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Russian Cyberattacks on U.S. Critical Infrastructure target energy grids, nuclear plants, water systems, and aviation, DHS and FBI warn, using spear phishing, malware, and ICS/SCADA intrusion to gain footholds for potential sabotage and disruption.

Key Points

State-backed hacks targeting U.S. energy, nuclear, water and aviation via phishing and ICS access for sabotage.

✅ DHS and FBI detail multi-stage intrusion since 2016

✅ Targets include energy, nuclear, water, aviation, manufacturing

✅ TTPs: spear phishing, lateral movement, ICS reconnaissance

Russia is attacking the U.S. energy grid, with reported power plant breaches unfolding alongside attacks on nuclear facilities, water processing plants, aviation systems, and other critical infrastructure that millions of Americans rely on, according to a new joint analysis by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.

In an unprecedented alert, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI have warned of persistent attacks by Russian government hackers on critical US government sectors, including energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and manufacturing.

The alert details numerous attempts extending back to March 2016 when Russian cyber operatives targeted US government and infrastructure.

The DHS and FBI said: “DHS and FBI characterise this activity as a multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian government cyber-actors who targeted small commercial facilities’ networks, where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing and gained remote access into energy sector networks.

“After obtaining access, the Russian government cyber-actors conducted network reconnaissance, moved laterally and collected information pertaining to industrial control systems.”

The Trump administration has accused Russia of engineering a series of cyberattacks that targeted American and European nuclear power plants and water and electric systems, and could have sabotaged or shut power plants off at will.

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United States officials and private security firms saw the attacks as a signal by Moscow that it could disrupt the West’s critical facilities in the event of a conflict.

They said the strikes accelerated in late 2015, at the same time the Russian interference in the American election was underway. The attackers had compromised some operators in North America and Europe by spring 2017, after President Trump was inaugurated.

In the following months, according to the DHS/FBI report, Russian hackers made their way to machines with access to utility control rooms and critical control systems at power plants that were not identified. The hackers never went so far as to sabotage or shut down the computer systems that guide the operations of the plants.

Still, new computer screenshots released by the Department of Homeland Security have made clear that Russian state hackers had the foothold they would have needed to manipulate or shut down power plants.

“We now have evidence they’re sitting on the machines, connected to industrial control infrastructure, that allow them to effectively turn the power off or effect sabotage,” said Eric Chien, a security technology director at Symantec, a digital security firm.

“From what we can see, they were there. They have the ability to shut the power off. All that’s missing is some political motivation,” Mr. Chien said.

American intelligence agencies were aware of the attacks for the past year and a half, and the Department of Homeland Security and the F.B.I. first issued urgent warnings to utility companies in June, 2017. Both DHS/FBI have now offered new details as the Trump administration imposed sanctions against Russian individuals and organizations it accused of election meddling and “malicious cyberattacks.”

It was the first time the administration officially named Russia as the perpetrator of the assaults. And it marked the third time in recent months that the White House, departing from its usual reluctance to publicly reveal intelligence, blamed foreign government forces for attacks on infrastructure in the United States.

In December, the White House said North Korea had carried out the so-called WannaCry attack that in May paralyzed the British health system and placed ransomware in computers in schools, businesses and homes across the world. Last month, it accused Russia of being behind the NotPetya attack against Ukraine last June, the largest in a series of cyberattacks on Ukraine to date, paralyzing the country’s government agencies and financial systems.

But the penalties have been light. So far, President Trump has said little to nothing about the Russian role in those attacks.

The groups that conducted the energy attacks, which are linked to Russian intelligence agencies, appear to be different from the two hacking groups that were involved in the election interference.

That would suggest that at least three separate Russian cyberoperations were underway simultaneously. One focused on stealing documents from the Democratic National Committee and other political groups. Another, by a St. Petersburg “troll farm” known as the Internet Research Agency, used social media to sow discord and division. A third effort sought to burrow into the infrastructure of American and European nations.

For years, American intelligence officials tracked a number of Russian state-sponsored hacking units as they successfully penetrated the computer networks of critical infrastructure operators across North America and Europe, including in Ukraine.

Some of the units worked inside Russia’s Federal Security Service, the K.G.B. successor known by its Russian acronym, F.S.B.; others were embedded in the Russian military intelligence agency, known as the G.R.U. Still others were made up of Russian contractors working at the behest of Moscow.

Russian cyberattacks surged last year, starting three months after Mr. Trump took office.

