Huge solar plant in the works

Five Nations Energy Transmission Line connects remote First Nations to the Ontario power grid, delivering clean, reliable electricity to Western James Bay through Indigenous-owned transmission infrastructure, replacing diesel generators and enabling sustainable community growth.

Key Points

An Indigenous-owned grid link providing reliable power to Western James Bay First Nations, replacing polluting diesel.

✅ Built by five First Nations; fully Indigenous-owned utility

✅ 270 km line connecting remote James Bay communities

✅ Ended diesel dependence; enabled sustainable development

For the Indigenous communities along northern Ontario’s James Bay — the ones that have lived on and taken care of the lands as long as anyone can remember — the new millenium marked the start of a diesel-less future, even as Ontario’s electricity outlook raised concerns about getting dirtier in policy debates. 

While the southern part of the province took Ontario’s power grid for granted, despite lessons from Europe’s power crisis about reliability, the vast majority of these communities had never been plugged in. Their only source of power was a handful of very loud diesel-powered generators. Because of that, daily life in the Attawapiskat, Kashechewan and Fort Albany First Nations involved deliberating a series of tradeoffs. Could you listen to the radio while toasting a piece of bread? How many Christmas lights could you connect before nothing else was usable? Was there enough power to open a new school? 

The communities wanted a safe, reliable, clean alternative, with Manitoba’s clean energy illustrating regional potential, too. So did their chiefs, which is why they passed a resolution in 1996 to connect the area to Ontario’s grid, not just for basic necessities but to facilitate growth and development, and improve their communities’ quality of life. 

The idea was unthinkable at the time — scorned and dismissed by those who held the keys to Ontario’s (electrical) power, much like independent power projects can be in other jurisdictions. Even some in the community didn’t fully understand it. When the idea was first proposed at a gathering of Nishnawbe Aski Nation, which represents 49 First Nations, one attendee said the only way he could picture the connection was as “a little extension cord running through the bush from Moosonee.” 

But the leadership of Attawapiskat, Kashechewan and Fort Albany First Nations had been dreaming and planning. In 1997, along with members of Taykwa Tagamou and Moose Cree First Nations, they created the first, and thus far only, fully Indigenous-owned energy company in Canada: Five Nations Energy Inc., as partnerships like an OPG First Nation hydro project would later show in action, too. 

Over the next five years, the organization built Omushkego Ishkotayo, the Cree name for the Western James Bay transmission line: “Omushkego” refers to the Swampy Cree people, and “Ishkotayo” to hydroelectric power, while other regions were commissioning new BC generating stations in parallel. The 270-kilometre-long transmission line is in one of the most isolated regions of Ontario, one that can only be accessed by plane, except for a few months in winter when ice roads are strong enough to drive on. The project went online in 2001, bringing reliable power to over 7,000 people who were previously underserved by the province’s energy providers. It also, somewhat controversially, enabled Ontario’s first diamond mine in Attawapiskat territory.

The future the First Nations created 25 years ago is blissfully quiet, now that the diesel generators are shut off. “When the power went on, you could hear the birds,” Patrick Chilton, the CEO of Five Nations Energy, said with a smile. “Our communities were glowing.”

Power, politics and money: Five Nations Energy needed government, banks and builders on board
Chilton took over in 2013 after the former CEO, his brother Ed, passed away. “This was all his idea,” Chilton told The Narwhal in a conversation over Zoom from his office in Timmins, Ont. The company’s story has never been told before in full, he said, because he felt “vulnerable” to the forces that fought against Omushkego Ishkotayo or didn’t understand it, a dynamic underscored by Canada’s looming power problem reporting in recent years. 

The success of Five Nations Energy is a tale of unwavering determination and imagination, Chilton said, and it started with his older brother. “Ed was the first person who believed a transmission line was possible,” he said.

In a Timmins Daily Press death notice published July 2, 2013, Ed Chilton is described as having “a quiet but profound impact on the establishment of agreements and enterprises benefitting First Nations peoples and their lands.” Chilton doesn’t describe him that way, exactly. 

