EPRI to help with smart grid roadmap

UK Energy Price Cap Cut 2024 signals relief as wholesale gas prices fall; Ofgem price cap drops per Cornwall Insight, aided by LNG supply, mild winter, despite Red Sea tensions and Ukraine conflict impacts.

Key Points

A forecast cut to Great Britain's Ofgem price cap as wholesale gas falls, easing typical annual household bills in 2024.

✅ Cap falls from £1,928 to £1,620 in April 2024

✅ Forecast £1,497 in July, then about £1,541 from October

✅ Drivers: lower wholesale gas, LNG supply, mild winter

Households in Great Britain are set to experience a significant reduction in energy costs this spring, with bills projected to drop by over £300 annually. This decrease is primarily due to a decline in wholesale gas prices, offering some respite to those grappling with the cost of living crisis.

Cornwall Insight, a well-regarded industry analyst, predicts a 16% reduction in average bills from the previous quarter, potentially reaching the lowest levels since the onset of the Ukraine conflict.

The industry’s price cap, indicative of the average annual bill for a typical household, is expected to decrease from the current £1,928, set earlier this month, to £1,620 in April – a reduction of £308 and £40 less than previously forecasted in December, as ministers consider ending the gas-electricity price link to improve market resilience.

Concerns about escalating tensions in the Red Sea, where Houthi rebels have disrupted global shipping, initially led analysts to fear an increase in wholesale oil prices and subsequent impact on household energy costs.

Contrary to these concerns, oil prices have remained relatively stable, and European gas reserves have been higher than anticipated during a mild winter, with European gas prices returning to pre-Ukraine war levels since November.

Cornwall Insight anticipates that energy prices will continue to be comparatively low through 2024. They predict a further decline to £1,497 for a typical annual bill from July, followed by a slight increase to £1,541 starting in October.

This forecast is a welcome development for Britons who have been dealing with increased expenses across various sectors, from food to utilities, amidst persistently high inflation rates, with energy-driven EU inflation hitting lower-income households hardest across member states.

Energy bills saw a steep rise in 2021, which escalated further due to the Ukraine conflict in 2022, driving up wholesale gas prices. This surge prompted government intervention to subsidize bills, with the UK price cap estimated to cost around £89bn to the public purse, capping costs to a typical household at £2,500.

Cornwall Insight noted that the supply of liquified natural gas to Europe had not been as adversely affected by the Red Sea disruptions as initially feared. Moreover, the UK has been well-supplied with gas from the US, which has become a more significant supplier since the Ukraine war, even as US electricity prices have risen to multi-decade highs. Contributing factors also include lower gas prices in Asia, mild weather, and robust gas availability.

Craig Lowrey, a principal consultant at Cornwall Insight, remarked that concerns about Red Sea events driving up energy prices have not materialized, allowing households to expect a reduction in prices.

On Monday, the next-month wholesale gas price dropped by 4% to 65p a therm.

However, Lowrey cautioned that a complete return to pre-crisis energy bill levels remains unlikely due to ongoing market impacts from shifting away from Russian energy sources and persistent geopolitical tensions, as well as policy changes such as Britain’s Energy Security Bill shaping market reforms.

Richard Neudegg, director of regulation at Uswitch, welcomed the potential further reduction of the price cap in April. However, he pointed out that this offers little solace to households currently struggling with high winter energy costs during the winter. Neudegg urged Ofgem, the energy regulator, to prompt suppliers to reintroduce more competitive and affordable fixed-price deals.

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BC Utilities Commission Site C Dam Questions press BC Hydro on geotechnical risks, stability issues, cost overruns, oversight gaps, seeking transparency for ratepayers and clarity on contracts, mitigation, and the powerhouse and spillway foundations.

Key Points

Inquiry seeking explanations from BC Hydro on geotechnical risks, costs, timelines and oversight for Site C.

✅ Timeline of studies, monitoring, and mitigation actions

✅ Rationale for contracts, costs, and right bank construction

✅ Implications for ratepayers, oversight, and project stability

The watchdog B.C. Utilities Commission has sent BC Hydro 70 questions about the troubled Site C dam, asking when geotechnical risks were first identified and when the project’s assurance board was first made aware of potential issues related to the dam’s stability. 

“I think they’ve come to the conclusion — but they don’t say it — that there’s been a cover-up by BC Hydro and by the government of British Columbia,” former BC Hydro CEO Marc Eliesen told The Narwhal. 

