Wind farm planned near Groton

US Power Grid Cyberattacks target utilities and nuclear plants, probing SCADA, ICS, and business networks at sites like Wolf Creek; suspected Russian actors, malware, and spear-phishing trigger DHS and FBI alerts on critical infrastructure resilience.

Key Points

Intrusions on energy networks probing ICS and SCADA, seeking persistence and elevating risks to critical infrastructure.

✅ Wolf Creek nuclear plant targeted; no operational systems breached

✅ Attackers leveraged stolen credentials, malware, and spear-phishing

✅ DHS and FBI issued alerts; utilities enhance cyber resilience

Hackers working for a foreign government recently breached at least a dozen US power plants, including the Wolf Creek nuclear facility in Kansas, according to current and former US officials, sparking concerns the attackers were searching for vulnerabilities in the electrical grid.

The rivals could be positioning themselves to eventually disrupt the nation’s power supply, warned the officials, who noted that a general alert, prompting a renewed focus on protecting the U.S. power grid, was distributed to utilities a week ago. Adding to those concerns, hackers recently infiltrated an unidentified company that makes control systems for equipment used in the power industry, an attack that officials believe may be related.

The chief suspect is Russia, according to three people familiar with the continuing effort to eject the hackers from the computer networks. One of those networks belongs to an ageing nuclear generating facility known as Wolf Creek -- owned by Westar Energy Inc, Great Plains Energy Inc, and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative Inc -- on a lake shore near Burlington, Kansas.

The possibility of a Russia connection is particularly worrying, former and current official s say, because Russian hackers have previously taken down parts of the electrical grid in Ukraine and appear to be testing increasingly advanced tools, including cyber weapons to disrupt power grids, to disrupt power supplies.

The hacks come as international tensions have flared over US intelligence agencies’ conclusion that Russia tried to influence the 2016 presidential election, and amid U.S. government condemnation of Russian power-grid hacking in recent advisories. The US, which has several continuing investigations into Russia’s activities, is known to possess digital weapons capable of disrupting the electricity grids of rival nations.

“We don’t pay attention to such anonymous fakes,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, in response to a request to comment on alleged Russian involvement.

It was unclear whether President Donald Trump was planning to address the cyber attacks at his meeting on Friday with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In an earlier speech in Warsaw, Trump called out Russia’s “destabilising activities” and urged the country to join “the community of responsible nations.”

The Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation said they are aware of a potential intrusion in the energy sector. The alert issued to utilities cited activities by hackers since May.

“There is no indication of a threat to public safety, as any potential impact appears to be limited to administrative and business networks,” the government agencies said in a joint statement.

The Department of Energy also said the impact appears limited to administrative and business networks and said it was working with utilities and grid operators to enhance security and resilience.

“Regardless of whether malicious actors attempt to exploit business networks or operational systems, we take any reports of malicious cyber activity potentially targeting our nation’s energy infrastructure seriously and respond accordingly,” the department said in an emailed statement.

Representatives of the National Security Council, the Director of National Intelligence and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to comment. While Bloomberg News was waiting for responses from the government, the New York Times reported that hacks were targeting nuclear power stations.

The North American Electric Reliability Corp, a nonprofit that works to ensure the reliability of the continent’s power system, said it was aware of the incident and was exchanging information with the industry through a secure portal.

“At this time, there has been no bulk power system impact in North America,” the corporation said in an emailed statement.

In addition, the operational controls at Wolf Creek were not pierced, according to government officials, even as attackers accessed utility control rooms elsewhere in the U.S., according to separate reports. “There was absolutely no operational impact to Wolf Creek,” Jenny Hageman, a spokeswoman for the nuclear plant, said in a statement to Bloomberg News.

“The reason that is true is because the operational computer systems are completely separate from the corporate network.”

Determining who is behind an attack can be tricky. Government officials look at the sophistication of the tools, among other key markers, when gauging whether a foreign government is sponsoring cyber activities.

Several private security firms, including Symantec researchers, are studying data on the attacks, but none has linked the work to a particular hacking team or country.

“We don’t tie this to any known group at this point,” said Sean McBride, a lead analyst for FireEye Inc, a global cyber security firm. “It’s not to say it’s not related, but we don’t have the evidence at this point.”

