand drilling, pipelines, and export capacity

✅ Exposed to OPEC pricing, global shocks, and cost competitiveness

✅ Faces infrastructure, ESG finance, and renewables transition risks

 

Former President Donald Trump has consistently advocated for “energy dominance” as a cornerstone of his energy policy. In his vision, the United States would leverage its abundant natural resources to achieve energy self-sufficiency, flood global markets with cheap energy, and undercut competitors like Russia and OPEC nations. However, while the rhetoric resonates with many Americans, particularly those in energy-producing states, the pursuit of energy dominance faces significant real-world challenges that could limit its feasibility and impact.

The Energy Dominance Vision

Trump’s energy dominance strategy revolves around deregulation, increased domestic production of oil and gas, and the rollback of climate-oriented restrictions. During his presidency, he emphasized opening federal lands to drilling, accelerating the approval of pipelines, and, through an executive order, boosting uranium and nuclear energy initiatives, as well as withdrawing from international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord. The goal was not only to meet domestic energy demands but also to establish the U.S. as a major exporter of fossil fuels, thereby reducing reliance on foreign energy sources.

This approach gained traction during Trump’s first term, with the U.S. achieving record levels of oil and natural gas production. Energy exports surged, making the U.S. a net energy exporter for the first time in decades. Yet, critics argue that this policy prioritizes short-term economic gains over long-term sustainability, while supporters believe it provides a roadmap for energy security and geopolitical leverage.

Market Realities

The energy market is complex, influenced by factors beyond the control of any single administration, with energy crisis impacts often cascading across sectors. While the U.S. has significant reserves of oil and gas, the global market sets prices. Even if the U.S. ramps up production, it cannot insulate itself entirely from price shocks caused by geopolitical instability, OPEC production cuts, or natural disasters.

For instance, despite record production in the late 2010s, American consumers faced volatile gasoline prices during an energy crisis driven by $5 gas and external factors like tensions in the Middle East and fluctuating global demand. Additionally, the cost of production in the U.S. is often higher than in countries with more easily accessible reserves, such as Saudi Arabia. This limits the competitive advantage of U.S. energy producers in global markets.

Infrastructure and Environmental Concerns

A major obstacle to achieving energy dominance is infrastructure. Expanding oil and gas production requires investments in pipelines, export terminals, and refineries. However, these projects often face delays due to regulatory hurdles, legal challenges, and public opposition. High-profile pipeline projects like Keystone XL and Dakota Access have become battlegrounds between industry proponents and environmental activists, and cross-border dynamics such as support for Canadian energy projects amid tariff threats further complicate permitting, highlighting the difficulty of reconciling energy expansion with environmental and community concerns.

Moreover, the transition to cleaner energy sources is accelerating globally, with many countries committing to net-zero emissions targets. This trend could reduce the demand for fossil fuels in the long run, potentially leaving U.S. producers with stranded assets if global markets shift more quickly than anticipated.

Geopolitical Implications

Trump’s energy dominance strategy also hinges on the belief that U.S. energy exports can weaken adversaries like Russia and Iran. While increased American exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe have reduced the continent’s reliance on Russian gas, achieving total energy independence for allies is a monumental task. Europe’s energy infrastructure, designed for pipeline imports from Russia, cannot be overhauled overnight to accommodate LNG shipments.

Additionally, the influence of major producers like Saudi Arabia and the OPEC+ alliance remains significant, even as shifts in U.S. policy affect neighbors; in Canada, some viewed Biden as better for the energy sector than alternatives. These countries can adjust production levels to influence prices, sometimes undercutting U.S. efforts to expand its market share.

The Renewable Energy Challenge

The growing focus on renewable energy adds another layer of complexity. Solar, wind, and battery storage technologies are becoming increasingly cost-competitive with fossil fuels. Many U.S. states and private companies are investing heavily in clean energy to align with consumer preferences and global trends, amid arguments that stepping away from fossil fuels can bolster national security. This shift could dampen the domestic demand for oil and gas, challenging the long-term viability of Trump’s energy dominance agenda.