On Oct. 21, The Narwhal reported that two top B.C. civil servants, including the senior bureaucrat who prepares Site C dam documents for cabinet, knew in May 2019 that the project faced serious geotechnical problems due to its “weak foundation” and the stability of the dam was “a significant risk.” 

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“They [the civil servants] would have reported to their ministers and to the government in general,” said Eliesen, who is among 18 prominent Canadians calling for a halt to Site C work until an independent team of experts can determine if the geotechnical problems can be resolved and at what cost.  

“It’s disingenuous for Premier [John] Horgan to try to suggest, ‘Well, I just found out about it recently.’ If that’s the case, he should fire the public servants who are representing the province.” 

The public only found out about significant issues with the Site C dam at the end of July, when BC Hydro released overdue reports saying the project faces unknown cost overruns, schedule delays and, even as it achieved a transmission line milestone earlier, such profound geotechnical troubles that its overall health is classified as ‘red,’ meaning it is in serious trouble. 

“The geotechnical challenges have been there all these years.”

The Site C dam is the largest publicly funded infrastructure project in B.C.’s history. If completed, it will flood 128 kilometres of the Peace River and its tributaries, forcing families from their homes and destroying Indigenous gravesites, hundreds of protected archeological sites, some of Canada’s best farmland and habitat for more than 100 species vulnerable to extinction.

Eliesen said geotechnical risks were a key reason BC Hydro’s board of directors rejected the project in the early 1990s, when he was at the helm of BC Hydro.

“The geotechnical challenges have been there all these years,” said Eliesen, who is also the former Chair and CEO of Ontario Hydro, where Ontario First Nations have urged intervention on a critical electricity line, the former Chair of Manitoba Hydro and the former Chair and CEO of the Manitoba Energy Authority.

Elsewhere, a Manitoba Hydro line to Minnesota has faced potential delays, highlighting broader grid planning challenges.

The B.C. Utilities Commission is an independent watchdog that makes sure ratepayers — including BC Hydro customers — receive safe and reliable energy services, as utilities adapt to climate change risks, “at fair rates.”

The commission’s questions to BC Hydro include 14 about the “foundational enhancements” BC Hydro now says are necessary to shore up the Site C dam, powerhouse and spillways. 

The commission is asking BC Hydro to provide a timeline and overview of all geotechnical engineering studies and monitoring activities for the powerhouse, spillway and dam core areas, and to explain what specific risk management and mitigation practices were put into effect once risks were identified.

The commission also wants to know why construction activities continued on the right bank of the Peace River, where the powerhouse would be located, “after geotechnical risks materialized.” 

It’s asking if geotechnical risks played a role in BC Hydro’s decision in March “to suspend or not resume work” on any components of the generating station and spillways.

The commission also wants BC Hydro to provide an itemized breakdown of a $690 million increase in the main civil works contract — held by Spain’s Acciona S.A. and the South Korean multinational conglomerate Samsung C&T Corp. — and to explain the rationale for awarding a no-bid contract to an unnamed First Nation and if other parties were made aware of that contract. 

Peace River Jewels of the Peace Site C The Narwhal
Islands in the Peace River, known as the ‘jewels of the Peace’ will be destroyed for fill for the Site C dam or will be submerged underwater by the dam’s reservoir, a loss that opponents are sharing with northerners in community discussions. Photo: Byron Dueck

B.C. Utilities Commission chair and CEO David Morton said it’s not the first time the commission has requested additional information after receiving BC Hydro’s quarterly progress reports on the Site C dam. 

“Our staff reads them to make sure they understand them and if there’s anything in then that’s not clear we go then we do go through this, we call it the IR — information request — process,” Morton said in an interview.

“There are things reported in here that we felt required a little more clarity, and we needed a little more understanding of them, so that’s why we asked the questions.”

The questions were sent to BC Hydro on Oct. 23, the day before the provincial election, but Morton said the commission is extraordinarily busy this year and that’s just a coincidence. 

“Our resources are fairly strained. It would have been nice if it could have been done faster, it would be nice if everything could be done faster.” 

“These questions are not politically motivated,” Morton said. “They’re not political questions. There’s no reason not to issue them when they’re ready.”

The commission has asked BC Hydro to respond by Nov. 19.

Read more: Top B.C. government officials knew Site C dam was in serious trouble over a year ago: FOI docs

Morton said the independent commission’s jurisdiction is limited because the B.C. government removed it from oversight of the project. 