American officials and private cybersecurity experts uncovered a series of Russian attacks aimed at the energy, water and aviation sectors and critical manufacturing, including nuclear plants, in the United States and Europe. In its urgent report in June, the Department of Homeland Security and the F.B.I. notified operators about the attacks but stopped short of identifying Russia as the culprit.

By then, Russian spies had compromised the business networks of several American energy, water and nuclear plants, mapping out their corporate structures and computer networks.

They included that of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, which runs a nuclear plant near Burlington, Kan. But in that case, and those of other nuclear operators, Russian hackers had not leapt from the company’s business networks into the nuclear plant controls.

Forensic analysis suggested that Russian spies were looking for inroads — although it was not clear whether the goal was to conduct espionage or sabotage, or to trigger an explosion of some kind.

In a report made public in October, Symantec noted that a Russian hacking unit “appears to be interested in both learning how energy facilities operate and also gaining access to operational systems themselves, to the extent that the group now potentially has the ability to sabotage or gain control of these systems should it decide to do so.”

The United States sometimes does the same thing. It bored deeply into Iran’s infrastructure before the 2015 nuclear accord, placing digital “implants” in systems that would enable it to bring down power grids, command-and-control systems and other infrastructure in case a conflict broke out. The operation was code-named “Nitro Zeus,” and its revelation made clear that getting into the critical infrastructure of adversaries is now a standard element of preparing for possible conflict.

Reconstructed screenshot fragments of a Human Machine Interface that the threat actors accessed, according to DHS

Sanctions Announced

The US treasury department has imposed sanctions on 19 Russian people and five groups, including Moscow’s intelligence services, for meddling in the US 2016 presidential election and other malicious cyberattacks.

Russia, for its part, has vowed to retaliate against the new sanctions.

The new sanctions focus on five Russian groups, including the Russian Federal Security Service, the country’s military intelligence apparatus, and the digital propaganda outfit called the Internet Research Agency, as well as 19 people, some of them named in the indictment related to election meddling released by special counsel Robert Mueller last month.

In announcing the sanctions, which will generally ban U.S. people and financial institutions from doing business with those people and groups, the Treasury Department pointed to alleged Russian election meddling, involvement in the infrastructure hacks, and the NotPetya malware, which the Treasury Department called “the most destructive and costly cyberattack in history.”

The new sanctions come amid ongoing criticism of the Trump administration’s reluctance to punish Russia for cyber and election meddling. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) said that, ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections, the administration’s decision was long overdue but not enough. “Nearly all of the entities and individuals who were sanctioned today were either previously under sanction during the Obama Administration, or had already been charged with federal crimes by the Special Counsel,” Warner said.

Warning: The Russians Are Coming

In an updated warning to utility companies, DHS/FBI officials included a screenshot taken by Russian operatives that proved they could now gain access to their victims’ critical controls, prompting a renewed focus on protecting the U.S. power grid among operators.

American officials and security firms, including Symantec and CrowdStrike, believe that Russian attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016 that left more than 200,000 citizens there in the dark are an ominous sign of what the Russian cyberstrikes may portend in the United States and Europe in the event of escalating hostilities.

Private security firms have tracked the Russian government assaults on Western power and energy operators — conducted alternately by groups under the names Dragonfly campaigns alongside Energetic Bear and Berserk Bear — since 2011, when they first started targeting defense and aviation companies in the United States and Canada.

By 2013, researchers had tied the Russian hackers to hundreds of attacks on the U.S. power grid and oil and gas pipeline operators in the United States and Europe. Initially, the strikes appeared to be motivated by industrial espionage — a natural conclusion at the time, researchers said, given the importance of Russia’s oil and gas industry.

But by December 2015, the Russian hacks had taken an aggressive turn. The attacks were no longer aimed at intelligence gathering, but at potentially sabotaging or shutting down plant operations.

At Symantec, researchers discovered that Russian hackers had begun taking screenshots of the machinery used in energy and nuclear plants, and stealing detailed descriptions of how they operated — suggesting they were conducting reconnaissance for a future attack.

Eventhough the US government enacted sanctions, cybersecurity experts are still questioning where the Russian attacks could lead, given that the United States was sure to respond in kind.

“Russia certainly has the technical capability to do damage, as it demonstrated in the Ukraine,” said Eric Cornelius, a cybersecurity expert at Cylance, a private security firm, who previously assessed critical infrastructure threats for the Department of Homeland Security during the Obama administration.