Moreover, international pressure to address climate change could limit the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure. Financial institutions and investors are increasingly reluctant to fund projects perceived as environmentally harmful, further constraining growth in the sector.

While Trump’s call for U.S. energy dominance taps into a desire for economic growth and energy security, it faces numerous challenges. Global market dynamics, infrastructure bottlenecks, environmental concerns, and the transition to renewable energy all pose significant barriers to achieving the ambitious vision.

For the U.S. to navigate these challenges effectively, a balanced approach that incorporates both traditional energy sources and investments in clean energy is likely needed. Striking this balance will require careful policymaking that considers not just immediate economic gains but also long-term sustainability and global competitiveness.

 

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Why Is Central Asia Suffering From Severe Electricity Shortages?

Central Asia power shortages strain grids across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, driven by drought-hit hydropower, aging coal and gas plants, rising demand, cryptomining loads, and winter peak consumption risks.

 

Key Points

Regionwide blackouts from drought, aging plants and grids, rising demand, and winter peaks stressing Central Asia.

✅ Drought slashes hydropower in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

✅ Aging coal and gas TPPs and weak grids cause frequent outages

✅ Cryptomining loads and winter heating spike demand and stress supply

 

Central Asians from western Kazakhstan to southern Tajikistan are suffering from power and energy shortages that have caused hardship and emergency situations affecting the lives of millions of people.

On October 14, several units at three power plants in northeastern Kazakhstan were shut down in an emergency that resulted in a loss of more than 1,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity.

It serves as an example of the kind of power failures that plague the region 30 years after the Central Asian countries gained independence and despite hundreds of millions of dollars being invested in energy infrastructure and power grids, and echo risks seen in other advanced markets such as Japan's near-blackouts during recent cold snaps.

Some of the reasons for these problems are clear, but with all the money these countries have allocated to their energy sectors and financial help they have received from international financial institutions, it is curious the situation is already so desperate with winter officially still weeks away.


The Current Problems
Three power plants were affected in the October 14 shutdowns of units: Ekibastuz-1, Ekibastuz-2, and the Aksu power plant.

Ekibastuz-1 is the largest power plant in Kazakhstan, capable of generating some 4,000 MW, roughly 13 percent of Kazakhstan’s total power output.

The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) explained the problems resulted partially from malfunctions and repair work, but also from overuse of the system that the government would later say was due to cryptominers, a large number of whom have moved to Kazakhstan recently from China after Beijing banned the mining needed by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, amid its own China's power cuts across several provinces in 2021.

But between November 8 and 9, rolling blackouts were reported in the East Kazakhstan, North Kazakhstan, and Kyzylorda provinces, as well as the area around Almaty, Kazakhstan’s biggest city, and Shymkent, its third largest city.

People in Uzbekistan say they, too, are facing blackouts that the Energy Ministry described as “short-term outages,” even as authorities have looked to export electricity to Afghanistan to support regional demand, though it has been clear for several weeks that the country will have problems with natural gas supplies this winter.


Power lines in Uzbekistan
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov continues to say there won't be any power rationing in Kyrgyzstan this winter, but at the end of September the National Energy Holding Company ordered “restrictions on the lighting of secondary streets, advertisements, and facades of shops, cafes, and other nonresidential customers.”

Many parts of Tajikistan are already experiencing intermittent supplies of electricity.

Even in Turkmenistan, a country with the fourth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world, there were reports of problems with electricity and heating in the capital, Ashgabat.


What Is Going On?
The causes of some of these problems are easy to see.

The population of the region has grown significantly, with the population of Central Asia when the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991 being some 50 million and today about 75 million.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are mountainous countries that have long been touted for their hydropower potential and some 90 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s domestically produced electricity and 98 percent of Tajikistan’s come from hydropower.