“If you knew my brother, he was very stubborn,” he said. A certified engineering technologist, Ed was a visionary whose whole life was defined by the transmission line. He was the first to approach the chiefs with the idea, the first to reach out to energy companies and government officials and the one who persuaded thousands of people in remote, underserved communities that it was possible to bring power to their region.

After that 1996 meeting of Nishnawbe Aski Nation, there came a four-year-long effort to convince the rest of Ontario, and the country, the project was possible and financially viable. The chiefs of the five First Nations took their idea to the halls of power: Queen’s Park, Parliament Hill and the provincial power distributor Hydro One (then Ontario Hydro). 

“All of them said no,” Chilton said. “They saw it as near to impossible — the idea that you could build a transmission line in the ‘swamp,’ as they called it.” The Five Nations Energy team kept a document at the time tracking how many times they heard no; it topped out at 37. 

One of the worst times was in 1998, at a meeting on the 19th floor of the Ontario Hydro building in the heart of downtown Toronto. There, despite all their preparation and planning, a senior member of the Ontario Hydro team told Chilton, Martin and other chiefs “you’ll build that line over my dead body,” Chilton recalled. 

At the time, Chilton said, Ontario Hydro was refusing to cooperate: unwilling to let go of its monopoly over transmission lines, but also saying it was unable to connect new houses in the First Nations to diesel generators it said were at maximum capacity. (Ontario Hydro no longer exists; Hydro One declined to comment.)

“There’s always naysayers no matter what you’re doing,” Martin said. “What we were doing had never been done before. So of course people were telling us how we had never managed something of this size or a budget of this size.” 

“[Our people] basically told them to blow it up your ass. We can do it,” Chilton said.

So the chiefs of the five nations did something they’d never done before: they went to all of the big banks and many, many charitable foundations trying to get the money, a big ask for a project of this scale, in this location. Without outside support, their pitch was that they’d build it themselves.

This was the hardest part of the process, said Lawrence Martin, the former Grand Chief of Mushkegowuk Tribal Council and a member of the Five Nations Energy board. “We didn’t know how to finance something like this, to get loans,” he told The Narwhal. “That was the toughest task for all of us to achieve.”

Eventually, they got nearly $50 million in funding from a series of financial organizations including the Bank of Montreal, Pacific and Western Capital, the Northern Ontario Heritage Fund Corporation (an Ontario government agency) and the engineering and construction company SNC Lavalin, which did an assessment of the area and deemed the project viable. 

And in 1999, Ed Chilton, other members of the Chilton family and the chiefs were able to secure an agreement with Ontario Hydro that would allow them to buy electricity from the province and sell it to their communities. 

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Infrastructure Security Algorithm prioritizes cyber defense for power grids and critical infrastructure, mitigating ransomware, blackout risks, and cascading failures by guiding utilities, regulators, and cyber insurers on optimal security investment allocation.

Key Points

An algorithm that optimizes security spending to cut ransomware and blackout risks across critical infrastructure.

✅ Guides utilities on optimal security allocation

✅ Uses incentives to correct human risk biases

✅ Prioritizes assets to prevent cascading outages

Millions of people could suddenly lose electricity if a ransomware attack just slightly tweaked energy flow onto the U.S. power grid, as past US utility intrusions have shown.

No single power utility company has enough resources to protect the entire grid, but maybe all 3,000 of the grid's utilities could fill in the most crucial security gaps if there were a map showing where to prioritize their security investments.

Purdue University researchers have developed an algorithm to create that map. Using this tool, regulatory authorities or cyber insurance companies could establish a framework for protecting the U.S. power grid that guides the security investments of power utility companies to parts of the grid at greatest risk of causing a blackout if hacked.

Power grids are a type of critical infrastructure, which is any network - whether physical like water systems or virtual like health care record keeping - considered essential to a country's function and safety. The biggest ransomware attacks in history have happened in the past year, affecting most sectors of critical infrastructure in the U.S. such as grain distribution systems in the food and agriculture sector and the Colonial Pipeline, which carries fuel throughout the East Coast, prompting increased military preparation for grid hacks in the U.S.

With this trend in mind, Purdue researchers evaluated the algorithm in the context of various types of critical infrastructure in addition to the power sector, including electricity-sector IoT devices that interface with grid operations. The goal is that the algorithm would help secure any large and complex infrastructure system against cyberattacks.