The commission, which would normally determine if a large dam like the Site C project is in the public’s financial interest, first examined BC Hydro’s proposal to build the dam in the early 1980s.

After almost two years of hearings, including testimony under oath, the commission concluded B.C. did not need the electricity. It found the Site C dam would have negative social and environmental impacts and said geothermal power should be investigated to meet future energy needs. 

The project was revived in 2010 by the BC Liberal government, which touted energy from the Site C dam as a potential source of electricity for California and a way to supply B.C.’s future LNG industry with cheap power.

Not willing to countenance another rejection from the utilities commission, the government changed the law, stripping the commission of oversight for the project. The NDP government, which came to power in 2017, chose not to restore that oversight.

“The approval of the project was exempt from our oversight,” Morton said. “We can’t come along and say ‘there’s something we don’t like about what you’re doing, we’re going to stop construction.’ We’re not in that position and that’s not the focus of these questions.” 

But the commission still retains oversight for the cost of construction once the project is complete, Morton said. 

“The cost of construction has to be recovered in [hydro] rates. That means BC Hydro will need our approval to recover their construction cost in rates, and those are not insignificant amounts, more than $10.7 billion, in all likelihood.” 

In order to recover the cost from ratepayers, the commission needs to be satisfied BC Hydro didn’t spend more money than necessary on the project, Morton said. 

“As you can imagine, that’s not a straight forward review to do after the fact, after a 10-year construction project or whatever it ends up being … so we’re using these quarterly reports as an opportunity to try to stay on top of it and to flag any areas where we think there may be areas we need to look into in the future.”

The price tag for the Site C dam was $10.7 billion before BC Hydro’s announcement at the end of July — a leap from $6.6 billion when the project was first announced in 2010 and $8.8 billion when construction began in 2015. 

Eliesen said the utilities commission should have been asking tough questions about the Site C dam far earlier. 

“They’ve been remiss in their due diligence activities … They should have been quicker in raising questions with BC Hydro, rather than allowing BC Hydro to be exceptionally late in submitting their reports.” 

BC Hydro is late in filing another Site C quarterly report, covering the period from April 1 to June 30. 

The quarterly reports provide the B.C. public with rare glimpses of a project that international hydro expert Harvey Elwin described as being more secretive than any hydro project he has encountered in five decades working on large dams around the world, including in China.

Read more: Site C dam secrecy ‘extraordinary’, international hydro construction expert tells court proceeding

Morton said the commission could have ordered regular reporting for the Site C project if it had its previous oversight capability.

“Then we would have had the ability to follow up and ultimately order any delinquent reports to be filed. In this circumstance, they are being filed voluntarily. They can file it as late as they choose. We don’t have any jurisdiction.” 

In addition to the six dozen questions, the commission has also filed confidential questions with BC Hydro. Morton said confidential information could include things such as competitive bid information. “BC Hydro itself may be under a confidentiality agreement not to disclose it.” 

With oversight, the commission would also have been able to drill down into specific project elements,  Morton said. 

“We would have wanted to ensure that the construction followed what was approved. BC Hydro wouldn’t have the ability to make significant changes to the design and nature of the project as they went along.”

BC Hydro has been criticized for changing the design of the Site C dam to an L-shape, which Eliesen said “has never been done anywhere in the world for an earthen dam.” 

Morton said an empowered commission could have opted to hold a public hearing about the design change and engage its own technical consultants, as it did in 2017 when the new NDP government asked it to conduct a fast-tracked review of the project’s economics. 

Construction Site C Dam
A recent report by a U.S. energy economist found cancelling the Site C dam project would save BC Hydro customers an initial $116 million a year, with increasing savings growing over time. Photo: Garth Lenz / The Narwhal

The commission’s final report found the dam could cost more than $12 billion, that BC Hydro had a historical pattern of overestimating energy demand and that the same amount of energy could be produced by a suite of renewables, including wind and proposed pumped storage such as the Meaford project, for $8.8 billion or less. 

The NDP government, under pressure from construction trade unions, opted to continue the project, refusing to disclose key financial information related to its decision. 

When the geotechnical problems were revealed in July, the government announced the appointment of former deputy finance minister Peter Milburn as a special Site C project advisor who will work with BC Hydro and the Site C project assurance board to examine the project and provide the government with independent advice.

Eliesen said BC Hydro and the B.C. government should never have allowed the recent diversion of the Peace River to take place given the tremendous geotechnical challenges the project faces and its unknown cost and schedule for completion. 