But a severe drought that struck Central Asia this year has resulted in less hydropower and, in general, less energy for the region, similar to constraints seen in Europe's reduced hydro and nuclear output this year.

Tajik authorities have not reported how low the water in the country’s key reservoirs is, but Kyrgyzstan has reported the water level in the reservoir at its Toktogul hydropower plant (HPP) is 11.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), the lowest level in years and far less than the 14.7 bcm of water it had in November 2020.

The Toktogul HPP, with an installed capacity of 1,200 MW, provides some 40 percent of the country's domestically produced electricity, but operating the HPP this winter to generate desperately needed energy brings the risk of leaving water levels at the reservoir critically low next spring and summer when the water is also needed for agricultural purposes.

This year’s drought is something Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will have to take into consideration as they plan how to provide power for their growing populations in the future. Hydropower is a desirable option but may be less reliable with the onset of climate change, prompting interest in alternatives such as Ukraine's wind power to diversify generation.

Uzbekistan is also feeling the effects of this year’s drought, and, like the South Caucasus where Georgia's electricity imports have increased, supply shortfalls are testing grids.

According to the International Energy Agency, HPPs account for some 12 percent of Uzbekistan’s generating capacity.

Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry attributed low water levels at HPPs that have caused a 23 percent decrease in hydropower generation this year.


A reservoir in Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the most populous Central Asian countries, and both depend on thermal power plants (TPP) for generating most of their electricity.

Most of the TPPs in Kazakhstan are coal-fired, while most of the TPPs in Uzbekistan are gas-fired.

Kazakhstan has 68 power plants, 80 percent of which are coal-fired TPPs, and most are in the northern part of the country where the largest deposits of coal are located. Kazakhstan has the world's 10th largest reserves of coal.

About 88 percent of Uzbekistan’s electricity comes from TTPs, most of which use natural gas.

Uzbekistan’s proven reserves are some 800 billion cubic meters, but gas production in Uzbekistan has been decreasing.

In December 2020, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev ordered a halt to the country’s gas exports and instructed that gas to be redirected for domestic use. Mirziyoev has already given similar instructions for this coming winter.


How Did It Come To This?
The biggest problem with the energy infrastructure in Central Asia is that it is generally very old. Nearly all of its power plants date back to the Soviet era -- and some well back into the Soviet period.

The use of power plants and transmission lines that some describe as “obsolete” and a few call “decrepit” has unfortunately been a necessity in Central Asia, even as regional players pursue new interconnections like Iran's plan to transmit electricity to Europe as a power hub.

Reporting on Kazakhstan in September 2016, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) said, “70 percent of the power generation infrastructure is in need of rehabilitation.”

The Ekibastuz-1 TPP is relatively new by the power-plant standards of Central Asia. The first unit of the eight units of the TPP was commissioned in 1980.

The first unit at the AKSU TPP was commissioned in 1968, and the first unit of the gas- and fuel-fired TPP in southern Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Province was commissioned in 1967.

 

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EV Sales Still Behind Gas Cars

U.S. EV and Hybrid Sales 2024 show slower adoption versus gas-powered cars, as charging infrastructure gaps, range anxiety, higher upfront costs, and affordability concerns persist despite incentives, battery tech advances, and expanding fast-charging networks.

 

Key Points

They represent 10-15% of U.S. car sales, lagging gas models due to costs, charging gaps, range anxiety, and access.

✅ 10-15% of U.S. auto sales; gas cars dominate

✅ Barriers: upfront cost, limited charging, range anxiety

✅ Incentives, battery tech, and networks may boost adoption

 

Sales of hybrid and electric vehicles (EVs) in the U.S. are continuing to trail behind traditional gas-powered vehicles in 2024, despite significant advancements in automotive technology and growing public awareness of environmental concerns. While the electric vehicle market has seen steady growth and recent sales momentum over the past few years, the gap between EVs and gasoline-powered cars remains wide.