US intelligence officials have long been concerned about the security of the country’s electrical grid. The recent attack, striking almost simultaneously at multiple locations, is testing the government’s ability to coordinate an effective response among several private utilities, state and local officials, and industry regulators.

Specialised teams from Homeland Security and the FBI have been scrambled to help extricate the hackers from the power stations, in some cases without informing local and state officials. Meanwhile, the US National Security Agency is working to confirm the identity of the hackers, who are said to be using computer servers in Germany, Italy, Malaysia and Turkey to cover their tracks.

Many of the power plants are conventional, but the targeting of a nuclear facility adds to the pressure. While the core of a nuclear generator is heavily protected, a sudden shutdown of the turbine can trigger safety systems. These safety devices are designed to disperse excess heat while the nuclear reaction is halted, but the safety systems themselves may be vulnerable to attack.

Homeland Security and the FBI sent out a general warning about the cyber attack to utilities and related parties on June 28, though it contained few details or the number of plants affected. The government said it was most concerned about the “persistence” of the attacks on choke points of the US power supply. That language suggests hackers are trying to establish backdoors on the plants’ systems for later use, according to a former senior DHS official who asked not to be identified.

Those backdoors can be used to insert software specifically designed to penetrate a facility’s operational controls and disrupt critical systems, according to Galina Antova, co-founder of Claroty, a New York firm that specialises in securing industrial control systems.

“We’re moving to a point where a major attack like this is very, very possible,” Antova said. “Once you’re into the control systems -- and you can get into the control systems by hacking into the plant’s regular computer network -- then the basic security mechanisms you’d expect are simply not there.”

The situation is a little different at nuclear facilities. Backup power supplies and other safeguards at nuclear sites are meant to ensure that “you can’t really cause a nuclear plant to melt down just by taking out the secondary systems that are connected to the grid,” Edwin Lyman, a nuclear expert with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said in a phone interview.

The operating systems at nuclear plants also tend to be legacy controls built decades ago and don’t have digital control systems that can be exploited by hackers. Wolf Creek, for example, began operations in 1985. “They’re relatively impervious to that kind of attack,” Lyman said.

The alert sent out last week inadvertently identified Wolf Creek as one of the victims of the attack. An analysis of one of the tools used by the hackers had the stolen credentials of a plant employee, a senior engineer. A US official acknowledged the error was not caught until after the alert was distributed.

According to a security researcher who has seen the report, the malware that activated the engineer’s username and password was designed to be used once the hackers were already inside the plant’s computer systems.

The tool tries to connect to non-public computers, and may have been intended to identify systems related to Wolf Creek’s generation plant, a part of the facility typically more modern than the nuclear reactor control room, according to a security expert who asked to note be identified because the alert is not public.

Even if there is no indication that the hackers gained access to those control systems, the design of the malware suggests they may have at least been looking for ways to do so, the expert said.

Stan Luke, the mayor of Burlington, the largest community near Wolf Creek, which is surrounded by corn fields and cattle pastures, said he learned about a cyber threat at the plant only recently, and then only through golfing buddies.

With a population of just 2,700, Burlington boasts a community pool with three water slides and a high school football stadium that would be the envy of any junior college. Luke said those amenities lead back to the tax dollars poured into the community by Wolf Creek, Coffey County’s largest employer with some 1,000 workers, 600 of whom live in the county.

E&E News first reported on digital attacks targeting US nuclear plants, adding it was code-named Nuclear 17. A senior US official told Bloomberg that there was a bigger breach of conventional plants, which could affect multiple regions.

Industry experts and US officials say the attack is being taken seriously, in part because of recent events in Ukraine. Antova said that the Ukrainian power grid has been disrupted at least twice, first in 2015, and then in a more automated attack last year, suggesting the hackers are testing methods.

Scott Aaronson, executive director for security and business continuity at the Edison Electric Institute, an industry trade group, said utilities, grid operators and federal officials were already dissecting the attack on Ukraine’s electric sector to apply lessons in North America before the US government issued the latest warning to “energy and critical manufacturing sectors”. The current threat is unrelated to recently publicised ransomware incidents or the CrashOverride malware, Mr Aaronson said in an emailed statement.

