All 73 turbines erected at Carleton wind farm

NB Power Pulp and Paper Subsidies lower electricity rates for six New Brunswick mills using firm power benchmarks and interruptible discounts, while government mandates, utility debt, ratepayer impacts, and competitiveness pressures shape provincial energy policy.

Key Points

Provincial mandates that buy down firm electricity rates for six mills to a national average, despite NB Power's debt.

✅ Mandated buy-down to match national firm electricity rates

✅ Ignores large non-firm interruptible power discounts

✅ Raises equity concerns amid NB Power debt and rate pressure

An effort to fix NB Power's struggling finances that is supposed to involve a look at "all options" will not include a review of the policy that requires the utility to subsidize electricity prices for six New Brunswick pulp and paper mills, according to the Department of Natural Resources and Energy Development.

The program is meant "to enable New Brunswick's pulp and paper companies have access to competitive priced electricity,"  said the department's communications officer Nick Brown in an email Monday 

"Keeping our large industries competitive with other Canadian jurisdictions, amid Nova Scotia rate hike opposition debates elsewhere, is important," he wrote, knocking down the idea the subsidy program might be scrutinized for shortcomings like other NB Power expenses.

Figures released last week show NB Power paid out $9.7 million in rate subsidies to the mills under the program in the fiscal year ended in March 2021, even though the utility was losing $4 million for the year and falling deeper into debt, amid separate concerns about old meter issues affecting households.

Subsidies went to three mills owned by J.D. Irving Ltd. including two in Saint John and one in Lake Utopia, two owned by the AV group in Nackawic and Atholville and the Twin Rivers pulp mill in Edmundston.

The New Brunswick government has made NB Power subsidize pulp and paper mills like Twin Rivers Paper Company since 2012, and is requiring the program to continue despite financial problems at the utility. (CBC)
It was NB Power's second year in a row of financial losses, while it is supposed to pay down $500 million of its $4.9 billion debt load in the next five years to prepare for the refurbishment of the Mactaquac dam, a burden comparable to customers in Newfoundland paying for Muskrat Falls elsewhere under separate policies, under a directive issued by the province

NB Power president Keith Cronkhite said he was "very disappointed" with debt increasing last year instead of  falling and senior vice president and chief financial officer Darren Murphy said everything would be under the microscope this year to turn the utility's finances around.  

"We need to do better," said Murphy on Thursday

"We need to step back and make sure we're considering all options, including approaches like Newfoundland's ratepayer shield agreement on megaproject overruns, to achieve that objective because the objective is quickly closing in on us."

However, reviewing the subsidy program for the six pulp and paper mills is apparently off limits.

The subsidy program requires NB Power to buy down the cost of "firm" electricity bought by pulp and paper mills to a national average that is calculated by the Department of Natural Resources and Energy Development.

Last year the province declared the price mills in New Brunswick pay to be an average of  7.536 cents per kilowatt hour (kwh).  It is higher than rates in five other provinces that have mills, which the province points to as justification for the subsidies, even as Nova Scotia's 14% rate hike approval highlights broader upward pressure, although the true significance of that difference is not entirely clear.

In British Columbia, the large forest products company Paper Excellence operates five pulp and paper mills which are charged 17.2 per cent less for firm electricity than the six mills in New Brunswick.

The Paper Excellence Paper Mill in Port Alberni, B.C. pays lower electricity prices than mills in New Brunswick, a benefit largely offset by higher property taxes. It's a factor New Brunswick does not count in calculating subsidies NB Power must pay. (Paper Excellence)
However, local property taxes on the five BC mills are a combined $7.8 million higher than the six New Brunswick plants, negating much of that difference.

The province's subsidy formula does not account for differences like that or for the fact New Brunswick mills buy a high percentage of their electricity at cheap non-firm prices.

Not counting the subsidies, NB Power already sells high volumes of what it calls interruptible and surplus power to industry at deep discounts on the understanding it can be cut off and redeployed elsewhere on short notice when needed.

Actual interruptions in service are rare.  Last year there were none, but NB Power sold 837 million kilowatt hours of the discounted power to industry at an average price of 4.9 cents per kwh.   