In 2024, hybrid and electric vehicles are projected to account for roughly 10-15% of total car sales in the U.S., a figure that, though significant, still lags far behind the sales of gas-powered vehicles and follows a Q1 2024 EV market share dip in the U.S., according to recent data. Analysts point to several factors contributing to this slower adoption rate, including higher upfront costs, limited charging infrastructure, and consumer concerns over range anxiety. Additionally, while EVs and hybrids offer lower lifetime operating costs, the initial price difference remains a hurdle for many prospective buyers.

One of the key challenges for EV sales continues to be the perception of cost, even as analyses show they can be better for the planet and often your budget over time. While federal and state incentives have made EVs more affordable, especially for lower-income buyers, the price tag for many electric models remains steep, particularly for higher-end vehicles. Even with government rebates, EVs can still be priced higher than their gasoline counterparts, making them less accessible for middle-class consumers. Many potential buyers are also hesitant to make the switch, unsure if the long-term savings will outweigh the initial investment.

Another critical factor is the limited charging infrastructure in many parts of the country. Though major cities have seen significant improvements in charging stations, rural areas and smaller towns still lack the necessary infrastructure to support widespread EV use. This uneven distribution of charging stations leads to concerns about being stranded in areas without access to fast-charging options. While automakers are working on expanding charging networks, the pace of this development is slow, and EVs won't go mainstream until key problems are fixed according to industry leaders.

Range anxiety is also a continuing issue, despite improvements in battery technology. Though newer electric vehicles can go further on a single charge than ever before, the range of many EVs still doesn't meet the expectations of some drivers, particularly those who regularly take long road trips or live in rural areas. The longer charging times and the necessity of planning routes around charging stations add to the hesitation, especially when gasoline-powered vehicles provide greater convenience and flexibility.

The shift toward EVs is further hindered by the continued dominance of gas-powered cars in the market. Gasoline vehicles benefit from decades of development, an extensive fueling infrastructure, and familiarity with the technology. For many consumers, the convenience, affordability, and ease of use of gas-powered vehicles still outweigh the benefits of switching to an electric alternative. Additionally, with fluctuating fuel prices, many drivers continue to find gas-powered cars relatively cost-effective in terms of daily commuting, especially when compared to the current costs of EV ownership.

Despite these challenges, there is hope for a future shift. The federal government’s push for stricter emissions regulations and tax incentives continues to fuel growth in the electric vehicle market. As automakers ramp up production and more affordable options become available, EV sales are expected to increase in the coming years. Companies like Tesla, Ford, whose hybrids are getting a boost, and General Motors are leading the charge, while new manufacturers like Rivian and Lucid Motors are offering alternatives to traditional gasoline vehicles.

Furthermore, the development of new technologies, such as solid-state batteries and faster charging systems, could help alleviate some of the current drawbacks of electric vehicles. If these advancements reach mass-market production in the next few years, they could help make EVs a more attractive and practical option for consumers, aligning with within-a-decade adoption forecasts from some industry observers.

In conclusion, while hybrid and electric vehicles are growing in popularity, gas-powered vehicles continue to dominate the U.S. car market in 2024. Challenges such as high upfront costs, limited charging infrastructure, and concerns about range persist, making it difficult for many consumers to make the switch to electric even as they ask if it's time to buy an EV in 2024. However, with continued investment in technology and infrastructure, the gap between EVs and gas-powered vehicles could narrow in the years to come.

 

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Russia and Ukraine Accuse Each Other of Violating Energy Ceasefire

Russia-Ukraine Energy Ceasefire Violations escalate as U.S.-brokered truce frays, with drone strikes, shelling, and grid attacks disrupting gas supply and power infrastructure across Kursk, Luhansk, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk, prompting sanctions calls.

 

Key Points

Alleged breaches of a U.S.-brokered truce, with both sides striking power grids, gas lines, and critical energy nodes.