“It is unclear what their perceived benefit would be from causing damage on U.S. soil, especially given the retaliation it would provoke,” Mr. Cornelius said.

Though a major step toward deterrence, publicly naming countries accused of cyberattacks still is unlikely to shame them into stopping. The United States is struggling to come up with proportionate responses to the wide variety of cyberespionage, vandalism and outright attacks.

Lt. Gen. Paul Nakasone, who has been nominated as director of the National Security Agency and commander of United States Cyber Command, the military’s cyberunit, said during his recent Senate confirmation hearing, that countries attacking the United States so far have little to worry about.

“I would say right now they do not think much will happen to them,” General Nakasone said. He later added, “They don’t fear us.”

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U.S. power grid cyberattacks expose critical infrastructure to Russian hackers, DHS warns, targeting SCADA, smart grid sensors, and utilities; NERC CIP defenses, microgrids, and resilience planning aim to mitigate outages and supply chain disruptions.

Key Points

U.S. power grid cyberattacks target utility control systems, risking outages, disruption, requiring stronger defenses.

✅ Russian access to utilities and SCADA raises outage risk

✅ NERC CIP, DHS, and utilities expand cyber defenses

✅ Microgrids and renewables enhance resilience, islanding capability

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has revealed that Russian government hackers accessed control rooms at hundreds of U.S. electrical utility companies, gaining far more access to the operations of many more companies than previously disclosed by federal officials.

Securing the electrical grid, upon which is built almost the entirety of modern society, is a monumental challenge. Several experts have explained aspects of the task, potential solutions and the risks of failure for The Conversation:

1. What’s at stake?

The scale of disruption would depend, in part, on how much damage the attackers wanted to do. But a major cyberattack on the electricity grid could send surges through the grid, much as solar storms have done.

Those events, explains Rochester Institute of Technology space weather scholar Roger Dube, cause power surges, damaging transmission equipment. One solar storm in March 1989, he writes, left “6 million people without power for nine hours … [and] destroyed a large transformer at a New Jersey nuclear plant. Even though a spare transformer was nearby, it still took six months to remove and replace the melted unit.”

More serious attacks, like larger solar storms, could knock out manufacturing plants that build replacement electrical equipment, gas pumps to fuel trucks to deliver the material and even “the machinery that extracts oil from the ground and refines it into usable fuel. … Even systems that seem non-technological, like public water supplies, would shut down: Their pumps and purification systems need electricity.”

In the most severe cases, with fuel-starved transportation stalled and other basic infrastructure not working, “[p]eople in developed countries would find themselves with no running water, no sewage systems, no refrigerated food, and no way to get any food or other necessities transported from far away. People in places with more basic economies would also be without needed supplies from afar.”

2. It wouldn’t be the first time

Russia has penetrated other countries’ electricity grids in the past, and used its access to do real damage. In the middle of winter 2015, for instance, a Russian cyberattack shut off the power to Ukraine’s capital in the middle of winter 2015.

Power grid scholar Michael McElfresh at Santa Clara University discusses what happened to cause hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to lose power for several hours, and notes that U.S. utilities use software similar to their Ukrainian counterparts – and therefore share the same vulnerabilities.

3. Security work is ongoing

These threats aren’t new, write grid security experts Manimaran Govindarasu from Iowa State and Adam Hahn from Washington State University. There are a lot of people planning defenses, including the U.S. government, as substation attacks are growing across the country. And the “North American Electric Reliability Corporation, which oversees the grid in the U.S. and Canada, has rules … for how electric companies must protect the power grid both physically and electronically.” The group holds training exercises in which utility companies practice responding to attacks.

4. There are more vulnerabilities now

Grid researcher McElfresh also explains that the grid is increasingly complex, with with thousands of companies responsible for different aspects of generating, transmission, and delivery to customers. In addition, new technologies have led companies to incorporate more sensors and other “smart grid” technologies. He describes how that, as a recent power grid report card underscores, “has created many more access points for penetrating into the grid computer systems.”

5. It’s time to ramp up efforts

The depth of access and potential control over electrical systems means there has never been a better time than right now to step up grid security amid a renewed focus on protecting the grid among policymakers and utilities, writes public-utility researcher Theodore Kury at the University of Florida. He notes that many of those efforts may also help protect the grid from storm damage and other disasters.