NB Power does not disclose how much of the $22 million or more in savings went to the six mills, but the price was 35 per cent below NB Power's posted rate for the plants and rivaled firm prices big mills receive anywhere in Canada, including Quebec.

Asked why the subsidy program ignores large amounts of discounted interruptible power used by New Brunswick mills in making comparisons between provinces, Brown said regulations governing the program require a comparison of firm prices only.

"The New Brunswick average rate is based on NB Power's published large industrial rate for firm energy, as required by the Electricity from Renewable Resources regulation," he wrote.

The subsidy program itself was imposed on NB Power by the province in 2012 to aid companies suffering after years of poor markets for forest products following the 2008 financial collapse and recession.  

Providing subsidies has cost NB Power $100 million so far and has continued even as markets for pulp products improved significantly and NB Power's own finances worsened.

Report warned against subsidies
NB Power has never directly criticized the program, but in a matter currently in front the of the New Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board looking at how NB Power might restructure its rates, including proposals such as seasonal rates that could prompt backlash, an independent consultant hired by the utility suggested rate subsidies to large export oriented manufacturing facilities, like pulp and paper mills, is generally a poor idea.

"We do not recommend offering subsidies to exporters," says the report by Christensen Associates Energy Consulting of Madison, Wis.

"There are two serious economic problems with subsidizing exports. The first is that the benefits may be less than the costs. The second problem is that subsidies tend to last forever, even if the circumstances that initially justified the subsidies have disappeared."

The Christensen report did not directly assess the merits of the current subsidy for pulp and paper mills but it addressed the issue because it said in the design of new rates "one NB Power business customer has raised the possibility that their electricity-intensive business ought to be granted subsidies because of the potential to generate extra benefits for the Province through increases in their exports"

That, said Christensen, rarely benefits the public.

"The direct costs of the subsidies are the subsidies themselves, a part of which ends up in the pockets of out-of-province consumers of the exported goods," said the report.  

"But there are also indirect costs due to the fact that the subsidies are financed through higher electricity prices, which means that other electricity customers have less money to spend on services provided by local businesses, thus putting a drag on the local economy."

The province does not agree.

Asked whether it has any studies or cost-benefit reviews that show the subsidy program is a net benefit to New Brunswick, the department cited none but maintained it is an important initiative, even as elsewhere governments have offered electricity bill credit relief to ratepayers.

"The program was designed to give large industrial businesses the ability to compete on a level energy field," wrote Brown.
 

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FERC Hydropower Licensing Dispute centers on FERC authority, Clean Water Act compliance, state water quality certifications, Federal Power Act timelines, and Army Corps dams on West Virginia's Monongahela River licenses.

Key Points

An inquiry into FERC's licensing process and state water quality authority for hydropower at Monongahela River dams.

✅ Questions on omitted state water quality conditions

✅ Debate over starting Clean Water Act certification timelines

✅ Potential impacts on states' rights and licensing schedules

As federal lawmakers, including Democrats pressing FERC, plan to consider a bill that would expand Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) licensing authority, questions emerged on Tuesday about the process used by FERC to issue two hydropower licenses for existing dams in West Virginia.

In a letter to FERC Chairman Neil Chatterjee, Democratic leaders of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, as electricity pricing changes were being debated, raised questions about hydropower licenses issued for two dams operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the Monongahela River in West Virginia.

U.S. Reps. Frank Pallone Jr. (D-NJ), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Energy, Bobby Rush (D-IL), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Environment, and John Sarbanes (D-MD), amid Maryland clean energy enforcement concerns, questioned why FERC did not incorporate all conditions outlined in a West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection water quality certificate into plans for the projects.

“By denying the state its allotted time to review this application and submit requirements on these licenses, FERC is undermining the state’s authority under the Clean Water Act and Federal Power Act to impose conditions that will ensure water quality standards are met,” the letter stated.

The House of Representatives was slated to consider the Hydropower Policy Modernization Act of 2017, H.R. 3043, later in the week. The measure would expand FERC authority over licensing processes, a theme mirrored in Maine's transmission line debate over interstate energy projects. Opponents of the bill argue that the changes would make it more difficult for states to protect their clean water interests.