✅ Drone and artillery attacks reported on power and gas assets

✅ Both sides accuse each other of breaking truce terms

✅ U.S. mediation faces verification and compliance hurdles

 

Russia and Ukraine have traded fresh accusations regarding violations of a fragile energy ceasefire, brokered by the United States, which both sides had agreed to last month. These new allegations highlight the ongoing tensions between the two nations and the challenges involved in implementing a truce amid global energy instability in such a complex and volatile conflict.

The U.S.-brokered ceasefire had initially aimed to reduce the intensity of the fighting, specifically in the energy sector, where both sides had previously targeted each other’s infrastructure. Despite this agreement, the accusations on Wednesday suggest that both Russia and Ukraine have continued their attacks on each other's energy facilities, a crucial aspect of the ceasefire’s terms.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence claimed that Ukrainian forces had launched drone and shelling attacks in the western Kursk region, cutting power to over 1,500 homes. This attack allegedly targeted key infrastructure, leaving several localities without electricity. Additionally, in the Russian-controlled part of Ukraine's Luhansk region, a Ukrainian drone strike hit a gas distribution station, severely disrupting the gas supply for over 11,000 customers in the area around Svatove.

In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russia of breaking the ceasefire. He claimed that Russian drone strikes had targeted an energy substation in Ukraine’s Sumy region, while artillery fire had damaged a power line in the Dnipropetrovsk region, leaving nearly 4,000 consumers without power even as Ukraine increasingly leans on electricity imports to stabilize the grid. Ukraine's accusations painted a picture of continued Russian aggression against critical energy infrastructure, a strategy that had previously been a hallmark of Russia’s broader military operations in the war.

The U.S. had brokered the energy truce as a potential stepping stone toward a more comprehensive ceasefire agreement. However, the repeated violations raise questions about the truce’s viability and the broader prospects for peace between Russia and Ukraine. Both sides are accusing each other of undermining the agreement, which had already been delicate due to previous suspicions and mistrust. In particular, the U.S. administration, led by President Donald Trump, has expressed impatience with the slow progress in moving toward a lasting peace, amid debates over U.S. national energy security priorities.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defended Russia’s stance, emphasizing that President Vladimir Putin had shown a commitment to peace by agreeing to the energy truce, despite what he termed as daily Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure. He reiterated that Russia would continue to cooperate with the U.S., even though the Ukrainian strikes were ongoing. This perspective suggests that Russia remains committed to the truce but views Ukraine’s actions as violations that could potentially derail efforts to reach a more comprehensive ceasefire.

On the other hand, President Zelensky argued that Russia was not adhering to the terms of the ceasefire. He urged the U.S. to take a stronger stance against Russia, including increasing sanctions on Moscow as punishment for its violations. Zelensky’s call for heightened sanctions is a continuation of his efforts to pressure international actors, particularly the U.S. and European countries, to provide greater energy security support for Ukraine’s struggle and to hold Russia accountable for its actions.

The ceasefire’s fragility is also reflected in the differing views between Ukraine and Russia on what constitutes a successful resolution. Ukraine had proposed a full 30-day ceasefire, but President Putin declined, raising concerns about monitoring and verifying compliance with the terms. This disagreement suggests that both sides are not entirely aligned on what a peaceful resolution should look like and how it can be realistically achieved.

The situation is complicated by the broader context of the war, which has now dragged on for over three years. The conflict has seen significant casualties, immense destruction, and deep geopolitical ramifications. Both countries are heavily reliant on their energy infrastructures, making any attack on these systems not only a military tactic but also a form of economic warfare. Energy resources, including electricity and natural gas, have become central to the ongoing conflict, with both sides using them to exert pressure on the other amid Europe's deepening energy crisis that reverberates beyond the battlefield.