Neither attack in Ukraine caused long-term damage. But with each escalation, the hackers may be gauging the world’s willingness to push back.

“If you think about a typical war, some of the acts that have been taken against critical infrastructure in Ukraine and even in the US, those would be considered crossing red lines,” Antova said.

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India Power Sector Crisis: a tangled market of underused plants, coal shortages, cross-subsidies, high transmission losses, and weak PPAs, requiring deregulation, power exchanges, and cost-reflective tariffs to fix insolvency and outages.

Key Points

India power market failure from subsidies, coal shortages, and losses, needing deregulation and reflective pricing.

✅ Deregulate to enable spot trading on power exchanges

✅ End cross-subsidies; charge cost-reflective tariffs

✅ Secure coal supply; cut T&D losses and theft

India's electricity industry is in a financial and political tangle.

Power producers sit on thousands of megawatts of underutilized plant, while consumers face frequent power cuts, both planned and unplanned.

Financially troubled generators struggle to escape insolvency proceedings. The state-owned banks that have mostly financed power utilities fear that debts of troubled utilities totaling 1.74 trillion rupees will soon go bad.

Aggressive bidding for supply contracts and slower-than-expected demand growth, including a recent demand slump in electricity use, is the root cause. The problems are compounded by difficulties in securing coal and other fuels, high transmission losses, electricity theft and cash-starved distribution companies.

But India's 36 state and union territory governments are contributing mightily to this financial and economic mess. They persist with populist cross-subsidies -- reducing charges for farmers and households at the cost of nonagricultural businesses, especially energy-intensive manufacturing sectors such as steel.

The states refuse to let go of their control over how electricity is produced, distributed and consumed. And they are adamant that true markets, with freedom for large industrial users to buy power at market-determined rates from whichever utility they want at power exchanges -- will not become a reality in India.

State politicians are driven mainly by the electoral need to appease farmers, India's most important vote bank, who have grown used to decades of nearly-free power.

New Delhi is therefore relying on short-term fixes instead of attempting to overhaul a defunct system. Users must pay the real cost of their electricity, as determined by a properly integrated national market free of state-level interference if India's power mess is to be really addressed.

As of Aug. 31, the country's total installed production capacity was 344,689 MW, underscoring its status as the third-largest electricity producer globally by output. Out of that, thermal power comprising coal, gas and diesel accounted for 64%, hydropower 13% and renewables accounted for 20%. Commercial and industrial users accounted for 55% of consumption followed by households on 25% and the remaining 20% by agriculture.

Coal-fired power generation, which contributes roughly 90% of thermal output and the bulk of the financially distressed generators, is the most troubled segment as it faces a secular decline in tariffs due to increasing competition from highly subsidized renewables (which also benefit from falling solar panel costs), coal shortages and weak demand.

The Central Electricity Act (CEA) 2003 opened the gates of the country's power sector for private players, who now account for 45% of generating capacity.

But easy credit, combined with an overconfident estimation of the risks involved, emboldened too many investors to pile in, without securing power purchase agreements (PPAs) with distribution companies.

As a result, power capacity grew at an annual compound rate of 11% compared to demand at 6% in the last decade leading to oversupply.

This does not mean that the electricity market is saturated. Merely that there are not enough paying customers. Distributors have plenty of consumers who will not or cannot pay, even though they have connections. There is huge unmet demand for power. There are 32 million Indian homes -- roughly 13% of the total -- mostly rural and poor with no access to electricity.

Moreover, consumption by those big commercial and industrial users which do not enjoy privileged rates is curbed by high prices, driven up by the cost of subsidizing others, extra charges on exchange-traded power and transmission and distribution losses (including theft) of 20-30%.

With renewables increasingly becoming cheaper, financially stressed distributors are avoiding long-term power purchase agreements, preferring spot markets. Meanwhile, coal shortages force generators to buy expensive imported coal supplies or cut output. The operating load for most private generators, which suffer particularly acute coal shortages in compared to state-owned utilities, has fallen from 84% in 2009-2010 to 55% now.

Smoothing coal supplies should be the top priority. Often coal is denied to power generators without long-term purchase contracts. Such discrimination in coal allocation prevails -- because the seller (state-run Coal India and its numerous subsidiaries) is an inefficient monopolist which cannot produce enough and rations coal supplies, favoring state-run generators over private.