West Virginia has announced plans to challenge FERC hydropower licenses for the dams on the Monongahela River, echoing Northern Pass opposition seen in New Hampshire.

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Maritime Link Subsea Cable enables HVDC grid interconnection across the Cabot Strait, linking Nova Scotia with Newfoundland and Labrador to import Muskrat Falls hydroelectric power and expand renewable energy integration and reliability.

Key Points

A 170-km HVDC subsea link connecting Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador for Muskrat Falls power and renewables

✅ 170-km HVDC subsea route across Cabot Strait

✅ Connects Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador grids

✅ Enables Muskrat Falls hydro and renewable energy trade

The longest sub-sea electricity cable in North America now connects Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, according to the company behind the $1.7-billion Maritime Link project.  

The first of the project's two high-voltage power transmission cables was anchored at Point Aconi, N.S., on Sunday. 

The 170-kilometre long cable across the Cabot Strait will connect the power grids in the two provinces. The link will allow power to flow between the two provinces, as demonstrated by its first electricity transfer milestone, and bring to Nova Scotia electricity generated by the massive Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project in Labrador. 

Ultimately, the Maritime Link will help Nova Scotia reach the renewable energy goals set out by the federal government, said Rick Janega, the president and CEO of Emera Newfoundland and Labrador, whose subsidiary owns the Maritime Link.

"If not for the Maritime Link then really the province would not have the ability to meet those requirements because we're pretty much tapped out of all the hydro in province and all the wind generation without creating new interconnections like the Maritime Link," said Janega. 

Not everyone wanted the link 

Fishermen in Cape Breton had objected to the Maritime Link. They were concerned about how the undersea cable might affect fish in the area. 

The laying of the cable and other construction closed a three-kilometre long and 600-metre wide swath of ocean bottom to fishermen for the entire 2017 lobster season.  

But the company came to an agreement to compensate a group of 60 Cape Breton lobster and crab fishermen affected by the project this season. The terms of the compensation deal were not released. 

Long cable, big job

The transmission cable runs northwest of the Marine Atlantic ferry route between North Sydney, N.S., and Port aux Basques, N.L. 

Installation of the second cable is set to begin in June, a major step comparable to BC Hydro's Site C transmission milestone achieved recently. The entire link should be completed by late 2017 and should go into full service by January 2018.

"We're quite confident as soon as the Maritime Link is in service there will be energy transactions between Nova Scotia Power and Newfoundland Hydro. Both utilities have already identified opportunities to save money and exchange energy between the two provinces," said Janega.

That's two years before power is expected to flow from the Muskrat Falls hydro project. The Labrador-based power generating facility has been hampered by delays.

Those kinds of transmission project delays are expected for such a large project, said Janega, and won't stop the Maritime Link from being used. 

"With the Maritime Link going in service this year providing Nova Scotia the opportunity that it needs to be able to reach carbon reductions and to adapt to climate change and to increase renewable energy content and we're very pleased to be at this state today," said Janega.

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Ontario electricity emissions forecast highlights rising grid CO2 as nuclear refurbishments and the Pickering closure drive more natural gas, limited renewables, and delayed Quebec hydro imports, pending advances in storage and transmission upgrades.

Key Points

A projection that Ontario's grid CO2 will rise as nuclear units refurbish or retire, increasing natural gas use.

✅ Nuclear refurbs and Pickering shutdown cut zero-carbon baseload

✅ Gas plants fill capacity gaps, boosting GHG emissions

✅ Quebec hydro imports face cost, transmission, and timing limits

Ontario's energy grid is among the cleanest in North America — but the province’s nuclear plans mean that some of our progress will be reversed over the next decade.

What was once Canada’s largest single source of greenhouse-gas emissions is now a solar-power plant. The Nanticoke Generating Station, a coal-fired power plant in Haldimand County, was decommissioned in stages from 2010 to 2013 — and even before the last remaining structures were demolished earlier this year, Ontario Power Generation had replaced its nearly 4,000 megawatts with a 44-megawatt solar project in partnership with the Six Nations of the Grand River Development Corporation and the Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation.