As of now, it remains unclear whether the recent violations of the energy ceasefire will lead to a breakdown of the truce or whether the United States will intervene further to restore compliance, even as Ukraine prepares for winter amid energy challenges. The situation remains fluid, and the international community continues to closely monitor the developments. The U.S., which played a central role in brokering the energy ceasefire, has made it clear that it expects both sides to uphold the terms of the agreement and work toward a more permanent cessation of hostilities.

The continued accusations between Russia and Ukraine regarding the breach of the energy ceasefire underscore the challenges of negotiating peace in such a complex and entrenched conflict. While both sides claim to be upholding their commitments, the reality on the ground suggests that reaching a full and lasting peace will require much more than temporary truces. The international community, particularly the U.S., will likely continue to push for stronger actions to enforce compliance and to prevent the conflict from further escalating. The outcome of this dispute will have significant implications for both countries and the broader European energy landscape and security landscape.

 

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UK Anticipates a 16% Decrease in Energy Bills in April

UK Energy Price Cap Cut 2024 signals relief as wholesale gas prices fall; Ofgem price cap drops per Cornwall Insight, aided by LNG supply, mild winter, despite Red Sea tensions and Ukraine conflict impacts.

 

Key Points

A forecast cut to Great Britain's Ofgem price cap as wholesale gas falls, easing typical annual household bills in 2024.

✅ Cap falls from £1,928 to £1,620 in April 2024

✅ Forecast £1,497 in July, then about £1,541 from October

✅ Drivers: lower wholesale gas, LNG supply, mild winter

 

Households in Great Britain are set to experience a significant reduction in energy costs this spring, with bills projected to drop by over £300 annually. This decrease is primarily due to a decline in wholesale gas prices, offering some respite to those grappling with the cost of living crisis.

Cornwall Insight, a well-regarded industry analyst, predicts a 16% reduction in average bills from the previous quarter, potentially reaching the lowest levels since the onset of the Ukraine conflict.

The industry’s price cap, indicative of the average annual bill for a typical household, is expected to decrease from the current £1,928, set earlier this month, to £1,620 in April – a reduction of £308 and £40 less than previously forecasted in December, as ministers consider ending the gas-electricity price link to improve market resilience.

Concerns about escalating tensions in the Red Sea, where Houthi rebels have disrupted global shipping, initially led analysts to fear an increase in wholesale oil prices and subsequent impact on household energy costs.

Contrary to these concerns, oil prices have remained relatively stable, and European gas reserves have been higher than anticipated during a mild winter, with European gas prices returning to pre-Ukraine war levels since November.

Cornwall Insight anticipates that energy prices will continue to be comparatively low through 2024. They predict a further decline to £1,497 for a typical annual bill from July, followed by a slight increase to £1,541 starting in October.

This forecast is a welcome development for Britons who have been dealing with increased expenses across various sectors, from food to utilities, amidst persistently high inflation rates, with energy-driven EU inflation hitting lower-income households hardest across member states.

Energy bills saw a steep rise in 2021, which escalated further due to the Ukraine conflict in 2022, driving up wholesale gas prices. This surge prompted government intervention to subsidize bills, with the UK price cap estimated to cost around £89bn to the public purse, capping costs to a typical household at £2,500.

Cornwall Insight noted that the supply of liquified natural gas to Europe had not been as adversely affected by the Red Sea disruptions as initially feared. Moreover, the UK has been well-supplied with gas from the US, which has become a more significant supplier since the Ukraine war, even as US electricity prices have risen to multi-decade highs. Contributing factors also include lower gas prices in Asia, mild weather, and robust gas availability.

Craig Lowrey, a principal consultant at Cornwall Insight, remarked that concerns about Red Sea events driving up energy prices have not materialized, allowing households to expect a reduction in prices.

On Monday, the next-month wholesale gas price dropped by 4% to 65p a therm.

However, Lowrey cautioned that a complete return to pre-crisis energy bill levels remains unlikely due to ongoing market impacts from shifting away from Russian energy sources and persistent geopolitical tensions, as well as policy changes such as Britain’s Energy Security Bill shaping market reforms.