To help power producers, New Delhi plans measures including auctioning power sales contracts with assured access to coal. However, even though coal and electricity shortages eased recently, such short-term fixes won't solve the problem. With electricity prices in secular decline, distributors are not seeking long-term supply contracts -- rather they are often looking for excuses to get out of existing agreements.

India needs a fundamental two-step reform. First, the market must be deregulated to allow most bulk suppliers and users to move to power trading exchanges, which currently account for just 10% of the market.

This would lead to genuine price discovery in a spot market and, in time, lead to the trading of electricity futures contracts. That would help in consumers and producers hedge their respective costs and revenues and safeguard their economic positions without any need for government intervention.

The second step to a healthy electricity industry is for consumers to pay the real cost of power. Cross-subsidization must end. That would promote optimal electricity use, innovation and environmental protection. Farmers enjoying nearly-free power create ecological problems by investing in water-guzzling crops such as rice and sugar cane.

Most industrial consumers, who do not have power supply privileges, have their businesses distorted and delayed by high prices. Lowering their costs would encourage power-intensive manufacturing to expand, and in the process, boost electricity demand and improve capacity utilization.

Of course, cutting theft is central to making consumers pay their way. Government officials must stop turning a blind eye to theft, especially when such transmission and distribution losses average 20%.

Politicians who want to continue subsidizing farmers or assist the poor can do so by paying cash out directly to their bank accounts, instead of wrongly relying on the power sector.

Such market-oriented reforms have long been blocked by state-level politicians, who now enjoy the influence born of operating subsidies and interfering in the sector. New Delhi must address this opposition. Narendra Modi, as a self-styled reforming prime minister, should have the courage to bite this bullet and convince state governments (starting with those ruled by his Bharatiya Janata Party) to reform. To encourage cooperation, he could offer states securing real improvements an increased share of centrally collected taxes.

Ritesh Kumar Singh is to be the chief economist of the new policy research and advocacy company Indonomics Consulting. He is former assistant director of the Finance Commission of India.

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Infrastructure Security Algorithm prioritizes cyber defense for power grids and critical infrastructure, mitigating ransomware, blackout risks, and cascading failures by guiding utilities, regulators, and cyber insurers on optimal security investment allocation.

Key Points

An algorithm that optimizes security spending to cut ransomware and blackout risks across critical infrastructure.

✅ Guides utilities on optimal security allocation

✅ Uses incentives to correct human risk biases

✅ Prioritizes assets to prevent cascading outages

Millions of people could suddenly lose electricity if a ransomware attack just slightly tweaked energy flow onto the U.S. power grid, as past US utility intrusions have shown.

No single power utility company has enough resources to protect the entire grid, but maybe all 3,000 of the grid's utilities could fill in the most crucial security gaps if there were a map showing where to prioritize their security investments.

Purdue University researchers have developed an algorithm to create that map. Using this tool, regulatory authorities or cyber insurance companies could establish a framework for protecting the U.S. power grid that guides the security investments of power utility companies to parts of the grid at greatest risk of causing a blackout if hacked.

Power grids are a type of critical infrastructure, which is any network - whether physical like water systems or virtual like health care record keeping - considered essential to a country's function and safety. The biggest ransomware attacks in history have happened in the past year, affecting most sectors of critical infrastructure in the U.S. such as grain distribution systems in the food and agriculture sector and the Colonial Pipeline, which carries fuel throughout the East Coast, prompting increased military preparation for grid hacks in the U.S.

With this trend in mind, Purdue researchers evaluated the algorithm in the context of various types of critical infrastructure in addition to the power sector, including electricity-sector IoT devices that interface with grid operations. The goal is that the algorithm would help secure any large and complex infrastructure system against cyberattacks.

"Multiple companies own different parts of infrastructure. When ransomware hits, it affects lots of different pieces of technology owned by different providers, so that's what makes ransomware a problem at the state, national and even global level," said Saurabh Bagchi, a professor in the Elmore Family School of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security at Purdue. "When you are investing security money on large-scale infrastructures, bad investment decisions can mean your power grid goes out, or your telecommunications network goes out for a few days."