But neither wind nor solar has done much to replace coal in Ontario’s hydro sector, a sign of how slowly Ontario is embracing clean power in practice across the province. At Nanticoke, the solar panels make up less than 2 per cent of the capacity that once flowed out to southern Ontario over high-voltage transmission lines. In cleaning up its electricity system, the province relied primarily on nuclear power — but the need to extend the nuclear system’s lifespan will end up making our electricity dirtier again.

“We’ve made some pretty great strides since 2005 with the fuel mix,” says Terry Young, vice-president of corporate communications at the Independent Electricity System Operator, the provincial agency whose job it is to balance supply and demand in Ontario’s electricity sector. “There have been big changes since 2005, but, yes, we will see an increase because of the closure of Pickering and the refurbs coming.”

“The refurbs” is industry-speak for the major rebuilds of both the Darlington and Bruce nuclear-power stations. The two are both in the early stages of major overhauls intended to extend their operating lives into the 2060s: in the coming years, they’ll be taken offline and rebuilt. (The Pickering nuclear plant will not be refurbished and will shut down in 2024.)

The catch is that, as the province loses its nuclear capacity in increments, Ontario will be short of electricity in the coming years and the IESO will need to find capacity elsewhere to make sure the lights stay on. And that could mean burning a lot more natural gas — and creating more greenhouse-gas emissions.

According to the IESO’s planning assumptions, electricity will be responsible for 11 megatonnes of greenhouse-gas emissions annually by 2035 (last year, it was three megatonnes). That’s the “reference case” scenario: if conservation and efficiency policies shave off some electricity demand, we could get it down to something like nine megatonnes. But if demand is higher than expected, it could be as high as 13 megatonnes — more than quadruple Ontario’s 2018 emissions.

Even in the worst-case scenario, the province’s emissions from electricity would still be less than half of what they were in 2005, before the province began phasing out its coal generation. But it’s still a reversal of a trend that both Liberals and Progressive Conservatives have boasted about — the Liberals to justify their energy policies, the PCs to justify their hostility to a federal carbon tax.

Young emphasized that technology can change and that the IESO’s planning assumptions are just that: projections based on the information available today. A revolution in electricity storage could make it possible to store the province’s cleaner power sources overnight for use during the day, but that’s still only in the realm of speculation — and the natural-gas infrastructure exists in the real world, today.

Ontario Power Generation — the Crown corporation that operates many of the province’s power plants, including Pickering and Darlington — recently bought four gas plants, two of them outright (two it already owned in part). All were nearly complete or already operational, so the purchase itself won’t change the province’s emissions prospects. Rather, OPG is simply looking to maintain its share of the electricity market after the Pickering shutdown.

“It will allow us to maintain our scale, with the upcoming end of Pickering’s commercial operations, so that we can continue our role as the driver of Ontario’s lower carbon future,” Neal Kelly, OPG’s director of media, issues, and management, told TVO.org via email. “Further, there is a growing need for flexible gas fired generation to support intermittent wind and solar generation.”

The shift to more gas-fired generation has been coming for a while, and critics say that Ontario has missed an opportunity to replace the lost Pickering capacity with something cleaner. MPP Mike Schreiner, leader of the Green party, has argued for years that Ontario should have pursued an agreement with Quebec to import clean hydroelectricity.

“To me, it’s a cost-effective solution, and it’s a zero-emissions solution,” Schreiner says. “Regardless of your position on sources of electricity, I think everyone could agree that waterpower from Quebec is going to be less expensive.”

Quebec is eager to sell Ontario its surplus hydro power, but not everyone agrees that importing power would be cheaper. A study published by the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (and commissioned by Ontario Power Generation) calls the claim a “myth” and states that upgrading electric-transmission wires between Ontario and Quebec would cost $1.2 billion and take 10 years, while some estimates suggest fully greening Ontario's grid would cost far more overall.

With Quebec imports seemingly a non-starter and major changes to Ontario’s nuclear fleet already underway, there’s only one path left for this province’s greenhouse-gas emissions: upwards.

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BC Utilities Commission Site C Dam Questions press BC Hydro on geotechnical risks, stability issues, cost overruns, oversight gaps, seeking transparency for ratepayers and clarity on contracts, mitigation, and the powerhouse and spillway foundations.