“It’s a disgrace and scandalous,” he said. “You can halt the river diversion, but you’ve got another four or five years left in construction of the dam. What are you going to do about all the cement you’ve poured if you’ve got stability problems?”

He said it’s counter-productive to continue with advice “from the same people who have been wrong, wrong, wrong,” without calling in independent global experts to examine the geotechnical problems. 

“If you stop construction, whether it takes three or six months, that’s the time that’s required in order to give yourself a comfort level. But continuing to do what you’ve been doing is not the right course. You should have to sit back.”

Eliesen said it reminded him of the Pete Seeger song Waist Deep in the Big Muddy, which tells the story of a captain ordering his troops to keep slogging through a river because they will soon be on dry ground. After the captain drowns, the troops turn around.

“It’s a reflection of the fact that if you don’t look at what’s new, you just keep on doing what you’ve been doing in the past and that, unfortunately, is what’s happening here in this province with this project.”

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India Power Sector Payment Crisis strains utilities with electricity theft, discom arrears, coal dues, and subsidy burdens, triggering outages, load-shedding, and tariff stress as record heatwave demand tests grid reliability, billing compliance, and infrastructure upgrades.

Key Points

Linked payment shortfalls, theft, and subsidies driving arrears, outages, and planning gaps across Indias power grid.

✅ Discom arrears surpass Rs 1 lakh crore, straining cash flow

✅ Coal India unpaid, fuel risk rises and tariffs face pressure

✅ Outages and load-shedding worsen amid heatwave demand spike

India is among the world leaders in losing money to electricity theft. The country’s power sector also has a peculiar pattern of entities selling without getting the money on time, or nothing at all, while Manitoba Hydro debt highlights similar strains elsewhere. Coal India is owed about Rs 12,300 crore by power generation companies, which themselves have not been paid over Rs 1 lakh crore by distribution companies. The figures of losses suffered by discoms are much higher, even as UK network profits have drawn criticism, underscoring divergent market outcomes. The circuit does get completed somehow, but the uneven transaction, which defies business sense, introduces a disruptive strand that limits the scope for any future planning. Regular and unannounced shutdowns become the norm as the power supply falls short of demand, which this time is expected to touch record highs of 215-220 gigawatts amid the scorching heatwave, and cases like deferred BC Hydro costs illustrate how financial pressures accumulate.

In debt-ridden Punjab, the power subsidy bill is over Rs 10,000 crore, a large portion of which serves farmers. The AAP government plans to provide free electricity up to 300 units for every household from July 1, even as power bill cuts in Thailand show alternative approaches to affordability. The generous giveaways cannot camouflage the state of affairs. Thirty-three government departments had outstanding electricity bills of Rs 62 crore as on March 31, the end of the last financial year. With arrears of Rs 22.48 crore, the biggest defaulter was the Water and Sanitation Department. According to the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited, around 40 police stations and posts have been found to be stealing power or failing to clear the bills, while utility impersonation scams target consumers elsewhere. Customary warnings have been issued of snapping supply if the dues are not paid, even as utility penalties for disconnection delays underscore enforcement challenges, but ‘public interest’ and ‘essential services’ will ensure that such an eventuality does not arise.

The substantial fine imposed on a dera stealing power in Tarn Taran, along with the registration of an FIR, is exemplary action that needs to be carried forward. Change is tough, but a new way of working begins with those in positions of power leading by example, be it fixing the payment mechanism, upgrading infrastructure with smart grid initiatives in mind, minimising the use of electricity or a gradual switch to alternative energy sources.

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BC Hydro pandemic electricity trends reveal weekend-like energy consumption patterns: later morning demand, earlier evenings, more cooking, streaming on smart TVs, and work-from-home routines, with tips to conserve using laptops and small appliances.

Key Points

Weekend-like shifts in power demand from work-from-home routines: later mornings, earlier evenings, and more streaming.

✅ Later morning electricity demand; earlier evening peaks

✅ More cooking and baking; increased streaming after dinner

✅ Conservation tips: laptops, small appliances, smart TVs

The latest report on electricity usage in British Columbia reveals the COVID-19 pandemic has created an atmosphere where every day feels like a Saturday, a pattern also reflected in BC electricity demand during peak seasons.

BC Hydro says overall power usage hasn't changed much, but similar Ontario electricity demand shifts suggest regional differences, while Manitoba demand fell more noticeably, and a survey of 500 people shows daily routines have shifted dramatically since mid-March when pandemic-related closures began.