Protecting infrastructure from hacks by improving security investment decisions

The researchers tested the algorithm in simulations of previously reported hacks to four infrastructure systems: a smart grid, industrial control system, e-commerce platform and web-based telecommunications network. They found that use of this algorithm results in the most optimal allocation of security investments for reducing the impact of a cyberattack.

The team's findings appear in a paper presented at this year's IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, the premier conference in the area of computer security. The team comprises Purdue professors Shreyas Sundaram and Timothy Cason and former PhD students Mustafa Abdallah and Daniel Woods.

"No one has an infinite security budget. You must decide how much to invest in each of your assets so that you gain a bump in the security of the overall system," Bagchi said.

The power grid, for example, is so interconnected that the security decisions of one power utility company can greatly impact the operations of other electrical plants. If the computers controlling one area's generators don't have adequate security protection, as seen when Russian hackers accessed control rooms at U.S. utilities, then a hack to those computers would disrupt energy flow to another area's generators, forcing them to shut down.

Since not all of the grid's utilities have the same security budget, it can be hard to ensure that critical points of entry to the grid's controls get the most investment in security protection.

The algorithm that Purdue researchers developed would incentivize each security decision maker to allocate security investments in a way that limits the cumulative damage a ransomware attack could cause. An attack on a single generator, for instance, would have less impact than an attack on the controls for a network of generators, which sophisticated grid-disruption malware can target at scale, rather than for the protection of a single generator.

Building an algorithm that considers the effects of human behavior

Bagchi's research shows how to increase cybersecurity in ways that address the interconnected nature of critical infrastructure but don't require an overhaul of the entire infrastructure system to be implemented.

As director of Purdue's Center for Resilient Infrastructures, Systems, and Processes, Bagchi has worked with the U.S. Department of Defense, Northrop Grumman Corp., Intel Corp., Adobe Inc., Google LLC and IBM Corp. on adopting solutions from his research. Bagchi's work has revealed the advantages of establishing an automatic response to attacks, and analyses like Symantec's Dragonfly report highlight energy-sector risks, leading to key innovations against ransomware threats, such as more effective ways to make decisions about backing up data.

There's a compelling reason why incentivizing good security decisions would work, Bagchi said. He and his team designed the algorithm based on findings from the field of behavioral economics, which studies how people make decisions with money.

"Before our work, not much computer security research had been done on how behaviors and biases affect the best defense mechanisms in a system. That's partly because humans are terrible at evaluating risk and an algorithm doesn't have any human biases," Bagchi said. "But for any system of reasonable complexity, decisions about security investments are almost always made with humans in the loop. For our algorithm, we explicitly consider the fact that different participants in an infrastructure system have different biases."

To develop the algorithm, Bagchi's team started by playing a game. They ran a series of experiments analyzing how groups of students chose to protect fake assets with fake investments. As in past studies in behavioral economics, they found that most study participants guessed poorly which assets were the most valuable and should be protected from security attacks. Most study participants also tended to spread out their investments instead of allocating them to one asset even when they were told which asset is the most vulnerable to an attack.

Using these findings, the researchers designed an algorithm that could work two ways: Either security decision makers pay a tax or fine when they make decisions that are less than optimal for the overall security of the system, or security decision makers receive a payment for investing in the most optimal manner.

"Right now, fines are levied as a reactive measure if there is a security incident. Fines or taxes don't have any relationship to the security investments or data of the different operators in critical infrastructure," Bagchi said.

In the researchers' simulations of real-world infrastructure systems, the algorithm successfully minimized the likelihood of losing assets to an attack that would decrease the overall security of the infrastructure system.

Bagchi's research group is working to make the algorithm more scalable and able to adapt to an attacker who may make multiple attempts to hack into a system. The researchers' work on the algorithm is funded by the National Science Foundation, the Wabash Heartland Innovation Network and the Army Research Lab.

Cybersecurity is an area of focus through Purdue's Next Moves, a set of initiatives that works to address some of the greatest technology challenges facing the U.S. Purdue's cybersecurity experts offer insights and assistance to improve the protection of power plants, electrical grids and other critical infrastructure.

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Russia-Ukraine Energy War disrupts infrastructure, oil, gas, and electricity, triggering supply shocks, price spikes, and inflation. Global markets face volatility, import risks, and cybersecurity threats, underscoring energy security, grid resilience, and diversified supply.