Key Points

Inquiry seeking explanations from BC Hydro on geotechnical risks, costs, timelines and oversight for Site C.

✅ Timeline of studies, monitoring, and mitigation actions

✅ Rationale for contracts, costs, and right bank construction

✅ Implications for ratepayers, oversight, and project stability

The watchdog B.C. Utilities Commission has sent BC Hydro 70 questions about the troubled Site C dam, asking when geotechnical risks were first identified and when the project’s assurance board was first made aware of potential issues related to the dam’s stability. 

“I think they’ve come to the conclusion — but they don’t say it — that there’s been a cover-up by BC Hydro and by the government of British Columbia,” former BC Hydro CEO Marc Eliesen told The Narwhal. 

On Oct. 21, The Narwhal reported that two top B.C. civil servants, including the senior bureaucrat who prepares Site C dam documents for cabinet, knew in May 2019 that the project faced serious geotechnical problems due to its “weak foundation” and the stability of the dam was “a significant risk.” 

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“They [the civil servants] would have reported to their ministers and to the government in general,” said Eliesen, who is among 18 prominent Canadians calling for a halt to Site C work until an independent team of experts can determine if the geotechnical problems can be resolved and at what cost.  

“It’s disingenuous for Premier [John] Horgan to try to suggest, ‘Well, I just found out about it recently.’ If that’s the case, he should fire the public servants who are representing the province.” 

The public only found out about significant issues with the Site C dam at the end of July, when BC Hydro released overdue reports saying the project faces unknown cost overruns, schedule delays and, even as it achieved a transmission line milestone earlier, such profound geotechnical troubles that its overall health is classified as ‘red,’ meaning it is in serious trouble. 

“The geotechnical challenges have been there all these years.”

The Site C dam is the largest publicly funded infrastructure project in B.C.’s history. If completed, it will flood 128 kilometres of the Peace River and its tributaries, forcing families from their homes and destroying Indigenous gravesites, hundreds of protected archeological sites, some of Canada’s best farmland and habitat for more than 100 species vulnerable to extinction.

Eliesen said geotechnical risks were a key reason BC Hydro’s board of directors rejected the project in the early 1990s, when he was at the helm of BC Hydro.

“The geotechnical challenges have been there all these years,” said Eliesen, who is also the former Chair and CEO of Ontario Hydro, where Ontario First Nations have urged intervention on a critical electricity line, the former Chair of Manitoba Hydro and the former Chair and CEO of the Manitoba Energy Authority.

Elsewhere, a Manitoba Hydro line to Minnesota has faced potential delays, highlighting broader grid planning challenges.

The B.C. Utilities Commission is an independent watchdog that makes sure ratepayers — including BC Hydro customers — receive safe and reliable energy services, as utilities adapt to climate change risks, “at fair rates.”

The commission’s questions to BC Hydro include 14 about the “foundational enhancements” BC Hydro now says are necessary to shore up the Site C dam, powerhouse and spillways. 

The commission is asking BC Hydro to provide a timeline and overview of all geotechnical engineering studies and monitoring activities for the powerhouse, spillway and dam core areas, and to explain what specific risk management and mitigation practices were put into effect once risks were identified.

The commission also wants to know why construction activities continued on the right bank of the Peace River, where the powerhouse would be located, “after geotechnical risks materialized.” 

It’s asking if geotechnical risks played a role in BC Hydro’s decision in March “to suspend or not resume work” on any components of the generating station and spillways.

The commission also wants BC Hydro to provide an itemized breakdown of a $690 million increase in the main civil works contract — held by Spain’s Acciona S.A. and the South Korean multinational conglomerate Samsung C&T Corp. — and to explain the rationale for awarding a no-bid contract to an unnamed First Nation and if other parties were made aware of that contract. 

Peace River Jewels of the Peace Site C The Narwhal
Islands in the Peace River, known as the ‘jewels of the Peace’ will be destroyed for fill for the Site C dam or will be submerged underwater by the dam’s reservoir, a loss that opponents are sharing with northerners in community discussions. Photo: Byron Dueck

B.C. Utilities Commission chair and CEO David Morton said it’s not the first time the commission has requested additional information after receiving BC Hydro’s quarterly progress reports on the Site C dam. 