Richard Neudegg, director of regulation at Uswitch, welcomed the potential further reduction of the price cap in April. However, he pointed out that this offers little solace to households currently struggling with high winter energy costs during the winter. Neudegg urged Ofgem, the energy regulator, to prompt suppliers to reintroduce more competitive and affordable fixed-price deals.

 

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How vehicle-to-building charging can save costs, reduce GHGs and help balance the grid: study

Ontario EV Battery Storage ROI leverages V2B, V2G, two-way charging, demand response, and second-life batteries to monetize peak pricing, cut GHG emissions, and unlock up to $38,000 in lifetime value for commuters and buildings.

 

Key Points

The economic return from V2B/V2G two-way charging and second-life storage using EV batteries within Ontario's grid.

✅ Monetize peak pricing via workplace V2B discharging

✅ Earn up to $8,400 per EV over vehicle life

✅ Reduce gas generation and GHGs with demand response

 

The payback that usually comes to mind when people buy an electric vehicle is to drive an emissions-free, low-maintenance, better-performing mode of transportation.

On top of that, you can now add $38,000.

That, according to a new report from Ontario electric vehicle education and advocacy nonprofit, Plug‘n Drive, is the potential lifetime return for an electric car driven as a commuter vehicle while also being used as an electricity storage option amid an energy storage crunch in Ontario’s electricity system.

“EVs contain large batteries that store electric energy,” says the report. “Besides driving the car, [those] batteries have two other potentially useful applications: mobile storage via vehicle-to-grid while they are installed in the vehicle, and second-life storage after the vehicle batteries are retired.”

Pricing and demand differentials
The study, prepared by the research firm Strategic Policy Economics, modeled a two-stage scenario calculating the total benefits from both mobile and second-life storage when taking advantage of differences in daytime and nighttime electricity pricing and demand.


If done systematically and at scale, the combined benefits to EV owners, building operators and the electricity system in Ontario could reach $129 million per year by 2035, according to the report. Along with the financial gains, the province would also cut GHG emissions by up to 67.2 kilotons annually.

The math might sound complicated, but the concepts are simple. All it requires is for drivers to charge their batteries with low-cost electricity overnight at home, then plug them into two-way EV charging stations at work and discharge their stored electricity for use by the building by day when buying power from the grid is more expensive.

“Workplace buildings could avoid high daytime prices by purchasing electricity from EVs parked onsite and enjoy savings as a result,” says the report.

Based on average commuting distances, EVs in this scenario could make half their storage capacity available for discharge. Drivers would be paid out of the building’s savings, effectively selling electricity back to the grid and earning up to $8,400 over the life of their vehicle.

According to the report, Ontario could have as many as 18,555 vehicles participating in mobile storage by 2030. At this level, the daily electricity demand would be reduced by 565 MWh. This, in turn, would reduce demand for natural gas-fired electricity generation, a fossil-fuel electricity source, avoiding the expense of gas purchases while reducing GHG emissions.

The second-life storage opportunity begins when the vehicle lifespan ends. “EV batteries will still have over 80% of their storage capacity after being driven for 13 years and providing mobile storage,” the report states. “Those-second life batteries could provide a low-cost energy storage solution for the electricity grid and enhance grid stability over time.”

Some of the savings could be shared with EV owners in the form of a rebate worth up to 20 per cent of the batteries’ initial cost.

Call to action
The report concludes with a call to action for EV advocates to press policy makers and other stakeholders to take actions on building codes, the federal Clean Fuel Standard and other business models in order to maximize the benefits of using EV batteries for the electricity system in this way, even as growing adoption could challenge power grids in some regions.

“EVs are often approached as an environmental solution to climate change,” says Cara Clairman, Plug’n Drive president and CEO. “While this is true, there are significant economic opportunities that are often overlooked.”

 

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