Key Points

It is Russia's strategic targeting of Ukraine's energy system to disrupt supplies, raise prices, and hit global markets.

✅ Attacks weaponize energy to strain Ukraine and allies

✅ Supply shocks risk oil, gas, and electricity price spikes

✅ Urgent need for cybersecurity, grid resilience, diversification

Russia's targeting of Ukraine's energy infrastructure has unleashed an "energy war" that could lead to widespread price increases, supply disruptions, and ripple effects throughout the global energy market, felt across the continent, with warnings of Europe's energy nightmare taking shape.

This highlights the unprecedented scale and severity of the attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. These attacks have disrupted power supplies, prompting increased electricity imports to keep the lights on, hindered oil and gas production, and damaged refineries, impacting Ukraine and the broader global energy system.

Energy as a Weapon

Experts claim that Russia's deliberate attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure represent a strategic escalation, amid energy ceasefire violations alleged by both sides, demonstrating the Kremlin's willingness to weaponize energy as part of its war effort. By crippling Ukraine's energy system, Russia aims to destabilize the country, inflict suffering on civilians, and undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Impacts on Global Oil and Gas Markets

The ongoing attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure could significantly impact global oil and gas markets, leading to supply shortages and dramatic price increases, even as European gas prices briefly returned to pre-war levels earlier this year, underscoring extreme volatility. Ukraine's oil and gas production, while not massive in global terms, is still significant, and its disruption feeds into existing anxieties about global energy supplies already affected by the war.

Ripple Effects Beyond Ukraine

The impacts of the "energy war" won't be limited to Ukraine or its immediate neighbours. Price increases for oil, gas, and electricity are expected worldwide, further fueling inflation and exacerbating the global cost of living crisis.  Additionally, supply disruptions could disproportionately affect developing nations and regions heavily dependent on energy imports, making targeted energy security support to Ukraine and other vulnerable importers vital.

Vulnerability of Energy Infrastructure

The attacks on Ukraine highlight the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure worldwide, as the country prepares for winter under persistent threats. The potential for other state or non-state actors to use similar tactics raises concerns about security and long-term stability in the global energy sector.

Strengthening Resilience

Experts emphasize the urgent need for global cooperation in strengthening the resilience of energy infrastructure. Investments in cybersecurity, diverse energy sources, and decentralized grids are crucial for mitigating the risks of future attacks, with some arguing that stepping away from fossil fuels would improve US energy security over time. International cooperation will be key in identifying vulnerable areas and providing aid to nations whose infrastructure is under threat.

The Unpredictable Future of Energy

The "energy war" unleashed by Russia has injected a new level of uncertainty into the global energy market. In addition to short-term price fluctuations and supply issues, the conflict could accelerate the long-term transition towards renewable energy sources and reshape how nations approach energy security.

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SDG&E Mitsubishi Power Energy Storage adds a 10 MW/60 MWh BESS in Pala, boosting grid reliability, renewable integration, and flexibility with EMS and SCADA controls, LFP safety chemistry, NERC CIP compliance, UL 9540 standards.

Key Points

A 10 MW/60 MWh BESS for SDG&E in Pala that enhances grid reliability, renewables usage, and operational flexibility.

✅ Emerald EMS/SCADA meets NERC CIP, IEC/ISA 62443, NIST 800-53

✅ LFP chemistry with UL 9540 and UL 9540A safety compliance

✅ Adds capacity, energy, and ancillary services to CA grid

San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), a regulated public utility that provides energy service to 3.7 million people, has awarded Mitsubishi Power an order for a 10 megawatt (MW) / 60 megawatt-hour (MWh) energy storage solution for its Pala-Gomez Creek Energy Storage Project in Pala, California. The battery energy storage system (BESS) will add capacity to help meet high energy demand, support grid reliability and operational flexibility, underscoring the broader benefits of energy storage now recognized by utilities, maximize use of renewable energy, and help prevent outages during peak demand.

The BESS project is Mitsubishi Power’s eighth in California, bringing total capacity to 280 MW / 1,140 MWh of storage to help meet California’s clean energy goals with reliable power to complement renewables, alongside emerging solutions like a California green hydrogen microgrid for added resilience.