6. A possible solution could be smaller grids

One protective effort was identified by electrical engineer Joshua Pearce at Michigan Technological University, who has studied ways to protect electricity supplies to U.S. military bases both within the country and abroad. He found that the Pentagon has already begun testing systems, as the military ramps up preparation for major grid hacks, that combine solar-panel arrays with large-capacity batteries. “The equipment is connected together – and to buildings it serves – in what is called a ‘microgrid,’ which is normally connected to the regular commercial power grid but can be disconnected and become self-sustaining when disaster strikes.”

He found that microgrid systems could make military bases more resilient in the face of cyberattacks, criminals or terrorists and natural disasters – and even help the military “generate all of its electricity from distributed renewable sources by 2025 … which would provide energy reliability and decrease costs, [and] largely eliminate a major group of very real threats to national security.”

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CAISO Net Negative Emissions signal moments when greenhouse gas intensity of serving ISO demand drops below zero, driven by high renewable generation, low load, strong solar exports, and imports accounting in the California grid.

Key Points

Moments when CAISO's CO2 to serve demand is below zero, driven by renewables, exports, and import accounting.

✅ Calculated using imports and exports to serve ISO demand

✅ Occur during high solar output, low weekend load

✅ Coincide with curtailment and record renewable penetration

We’re a long way from the land of milk and honey, but on Easter Sunday – for about an hour – we got a taste.

On Sunday, at 1:55 PM Pacific Time the California Independent Systems Operator (CAISO) reported that greenhouse gas emissions necessary to serve its demand (~80% of California’s electricity demand on an annual basis), was measured at a rate -16 metric tons of CO2 per hour. Five minutes later, the value was -2 mTCO2/h, before it crept back up to 40 mTCO2/h at 2:05 PM PST. At 2:10 PST though it fell back to -86 mTCO2/h and stayed negative until 3:05 PM PST, even as global CO2 emissions flatlined in 2019 according to the IEA.

This information was brought to the attention of pv magazine via tweet from eagle eye Jon Pa after CAISO’s site first noted the negative values:

The region was still generating CO2 though, as natural gas, biogas, biomass, geothermal and even coal plants were running and pumping out emissions, even as potent greenhouse gases declined in the US under control efforts. CAISO’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Tracking Methodology, December 28, 2016 (pdf) notes the below calculations to create the value what it terms, “Total GHG emissions to serve ISO demand”:

Of importance to note is that to get to the net negative value, CAISO considered all electricity imports and exports, a reminder that climate policy shapes grid operations across North America. And as can be noted in the image below the CO2 intensity of imports during the day rapidly declined as the sun came up, first going negative around 9:05 AM PST, and mostly staying so until just before 6 PM PST.

During this same weekend, other records were noted (reiterating that we’re in record setting season and as the state pursues its 100% carbon-free mandate now in law) such as a new electricity export record of greater than 2 GW and total renewable electricity as part of total demand at greater than 70%.

At the peak negative moment of 2:15 PM PST, -112 mTCO2/h seen below, the total amount of clean instantaneous generation being used in the power grid region was 17 GW, a far cry from heat-driven reliability strains like rolling blackout warnings that arise during extreme demand, with renewables giving 76% of the total, hydro 14%, nuclear 13% and imports of -12% countering the CO2 coming from just over 1.4 GW of gas generation.

Also of importance are a few layers of nuance in the electricity demand charts. First off we’re in the shoulder seasons  of California – nice cool weather before the warmth of summer drives air conditioning demand. Additional the weekend electricity demand is always lower, as well, Easter Sunday might have had an affect, whereas in colder regions Calgary’s electricity use can soar during frigid snaps.

Lastly to note was the amount of electricity from solar and wind generation being curtailed. And while the Sunday numbers weren’t available yet, the below image noted Saturday with 10 GWh in total being curtailed (pdf) – peaking at over 3.2 GW of instantaneous mostly solar power even as solar is now the cheapest electricity according to the IEA, in the hours of 2 and 3 PM PST. On an annualized basis, less than 2% of total potential solar electricity was curtailed in 2018.

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Netherlands renewable energy progress highlights rising wind energy and solar power output, delivering 17 billion kWh of green electricity from sustainable sources, yet trailing EU targets, with wind providing 60% and solar 34%.

Key Points

It is the country's growth in green electricity, led by wind and solar, yet short of EU targets at 13.8% of generation.

✅ 17 billion kWh green output; 13.8% of total generation

✅ Wind energy up 16% to 9.6 billion kWh; 60% of green power

✅ Solar power up about 13%; 34% of renewable production

The Netherlands is generating more electricity from sustainable sources as US renewable record 28% in April underscores broader momentum but is still far from reaching its targets, the national statistics office CBS said on Friday.