“Our staff reads them to make sure they understand them and if there’s anything in then that’s not clear we go then we do go through this, we call it the IR — information request — process,” Morton said in an interview.

“There are things reported in here that we felt required a little more clarity, and we needed a little more understanding of them, so that’s why we asked the questions.”

The questions were sent to BC Hydro on Oct. 23, the day before the provincial election, but Morton said the commission is extraordinarily busy this year and that’s just a coincidence. 

“Our resources are fairly strained. It would have been nice if it could have been done faster, it would be nice if everything could be done faster.” 

“These questions are not politically motivated,” Morton said. “They’re not political questions. There’s no reason not to issue them when they’re ready.”

The commission has asked BC Hydro to respond by Nov. 19.

Read more: Top B.C. government officials knew Site C dam was in serious trouble over a year ago: FOI docs

Morton said the independent commission’s jurisdiction is limited because the B.C. government removed it from oversight of the project. 

The commission, which would normally determine if a large dam like the Site C project is in the public’s financial interest, first examined BC Hydro’s proposal to build the dam in the early 1980s.

After almost two years of hearings, including testimony under oath, the commission concluded B.C. did not need the electricity. It found the Site C dam would have negative social and environmental impacts and said geothermal power should be investigated to meet future energy needs. 

The project was revived in 2010 by the BC Liberal government, which touted energy from the Site C dam as a potential source of electricity for California and a way to supply B.C.’s future LNG industry with cheap power.

Not willing to countenance another rejection from the utilities commission, the government changed the law, stripping the commission of oversight for the project. The NDP government, which came to power in 2017, chose not to restore that oversight.

“The approval of the project was exempt from our oversight,” Morton said. “We can’t come along and say ‘there’s something we don’t like about what you’re doing, we’re going to stop construction.’ We’re not in that position and that’s not the focus of these questions.” 

But the commission still retains oversight for the cost of construction once the project is complete, Morton said. 

“The cost of construction has to be recovered in [hydro] rates. That means BC Hydro will need our approval to recover their construction cost in rates, and those are not insignificant amounts, more than $10.7 billion, in all likelihood.” 

In order to recover the cost from ratepayers, the commission needs to be satisfied BC Hydro didn’t spend more money than necessary on the project, Morton said. 

“As you can imagine, that’s not a straight forward review to do after the fact, after a 10-year construction project or whatever it ends up being … so we’re using these quarterly reports as an opportunity to try to stay on top of it and to flag any areas where we think there may be areas we need to look into in the future.”

The price tag for the Site C dam was $10.7 billion before BC Hydro’s announcement at the end of July — a leap from $6.6 billion when the project was first announced in 2010 and $8.8 billion when construction began in 2015. 

Eliesen said the utilities commission should have been asking tough questions about the Site C dam far earlier. 

“They’ve been remiss in their due diligence activities … They should have been quicker in raising questions with BC Hydro, rather than allowing BC Hydro to be exceptionally late in submitting their reports.” 

BC Hydro is late in filing another Site C quarterly report, covering the period from April 1 to June 30. 

The quarterly reports provide the B.C. public with rare glimpses of a project that international hydro expert Harvey Elwin described as being more secretive than any hydro project he has encountered in five decades working on large dams around the world, including in China.

Read more: Site C dam secrecy ‘extraordinary’, international hydro construction expert tells court proceeding

Morton said the commission could have ordered regular reporting for the Site C project if it had its previous oversight capability.

“Then we would have had the ability to follow up and ultimately order any delinquent reports to be filed. In this circumstance, they are being filed voluntarily. They can file it as late as they choose. We don’t have any jurisdiction.” 

In addition to the six dozen questions, the commission has also filed confidential questions with BC Hydro. Morton said confidential information could include things such as competitive bid information. “BC Hydro itself may be under a confidentiality agreement not to disclose it.” 

With oversight, the commission would also have been able to drill down into specific project elements,  Morton said. 

“We would have wanted to ensure that the construction followed what was approved. BC Hydro wouldn’t have the ability to make significant changes to the design and nature of the project as they went along.”