Mitsubishi Power’s Emerald storage solution for SDG&E includes full turnkey design, engineering, procurement, and construction, as well as a 10-year long-term service agreement, aligning with CEC long-duration storage funding initiatives underway. It is scheduled to be online in early 2023.

The project will repower an existing energy storage site. It will employ Mitsubishi Power’s Emerald Integrated Plant Controller, which is an Energy Management System (EMS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system with real-time BESS operation and a monitoring/supervisory control platform. Mitsubishi Power leverages its decades of technology monitoring and diagnostics to turn data into actionable insights to maximize reliability, a priority as regions like Ontario increasingly rely on battery storage to meet rising demand. The Mitsubishi Power Emerald Integrated Plant Controller complies with North American Electric Reliability Corporation critical infrastructure protection (NERC CIP) standards and meets the highest security certification in the energy storage industry (IEC/ISA 62443, NIST 800-53) for maximum protection from cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities.

For added physical safety, Mitsubishi Power’s solution employs lithium iron phosphate (LFP) battery chemistry, aligning with BESS adoption in New York where safety and performance are critical. Compared with other chemistries, LFP provides longer life and superior thermal stability and chemical stability, while meeting UL 9540 and UL 9540A safety standards.

Fernando Valero, Director, Advanced Clean Technology, SDG&E, said, “SDG&E is committed to achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045. We are increasing our portfolio of energy storage assets, including virtual power plant models, to reach this goal. These assets enhance grid reliability and operational flexibility while maximizing our use of abundant renewable energy sources in California.”

Tom Cornell, Senior Vice President, Energy Storage Solutions, Mitsubishi Power Americas, said, “As more and more renewables come online during the energy transition, BESS solutions are essential to support a reliable and stable grid. We look forward to providing SDG&E with our BESS solution to add capacity, energy, and ancillary services to California’s grid. Mitsubishi Power’s Emerald storage solutions are enabling a smarter and more resilient energy future for our customers in California and around the globe, with projects like an energy storage demonstration in India underscoring this momentum.”

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V.C. Summer nuclear plant leak update: Dominion Energy repaired a valve in the reactor cooling system; radioactive water stayed within containment, NRC oversight continues as power output ramps toward full operation.

Key Points

A minor valve leak in the reactor cooling system contained onsite; Dominion repaired it as the plant resumes power.

✅ Valve leak in piping to steam generators, not environmental release.

✅ Radioactive water remained in containment, monitored per NRC rules.

✅ Plant ramping from 17% power; full operations may take days.

The V.C. Summer nuclear power plant, which has been shut down since early November because of a pipe leak, is expected to begin producing energy in a few days, a milestone comparable to a new U.S. reactor startup reported recently.

Dominion Energy says it has fixed the small leak in a pipe valve that allowed radioactive water to drip out. The company declined to say when the plant would be fully operational, but spokesman Ken Holt said that can take several days, amid broader discussions about the stakes of early nuclear closures across the industry.

The plant was at 17 percent power Wednesday, he said, as several global nuclear project milestones continue to be reported this year.

Holt, who said Dominion is still investigating the cause, said water that leaked was part of the reactor cooling system. While the water came in contact with nuclear fuel in the reactor, the water never escaped the plant's containment building and into the environment, Holt said.

He characterized the valve leak as '"uncommon" but not unexpected. The nuclear leak occurred in piping that links the nuclear reactor with the power plant's steam generators. Hundreds of pipes are in that part of the nuclear plant, a complexity often cited in the energy debate over struggling nuclear plants nationwide.

"There is always some level of leakage when you are operating, but it is contained and monitored, and when it rises to a certain level, you may take action to stop it," Holt said.

A nuclear safety watchdog has criticized Dominion for not issuing a public notice about the leak, but both the company and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission say the amount was so small it did not require notice.

The V.C. Summer Nuclear plant is about 25 miles northwest of Columbia in Fairfield County. It was licensed in the early 1980s. At one point, Dominion's predecessor, SCE&G, partnered with state owned Santee Cooper to build two more reactors there, even as new reactors in Georgia were taking shape. But the companies walked away from the project in 2017, citing high costs and troubles with its chief contractor, Westinghouse, even as closures such as Three Mile Island's shutdown continued to influence policy.

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