In total, the Netherlands produced 17 billion kilowatts of green energy last year, a rise of 10% on 2016. Sustainable sources now account for 13.8 per cent of energy generation, even as solar reshapes prices in Northern Europe across the region.

The biggest growth was in wind energy – up 16 per cent to 9.6 billion kWh – or the equivalent of energy for three million households. Wind energy now accounts for 60 per cent of green Dutch power. The amount of solar power, which accounts for 34% of green energy production, rose almost 13 per cent, and Dutch solar outpaces Canada according to recent reports.

In January, European statistics agency Eurostat said the Netherlands is near the bottom of a new table on renewable energy use in Europe. The EU has a target of a fifth of all energy use from green sources by 2020 and – while some countries have reached their own targets, including Germany's 50% clean power milestones – the Dutch, French and Irish need to increase their rates by at least 6%, Eurostat said, and Ireland has set green electricity goals for the next four years to close the gap.

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Canada Clean Energy Transition accelerates via carbon pricing, renewables, EV incentives, energy efficiency upgrades, smart grids, interprovincial transmission, and innovation in hydro, wind, solar, and storage to cut emissions and power sustainable growth.

Key Points

Canada Clean Energy Transition is a shift to renewables, EVs and efficiency powered by smart policy and innovation.

✅ Carbon pricing and EV incentives accelerate adoption

✅ Grid upgrades, storage, and transmission expand renewables

✅ Industry efficiency and smart tech cut energy waste

So, how do we get there?

We're already on our way.

The final weeks of 2016 delivered some progress, as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and premiers of 11 of the 13 provinces and territories negotiated a new national climate plan. The deal is a game changer. It marks the moment that Canada stopped arguing about whether to tackle climate change and started figuring out how we're going to get there.

We can each be part of the solution by reducing the amount of energy we use, making sure our homes and workplaces are well insulated and choosing energy efficient appliances. When the time comes to upgrade our cars, washing machines and refrigerators, we can take advantage of rebates that cut the cost of electric models. In our homes, we can install smart technology — like automated thermostats — to cut down on energy waste and reduce power bills.

Even industries that use a lot of energy, like mining and manufacturing, could become leaders in sustainability. It would mean investing in energy saving technology, making their operations more efficient and running conveyor belts, robots and other equipment off locally produced renewable electricity.

Meanwhile, laboratories and factories in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia are making breakthroughs in areas like energy storage, while renewable energy growth in the Prairie Provinces gathers momentum, which will make it possible to access clean power even when the sun isn't shining and the wind isn't blowing.

Liberal leader Justin Trudeau holds a copy of his environmental platform after announcing details of it at Jericho Beach Park in Vancouver, B.C., on Monday June 29, 2015. (Darryl Dyck/Canadian Press)

The scale and speed of Canada's transition to clean energy depends on provincial and federal policies that do things like tax carbon pollution, build interprovincial electricity transmission lines, invest in renewable energy and grid modernization projects that strengthen the system, and increase incentives for electric vehicles. 

Of course, even the best policies won't produce lasting results unless Canadians fight for them and take ownership for our role in the energy transition. Global momentum toward clean energy may be "irreversible," as former U.S. President Barack Obama recently wrote in the journal Science — but it's up to us whether Canada catches that wave or misses out.

Fortunately, clean energy has always been part of Canada's DNA.

We can learn from the past

In remote corners of the newly minted Dominion of Canada, rushing rivers turned the waterwheels that powered the lumber mills that built the places we inhabit today. The first electric lights were switched on in Winnipeg shortly after Confederation. By the turn of the 20th century, hydro power was lighting up towns and cities from coast to coast.  

Our country is home to some of the world's best clean energy resources, and experts note that zero-emissions electricity by 2035 is possible given our strengths, and fully two-thirds of our power is generated from renewable sources like hydro, wind and solar.

Looking to our heritage, we can make clean growth the next chapter in Canada's history

Recent commitments to phase out coal and invest in clean energy infrastructure mean the share of renewable power in Canada's energy mix is poised to grow. The global shift from fossil fuels to clean energy is opening up huge opportunities and Canada's opportunity in the global electricity market is growing as the country has the expertise to deliver solutions around the world.