"Multiple companies own different parts of infrastructure. When ransomware hits, it affects lots of different pieces of technology owned by different providers, so that's what makes ransomware a problem at the state, national and even global level," said Saurabh Bagchi, a professor in the Elmore Family School of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security at Purdue. "When you are investing security money on large-scale infrastructures, bad investment decisions can mean your power grid goes out, or your telecommunications network goes out for a few days."

Protecting infrastructure from hacks by improving security investment decisions

The researchers tested the algorithm in simulations of previously reported hacks to four infrastructure systems: a smart grid, industrial control system, e-commerce platform and web-based telecommunications network. They found that use of this algorithm results in the most optimal allocation of security investments for reducing the impact of a cyberattack.

The team's findings appear in a paper presented at this year's IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, the premier conference in the area of computer security. The team comprises Purdue professors Shreyas Sundaram and Timothy Cason and former PhD students Mustafa Abdallah and Daniel Woods.

"No one has an infinite security budget. You must decide how much to invest in each of your assets so that you gain a bump in the security of the overall system," Bagchi said.

The power grid, for example, is so interconnected that the security decisions of one power utility company can greatly impact the operations of other electrical plants. If the computers controlling one area's generators don't have adequate security protection, as seen when Russian hackers accessed control rooms at U.S. utilities, then a hack to those computers would disrupt energy flow to another area's generators, forcing them to shut down.

Since not all of the grid's utilities have the same security budget, it can be hard to ensure that critical points of entry to the grid's controls get the most investment in security protection.

The algorithm that Purdue researchers developed would incentivize each security decision maker to allocate security investments in a way that limits the cumulative damage a ransomware attack could cause. An attack on a single generator, for instance, would have less impact than an attack on the controls for a network of generators, which sophisticated grid-disruption malware can target at scale, rather than for the protection of a single generator.

Building an algorithm that considers the effects of human behavior

Bagchi's research shows how to increase cybersecurity in ways that address the interconnected nature of critical infrastructure but don't require an overhaul of the entire infrastructure system to be implemented.

As director of Purdue's Center for Resilient Infrastructures, Systems, and Processes, Bagchi has worked with the U.S. Department of Defense, Northrop Grumman Corp., Intel Corp., Adobe Inc., Google LLC and IBM Corp. on adopting solutions from his research. Bagchi's work has revealed the advantages of establishing an automatic response to attacks, and analyses like Symantec's Dragonfly report highlight energy-sector risks, leading to key innovations against ransomware threats, such as more effective ways to make decisions about backing up data.

There's a compelling reason why incentivizing good security decisions would work, Bagchi said. He and his team designed the algorithm based on findings from the field of behavioral economics, which studies how people make decisions with money.

"Before our work, not much computer security research had been done on how behaviors and biases affect the best defense mechanisms in a system. That's partly because humans are terrible at evaluating risk and an algorithm doesn't have any human biases," Bagchi said. "But for any system of reasonable complexity, decisions about security investments are almost always made with humans in the loop. For our algorithm, we explicitly consider the fact that different participants in an infrastructure system have different biases."

To develop the algorithm, Bagchi's team started by playing a game. They ran a series of experiments analyzing how groups of students chose to protect fake assets with fake investments. As in past studies in behavioral economics, they found that most study participants guessed poorly which assets were the most valuable and should be protected from security attacks. Most study participants also tended to spread out their investments instead of allocating them to one asset even when they were told which asset is the most vulnerable to an attack.

Using these findings, the researchers designed an algorithm that could work two ways: Either security decision makers pay a tax or fine when they make decisions that are less than optimal for the overall security of the system, or security decision makers receive a payment for investing in the most optimal manner.

"Right now, fines are levied as a reactive measure if there is a security incident. Fines or taxes don't have any relationship to the security investments or data of the different operators in critical infrastructure," Bagchi said.

In the researchers' simulations of real-world infrastructure systems, the algorithm successfully minimized the likelihood of losing assets to an attack that would decrease the overall security of the infrastructure system.