BC Hydro has been criticized for changing the design of the Site C dam to an L-shape, which Eliesen said “has never been done anywhere in the world for an earthen dam.” 

Morton said an empowered commission could have opted to hold a public hearing about the design change and engage its own technical consultants, as it did in 2017 when the new NDP government asked it to conduct a fast-tracked review of the project’s economics. 

Construction Site C Dam
A recent report by a U.S. energy economist found cancelling the Site C dam project would save BC Hydro customers an initial $116 million a year, with increasing savings growing over time. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

The commission’s final report found the dam could cost more than $12 billion, that BC Hydro had a historical pattern of overestimating energy demand and that the same amount of energy could be produced by a suite of renewables, including wind and proposed pumped storage such as the Meaford project, for $8.8 billion or less. 

The NDP government, under pressure from construction trade unions, opted to continue the project, refusing to disclose key financial information related to its decision. 

When the geotechnical problems were revealed in July, the government announced the appointment of former deputy finance minister Peter Milburn as a special Site C project advisor who will work with BC Hydro and the Site C project assurance board to examine the project and provide the government with independent advice.

Eliesen said BC Hydro and the B.C. government should never have allowed the recent diversion of the Peace River to take place given the tremendous geotechnical challenges the project faces and its unknown cost and schedule for completion. 

“It’s a disgrace and scandalous,” he said. “You can halt the river diversion, but you’ve got another four or five years left in construction of the dam. What are you going to do about all the cement you’ve poured if you’ve got stability problems?”

He said it’s counter-productive to continue with advice “from the same people who have been wrong, wrong, wrong,” without calling in independent global experts to examine the geotechnical problems. 

“If you stop construction, whether it takes three or six months, that’s the time that’s required in order to give yourself a comfort level. But continuing to do what you’ve been doing is not the right course. You should have to sit back.”

Eliesen said it reminded him of the Pete Seeger song Waist Deep in the Big Muddy, which tells the story of a captain ordering his troops to keep slogging through a river because they will soon be on dry ground. After the captain drowns, the troops turn around.

“It’s a reflection of the fact that if you don’t look at what’s new, you just keep on doing what you’ve been doing in the past and that, unfortunately, is what’s happening here in this province with this project.”

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Puerto Rico Power Restoration advances as PREPA, FEMA, and the Army Corps rebuild the grid after Hurricane Maria; 75% of customers powered, amid privatization debate, Whitefish contract fallout, and a continuing island-wide boil-water advisory.

Key Points

Effort to rebuild Puerto Rico's grid and restore power, led by PREPA with FEMA support after Hurricane Maria.

✅ 75.35% of customers have power; 90.8% grid generating

✅ PREPA, FEMA, and Army Corps lead restoration work

✅ Privatization debate, Whitefish contract scrutiny

Nearly six months after Hurricane Maria decimated Puerto Rico, the island's electricity has been restored to 75 percent capacity, according to its utility company, a contrast to California power shutdowns implemented for different reasons.

The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority said Sunday that 75.35 percent of customers now have electricity. It added that 90.8 percent of the electrical grid, already anemic even before the Sept. 20 storm barrelled through the island, is generating power again, though demand dynamics can vary widely as seen in Spain's power demand during lockdowns.

Thousands of power restoration personnel made up of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), industry workers from the mainland, and the Army Corps of Engineers have made marked progress in recent weeks, even as California power shutoffs highlight grid risks elsewhere.

Despite this, 65 people in shelters and an island-wide boil water advisory is still in effect even though almost 100 percent of Puerto Ricans have access to drinking water, local government records show.

The issue of power became controversial after Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rossello recently announced plans to privatize PREPA after it chose to allocate a $300 million power restoration contract to Whitefish, a Montana-based company with only a few staffers, rather than put it through the mutual-aid network of public utilities usually called upon to coordinate power restoration after major disasters, and unlike investor-owned utilities overseen by regulators such as the Florida PSC on the mainland.

That contract was nixed and Whitefish stopped working in Puerto Rico after FEMA raised "significant concerns" over the procurement process, scrutiny mirrored by the fallout from Taiwan's widespread outage where the economic minister resigned.

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