The hydro report says, with nearly 40 per cent of B.C. residents working from home, trends in residential electricity use confirm almost half are sleeping in and eating breakfast later, while about a quarter say they are showering less.

Those patterns more closely resemble what hydro says is typical weekend power consumption, and could influence time-of-use rates as electricity demand occurs later in the morning and earlier in the evening.

The report also finds many people are cooking and baking more than before the pandemic, preparing the evening meal earlier, streaming or viewing more television after dinner even as Ottawa's electricity consumption dipped earlier in the pandemic, and 80 per cent are going to bed later.

Although electricity use is normal for this time of year, hydro says homebound residents can conserve by using laptops instead of desktops, small appliances such as Instant Pots instead of ovens, and streaming movies or TV shows on a smart televisions instead of game consoles, even as Hydro One peak rates continue to shape consumption patterns elsewhere.

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Expanded Hoa Binh Hydropower Plant increases EVN capacity with 480MW turbines, commercial loan financing, grid stability, flood control, and Da River reliability, supported by PECC1 feasibility work and CMSC collaboration on site clearance.

Key Points

A 480MW EVN expansion on the Da River to enhance grid stability, flood control, and seasonal water supply in Vietnam.

✅ 480MW, two turbines, EVN-led financing without guarantees

✅ Improves frequency modulation and national grid stability

✅ Supports flood control and dry-season water supply

The extended Hoa Binh Hydropower Plant, which is expected to break ground in October 2020, is considered the largest power project to be constructed this year, even as Vietnam advances a mega wind project planned for 2025.

Covering an area of 99.2 hectares, the project is invested by Electricity of Vietnam (EVN). Besides, Vietnam Electricity Power Projects Management Board No.1 (EVNPMB1) is the representative of the investor and Power Engineering Consulting JSC 1 (EVNPECC1) is in charge of building the feasibility report for the project. The expanded Hoa Binh Hydro Power Plant has a total investment of VND9.22 trillion ($400.87 million), 30 per cent of which is EVN’s equity and the remaining 70 per cent comes from commercial loans without a government guarantee.

According to the initial plan, EVN will begin the construction of the project in the second quarter of this year and is expected to take the first unit into operation in the third quarter of 2023, a timeline reminiscent of Barakah Unit 1 reaching full power, and the second one in the fourth quarter of the same year.

Chairman of the Committee for Management of State Capital at Enterprises (CMSC) Nguyen Hoang Anh said that in order to start the construction in time, CMSC will co-operate with EVN to work with partners as well as local and foreign banks to mobilise capital, reflecting broader nuclear project milestones across the energy sector.

In addition, EVN will co-operate with Hoa Binh People’s Committee to implement site clearance, remove Ba Cap port and select contractors.

Once completed, the project will contribute to preventing floods in the rainy season and supply water in the dry season. The plant expansion will include two turbines with the total capacity of 480MW, similar in scale to the 525-MW hydropower station China is building on a Yangtze tributary, and electricity output of about 488.3 million kWh per year.

In addition, it will help improve frequency modulation capability and stabilise the frequency of the national electricity system through approaches like pumped storage capacity, and reduce the working intensity of available turbines of the plant, thus prolonging the life of the equipment and saving maintenance and repair costs.

Built in the Da River basin in the northern mountainous province of Hoa Binh, at the time of its conception in 1979, Hoa Binh was the largest hydropower plant in Southeast Asia, while projects such as China’s Lawa hydropower station now dwarf earlier benchmarks.

The construction was supported by the Soviet Union all the way through, designing, supplying equipment, supervising, and helping it go on stream. Construction began in November 1979 and was completed 15 years later in December 1994, when it was officially commissioned, similar to two new BC generating stations recently brought online.

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BPA Privatization would sell the Bonneville Power Administration's transmission lines, raising FERC-regulated grid rates for ratepayers, impacting hydropower and the California-Oregon Intertie under the Trump 2018 budget proposal in the Pacific Northwest region.

Key Points

Selling Bonneville's transmission grid to private owners, raising rates and returns, shifting costs to ratepayers.

✅ Trump 2018 budget targets BPA transmission assets for sale.

✅ Higher capital costs, taxes, and profit would raise transmission rates.

✅ California-Oregon Intertie and hydropower flows face price impacts.