Bagchi's research group is working to make the algorithm more scalable and able to adapt to an attacker who may make multiple attempts to hack into a system. The researchers' work on the algorithm is funded by the National Science Foundation, the Wabash Heartland Innovation Network and the Army Research Lab.

Cybersecurity is an area of focus through Purdue's Next Moves, a set of initiatives that works to address some of the greatest technology challenges facing the U.S. Purdue's cybersecurity experts offer insights and assistance to improve the protection of power plants, electrical grids and other critical infrastructure.

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Atlanta Airport Power Outage disrupts Hartsfield-Jackson as an underground fire cripples switchgear redundancy, canceling flights during holiday travel; Georgia Power restores electricity overnight while utility crews probe causes and monitor system resilience.

Key Points

A major Hartsfield-Jackson blackout from an underground fire; power restored as switchgear redundancy is investigated.

✅ Underground fire near Plane Train tunnel damaged switchgear systems

✅ Over 1,100 flights canceled; holiday travel severely disrupted

✅ Georgia Power restored service; redundancy and root cause under review

Power has been restored at the world’s busiest airport after a massive outage Sunday afternoon left planes and passengers stranded for hours, forced airlines to cancel more than 1,100 flights and created a logistical nightmare during the already-busy holiday travel season.

An underground fire caused a complete power outage Sunday afternoon at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, resulting in thousands of canceled flights at the world's busiest terminal and affecting travelers worldwide.

The massive outage didn’t just leave passengers stranded overnight Sunday, it also affected travelers with flights Monday morning schedules.

According to Paul Bowers, the president and CEO of Georgia Power,  “From our standpoint, we apologize for the inconvenience,” he said. The utility restored power to the airport shortly before midnight.

Utility Crews are monitoring the fixes that restored power and investigating what caused the fire and why it was able to damage redundant systems. Bowers said the fire occurred in a tunnel that runs along the path of the underground Plane Train tunnel near Concourse E.

Sixteen highly trained utility personnel worked in the passageway to reconnect the network.“Our investigation is going through the process of what do we do to ensure we have the redundancy going back at the airport, because right now we are a single source feed,” Bowers said.

“We will have that complete by the end of the week, and then we will turn to what caused the failure of the switchgear.”

Though the cause isn’t yet known, he said foul play is not suspected.“There are two things that could happen,” he said.

“There are inner workings of the switchgear that could create the heat that caused the fire, or the splicing going into that switchgear -- that the cable had a failure on that going into the switch gear.”

When asked if age of the system could have been a failure, Bowers said his company conducts regular inspections.“We constantly inspect,” he said. “We inspect on an annual basis to ensure the reliability of the network, and that redundancy is protection for the airport.”Bowers said he is not familiar with any similar fire or outage at the airport.

“The issue for us is to ensure the reliability is here and that it doesn’t happen again and to ensure that our network is resilient enough to withstand any kind of fire,” he said. He added that Georgia Power will seek to determine what can be done in the future to avoid a similar event, such as those experienced during regional outages in other communities.

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Duke Energy Clean Energy Strategy advances renewables, battery storage, grid modernization, and energy efficiency to cut carbon, retire coal, and target net-zero by 2050 across the Carolinas with robust IRPs and capital investments.

Key Points

Plan to expand renewables, storage, and grid upgrades to cut carbon and reach net-zero electricity by 2050.

✅ 56B investment in renewables, storage, and grid modernization

✅ Targets 50% carbon reduction by 2030 and net-zero by 2050

✅ Retires coal units; expands energy efficiency and IRPs

Duke Energy says that the company will continue advancing its ambitious clean energy goals without the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) by investing in renewables, battery storage, energy efficiency programs and grid projects that support U.S. electrification efforts.

Duke Energy, the nation's largest electric utility, unveils its new logo. (PRNewsFoto/Duke Energy) (PRNewsfoto/Duke Energy)

Duke Energy's $56 billion capital investment plan will deliver significant customer benefits and create jobs at a time when policymakers at all levels are looking for ways to rebuild the economy in 2020 and beyond. These investments will deliver cleaner energy for customers and communities while enhancing the energy grid to provide greater reliability and resiliency.