Looking to our heritage, we can make clean growth the next chapter in Canada's history — building a nation that's electric, connected and on a practical, profitable path to 2035 zero-emission power for households and industry, stronger than ever.

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Georgia Electricity Imports October 2017 surged as hydropower output fell and thermal power plants underperformed; ESCO balanced demand via low-cost imports, mainly from Azerbaijan, amid rising tariffs, kWh consumption growth, and a widening generation-consumption gap.

Key Points

They mark a record import surge due to costly local generation, lower hydropower, ESCO balancing costs, and rising demand.

✅ Imports rose 832% YoY to 157 mln kWh, mainly from Azerbaijan

✅ TPP output fell despite capacity; only low-tariff plants ran

✅ Balancing price 13.8 tetri/kWh signaled costly domestic PPAs

In October 2017, Georgian power plants generated 828 mln. KWh of electricity, marginally up (+0.79%) compared to September. Following the traditional seasonal pattern and amid European concerns over dispatchable power shortages affecting markets, the share of electricity produced by renewable sources declined to 71% of total generation (87% in September), while thermal power generation’s share increased, accounting for 29% of total generation (compared to 13% in September). When we compare last October’s total generation with the total generation of October 2016, however, we observe an 8.7% decrease in total generation (in October 2016, total generation was 907 mln. kWh). The overall decline in generation with respect to the previous year is due to a simultaneous decline in both thermal power and hydro power generation. 

Consumption of electricity on the local market in the same period was 949 mln. kWh (+7% compared to October 2016, and +3% with respect to September 2017), and reflected global trends such as India's electricity growth in recent years. The gap between consumption and generation increased to 121 mln. kWh (15% of the amount generated in October), up from 100 mln. kWh in September. Even more importantly, the situation was radically different with respect to the prior year, when generation exceeded consumption.

The import figure for October was by far the highest from the last 12 years (since ESCO was established), occurring as Ukraine electricity exports resumed regionally, highlighting wider cross-border dynamics. In October 2017, Georgia imported 157 mln. kWh of electricity (for 5.2 ¢/kWh – 13 tetri/kWh). This constituted an 832% increase compared to October 2016, and is about 50% larger than the second largest import figure (104.2 mln. kWh in October 2014). Most of the October 2017 imports (99.6%) came from Azerbaijan, with the remaining 0.04% coming from Russia.

The main question that comes to mind when observing these statistics is: why did Georgia import so much? One might argue that this is just the result of a bad year for hydropower generation and increased demand. This argument, however, is not fully convincing. While it is true that hydropower generation declined and demand increased, the country’s excess demand could have been easily satisfied by its existing thermal power plants, even as imported coal volumes rose in regional markets. Instead of increasing, however, the electricity coming from thermal power plants declined as well. Therefore, that cannot be the reason, and another must be found. The first that comes to mind is that importing electricity may have been cheaper than buying it from local TPPs, or from other generators selling electricity to ESCO under power purchase agreements (PPAs). We can test the first part of this hypothesis by comparing the average price of imported electricity to the price ceiling on the tariff that TPPs can charge for the electricity they sell. Looking at the trade statistics from Geostat, the average price for imported electricity in October 2017 remained stable with respect to the same month of the previous year, at 5.2 ¢ (13 tetri) per kWh. Only two thermal power plants (Gardabani and Mtkvari) had a price ceiling below 13 tetri per kWh. Observing the electricity balance of Georgia, we see that indeed more than 98% of the electricity generated by TPPs in October 2017 was generated by those two power plants.

What about other potential sources of electricity amid Central Asia's power shortages at the time? To answer this question, we can use the information derived from the weighted average price of balancing electricity. Why balancing electricity? Because it allows us to reconstruct the costs the market operator (ESCO) faced during the month of October to make sure demand and supply were balanced, and it allows us to gain an insight about the price of electricity sold through PPAs.

ESCO reports that the weighted average price of balancing electricity in October 2017 was 13.8 tetri/kWh, (25% higher than in October 2016, when it was below the average weighted cost of imports – 11 vs. 13 – and when the quantity of imported electricity was substantially smaller). Knowing that in October 2017, 61% of balancing electricity came from imports, while 39% came from hydropower and wind power plants selling electricity to ESCO under their PPAs, we can deduce that in this case, internal generation was (on average) also substantially more expensive than imports. Therefore, the high cost of internally generated electricity, rather than the technical impossibility of generating enough electricity to satisfy electricity demand, indeed appears to be one the main reasons why electricity imports spiked in October 2017.

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