President Trump's 2018 budget proposal is so chock-full of noxious elements — replacing food stamps with "food boxes," drastically cutting Medicaid and Medicare, for a start — that it's unsurprising that one of its most misguided pieces has slipped under the radar.

That's the proposal to privatize the government-owned Bonneville Power Administration, which owns about three-quarters of the high-voltage electric transmission lines in a region that includes California, Washington state and Oregon, serving more than 13.5 million customers. By one authoritative estimate, any such sale would drive up the cost of transmission by 26%-44%.

The $5.2-billon price cited by the Trump administration, moreover, is nearly 20% below the actual value of the Bonneville grid — meaning that a private buyer would pocket an immediate windfall of $1.2 billion, at the expense of federal taxpayers and Bonneville customers.

Trump's plan for Portland, Ore.-based Bonneville is part of a larger proposal to sell off other government-owned electricity bodies, including the Colorado-based Western Area Power Administration and the Oklahoma-based Southwestern Power Administration. But Bonneville is by far the largest of the three, accounting for nearly 90% of the total $5.8 billion the budget anticipates collecting from the sales. The proposal is also part of the administration's

Both plans are said to be politically dead-on-arrival in Washington. But they offer a window into the thinking in the Trump White House.

"The word 'muddle' comes to mind," says Robert McCullough, a respected Portland energy consultant, referring to the justification for the privatization sale included in the Trump budget.

The White House suggests that selling the Bonneville grid would result in lower costs. But that narrative, McCullough wrote in a blistering assessment of the proposal, "displays a severe lack of understanding about the process of setting transmission rates."

McCullough's assessment is an update of a similar analysis he performed when the privatization scheme was first raised by the Trump administration last year. In that analysis issued in June, McCullough said the proposal "raises the question of why these valuable assets would be sold at a discount — and who would get the benefit of the discounted price."

The implications of a sale could be dire for Californians. Bonneville is the majority owner of the California-Oregon Intertie, an electrical transmission system that carries power, including Columbia River-generated hydropower and other clean-energy generation in British Columbia that supports the regional exchange, south to California in the summer and excess California generation to the Pacific Northwest in the winter.

But the idea has drawn fire throughout the region. When it was first broached last year, the Public Power Council, an association of utilities in the Northwest, assailed it as an apparent "transfer of value from the people of the Northwest to the U.S. Treasury," drawing parallels to Manitoba Hydro governance issues elsewhere.

The region's political leaders had especially harsh words for the idea this time around. "Oregonians raised hell last year when Trump tried to raise power bills for Pacific Northwesterners by selling off Bonneville Power, and yet his administration is back at it again," Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) said after the idea reappeared. "Our investment shouldn't be put up for sale to free up money for runaway military spending or tax cuts for billionaires." Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) promised in a statement to work to "stop this bad idea in its tracks."

The notion of privatizing Bonneville predates the Trump administration; it was raised by Bill Clinton and again by George W. Bush, who thought the public would gain if the administration could sell its power at market rates. Both initiatives failed.

The same free-enterprise ideology underlies the Trump proposal. Privatizing the transmission lines "encourages a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigates unnecessary risk to taxpayers," the budget asserts. "Ownership of transmission assets is best carried out by the private sector where there are appropriate market and regulatory incentives."

But that's based on a misunderstanding of how transmission rates are set, McCullough says. Transmission is essentially a monopoly enterprise, with rates overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission based on the grid's costs, and with federal scrutiny of public utilities such as the TVA underscoring that oversight. There's very little in the way of market "incentives" involved in transmission, since no one has come forward to build a competing grid.

Those include the owners' cost of capital — which would be much higher for a private owner than a government agency, McCullough observes, as Hydro One investor uncertainty demonstrates in practice. A private owner, unlike the government-owned Bonneville, also would owe federal income taxes, which would be passed on to consumers.

Then there's the profit motive. Bonneville "currently sells and delivers its power at cost," McCullough wrote last year. "Under a private regime, an investor-owned utility would likely charge a higher rate of return, a pattern seen when UK network profits drew regulatory rebukes."

None of these considerations appears to have been factored into the White House budget proposal. "Either there's an unsophisticated person at the Office of Management and Budget thinking up these numbers himself," McCullough told me, "or there would seem to be ongoing negotiations with an unidentified third party." No such buyer has emerged in the past, however.

What's left is a blind faith in the magic of the market, compounded by ignorance about how the transmission market operates. Put it together, and there's reason to wonder if Trump is even serious about this plan.

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