"Sustainability and the reduction of carbon emissions are closely tied to our region's success," said Lynn Good, Duke Energy Chair, President and CEO. "In our recent Climate Report, we shared a vision of a cleaner electricity future with an increasing focus on renewables and battery storage in addition to a diverse mix of zero-carbon nuclear, natural gas, hydro and energy efficiency programs.

"Achieving this clean energy vision will require all of us working together to develop a plan that is smart, equitable and ensures the reliability and affordability that will spur economic growth in the region. While we're disappointed that we're not able to move forward with ACP, we will continue exploring ways to help our customers and communities, particularly in eastern North Carolina where the need is great," said Good.

Already a clean-energy leader, Duke Energy has reduced its carbon emissions by 39% from 2005 and remains on track to cut its carbon emissions by at least 50% by 2030, as peers like Alliant's carbon-neutral plan demonstrate broader industry momentum toward decarbonization. The company also has an ambitious clean energy goal of reaching net-zero emissions from electricity generation by 2050. 

In September 2020, Duke Energy plans to file its Integrated Resource Plans (IRP) for the Carolinas after an extensive process of working with the state's leaders, policymakers, customers and other stakeholders. The IRPs will include multiple scenarios to support a path to a cleaner energy future in the Carolinas, reflecting key utility trends shaping resource planning.

Since 2010, Duke Energy has retired 51 coal units totaling more than 6,500 megawatts (MW) and plans to retire at least an additional 900 MW by the end of 2024. In 2019, the company proposed to shorten the book lives of another approximately 7,700 MW of coal capacity in North Carolina and Indiana.

Duke Energy will host an analyst call in early August 2020 to discuss second quarter 2020 financial results and other business and financial updates. The company will also host its inaugural Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investor day in October 2020.

Duke Energy

Duke Energy is transforming its customers' experience, modernizing the energy grid, generating cleaner energy and expanding natural gas infrastructure to create a smarter energy future for the people and communities it serves. The Electric Utilities and Infrastructure unit's regulated utilities serve 7.8 million retail electric customers in six states: North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky. The Gas Utilities and Infrastructure unit distributes natural gas to 1.6 million customers in five states: North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Ohio and Kentucky. The Duke Energy Renewables unit operates wind and solar generation facilities across the U.S., as well as energy storage and microgrid projects.

Duke Energy was named to Fortune's 2020 "World's Most Admired Companies" list and Forbes' "America's Best Employers" list. More information about the company is available at duke-energy.com. The Duke Energy News Center contains news releases, fact sheets, photos, videos and other materials. Duke Energy's illumination features stories about people, innovations, community topics and environmental issues. Follow Duke Energy on Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram and Facebook.

Forward-Looking Information

This document includes forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Forward-looking statements are based on management's beliefs and assumptions and can often be identified by terms and phrases that include "anticipate," "believe," "intend," "estimate," "expect," "continue," "should," "could," "may," "plan," "project," "predict," "will," "potential," "forecast," "target," "guidance," "outlook" or other similar terminology. Various factors may cause actual results to be materially different than the suggested outcomes within forward-looking statements; accordingly, there is no assurance that such results will be realized. These factors include, but are not limited to:

• The impact of the COVID-19 electricity demand shift on operations and revenues;
• State, federal and foreign legislative and regulatory initiatives, including costs of compliance with existing and future environmental requirements, including those related to climate change, as well as rulings that affect cost and investment recovery or have an impact on rate structures or market prices;
• The extent and timing of costs and liabilities to comply with federal and state laws, regulations and legal requirements related to coal ash remediation, including amounts for required closure of certain ash impoundments, are uncertain and difficult to estimate;
• The ability to recover eligible costs, including amounts associated with coal ash impoundment retirement obligations and costs related to significant weather events, and to earn an adequate return on investment through rate case proceedings and the regulatory process;
• The costs of decommissioning nuclear facilities could prove to be more extensive than amounts estimated and all costs may not be fully recoverable through the regulatory process;
• Costs and effects of legal and administrative proceedings, settlements, investigations and claims;
• Industrial, commercial and residential growth or decline in service territories or customer bases resulting from sustained downturns of the economy and the economic health of our service territories or variations in customer usage patterns, including energy efficiency and demand response efforts and use of alternative energy sources, such as self-generation and distributed generation technologies;
• Federal and state regulations, laws and other efforts designed to promote and expand the use of energy efficiency measures and distributed generation technologies, such as private solar and battery storage, in Duke Energy service territories could result in customers leaving the electric distribution system, excess generation resources as well as stranded costs;
• Advancements in technology;
• Additional competition in electric and natural gas markets and continued industry consolidation;
• The influence of weather and other natural phenomena on operations, including the economic, operational and other effects of severe storms, hurricanes, droughts, earthquakes and tornadoes, including extreme weather associated with climate change;
• The ability to successfully operate electric generating facilities and deliver electricity to customers including direct or indirect effects to the company resulting from an incident that affects the U.S. electric grid or generating resources;
• The ability to obtain the necessary permits and approvals and to complete necessary or desirable pipeline expansion or infrastructure projects in our natural gas business;
• Operational interruptions to our natural gas distribution and transmission activities;
• The availability of adequate interstate pipeline transportation capacity and natural gas supply;
• The impact on facilities and business from a terrorist attack, cybersecurity threats, data security breaches, operational accidents, information technology failures or other catastrophic events, such as fires, explosions, pandemic health events or other similar occurrences;
• The inherent risks associated with the operation of nuclear facilities, including environmental, health, safety, regulatory and financial risks, including the financial stability of third-party service providers;
• The timing and extent of changes in commodity prices and interest rates and the ability to recover such costs through the regulatory process, where appropriate, and their impact on liquidity positions and the value of underlying assets;
• The results of financing efforts, including the ability to obtain financing on favorable terms, which can be affected by various factors, including credit ratings, interest rate fluctuations, compliance with debt covenants and conditions and general market and economic conditions;
• Credit ratings of the Duke Energy Registrants may be different from what is expected;
• Declines in the market prices of equity and fixed-income securities and resultant cash funding requirements for defined benefit pension plans, other post-retirement benefit plans and nuclear decommissioning trust funds;
• Construction and development risks associated with the completion of the Duke Energy Registrants' capital investment projects, including risks related to financing, obtaining and complying with terms of permits, meeting construction budgets and schedules and satisfying operating and environmental performance standards, as well as the ability to recover costs from customers in a timely manner, or at all;
• Changes in rules for regional transmission organizations, including FERC debates on coal and nuclear subsidies and new and evolving capacity markets, and risks related to obligations created by the default of other participants;
• The ability to control operation and maintenance costs;
• The level of creditworthiness of counterparties to transactions;
• The ability to obtain adequate insurance at acceptable costs;
• Employee workforce factors, including the potential inability to attract and retain key personnel;
• The ability of subsidiaries to pay dividends or distributions to Duke Energy Corporation holding company (the Parent);
• The performance of projects undertaken by our nonregulated businesses and the success of efforts to invest in and develop new opportunities;
• The effect of accounting pronouncements issued periodically by accounting standard-setting bodies;
• The impact of U.S. tax legislation to our financial condition, results of operations or cash flows and our credit ratings;
• The impacts from potential impairments of goodwill or equity method investment carrying values; and
• The ability to implement our business strategy, including enhancing existing technology systems.
• Additional risks and uncertainties are identified and discussed in the Duke Energy Registrants' reports filed with the SEC and available at the SEC's website at sec.gov. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the events described in the forward-looking statements might not occur or might occur to a different extent or at a different time than described. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and the Duke Energy Registrants expressly disclaim an obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

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NRC Advanced Reactor Licensing streamlines a risk-informed, performance-based, technology-inclusive pathway for advanced non-light water reactors, aligning with NEIMA to enable predictable regulatory reviews, inherent safety, clean energy deployment, and industrial heat, hydrogen, and desalination applications.

Key Points

A risk-informed, performance-based NRC pathway streamlining licensing for advanced non-light water reactors.

✅ Aligned with NEIMA: risk-informed, performance-based, tech-inclusive

✅ Predictable licensing for advanced non-light water reactor designs

✅ Enables clean heat, hydrogen, desalination beyond electricity

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) voted 4-0 to approve the implementation of a more streamlined and predictable licensing pathway for advanced non-light water reactors, aligning with nuclear innovation priorities identified by industry advocates, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) announced, and amid regional reliability measures such as New England emergency fuel stock plans that have drawn cost scrutiny.

This approach is consistent with the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernisation Act (NEIMA), a nuclear innovation act passed in 2019 by the US Congress calling for the development of a risk-informed, performance-based and technology inclusive licensing process for advanced reactor developers.

NEI Chief Nuclear Officer Doug True said: “A modernised regulatory framework is a key enabler of next-generation nuclear technologies that, amid ACORE’s challenge to DOE subsidy proposals in energy market proceedings, can help us meet our energy needs while protecting the climate. The Commission’s unanimous approval of a risk-informed and performance-based licensing framework paves the way for regulatory reviews to be aligned with the inherent safety characteristics, smaller reactor cores and simplified designs of advanced reactors.”

Over the last several years the industry’s Licensing Modernisation Project, sponsored by US Department of Energy, led by Southern Nuclear, and supported by NEI’s Advanced Reactor Regulatory Task Force, and influenced by a presidential order to bolster uranium and nuclear energy, developed the guidance for this new framework. Amid shifts in the fuel supply chain, including the U.S. ban on Russian uranium, this approach will inform the development of a new rule for licensing advanced reactors, which NEIMA requires.

“A well-defined licensing path will benefit the next generation of nuclear plants, especially as regions consider New England market overhaul efforts, which could meet a wide range of applications beyond generating electricity such as producing heat for industry, desalinating water, and making hydrogen – all without carbon emissions,” True noted.

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IAEA OSART Cernavoda highlights strengthened operational safety at Romania’s Cernavoda NPP, citing improved maintenance practices, simulator training, and deficiency reporting, with ongoing actions on spare parts procurement, procedure updates, and chemical control for nuclear compliance.

Key Points

An IAEA follow-up mission confirming improved operational safety at Cernavoda NPP, with remaining actions tracked.

✅ Enhanced simulator training and crew performance

✅ Improved field deficiency identification and reporting

✅ Ongoing upgrades to procedures, spares, and chemical control

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said yesterday that the operator of Romania’s Cernavoda nuclear power plant had demonstrated "strengthened operational safety" by addressing the findings of an initial IAEA review in 2016. The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) concluded a five-day follow-up mission on 8 March to the Cernavoda plant, which is on the Danube-Black Sea Canal, about 160 km from Bucharest.

The plant's two 706 MWe CANDU pressurised heavy water reactors, reflecting Canadian nuclear projects, came online in 1996 and 2007, respectively.

The OSART team was led by Fuming Jiang, a senior nuclear safety officer at the IAEA, which recently commended China's nuclear security in separate assessments.

"We saw improvements in key areas, such as the procurement of important spare parts, the identification and reporting of some deficiencies, and some maintenance work practices, as evidenced by relevant performance indicators," Jiang said, noting milestones at nuclear projects worldwide this year.

The team observed that several findings from the 2016 review had been fully addressed, including: enhanced operator crew performance during simulator training; better identification and reporting of deficiencies in the field; and improvement in maintenance work practices.

More time is required, it said, to fully implement some actions, including: further improvements in the procurement of important spare parts with relevance to safety; further enhancement in the revision and update of some operating procedures, drawing on lessons from Pickering NGS life extensions undertaken in Ontario; and control and labelling of some plant chemicals.

Dan Bigu, site vice president of Cernavoda NPP, said the 2016 mission had "proven to be very beneficial", adding that the current follow-up mission would "provide further catalyst support to our journey to nuclear excellence".

The team provided a draft report of the mission to the plant's management and a final report will be submitted to the Romanian government, which recently moved to terminate talks with a Chinese partner on a separate nuclear project, within three months.

OSART missions aim to improve operational safety by objectively assessing safety performance, even as the agency reports mines at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia plant amid ongoing risks, using the IAEA's safety standards and proposing recommendations and suggestions for improvement where appropriate. The follow-up missions are standard components of the OSART programme and, as the IAEA has warned of risks from attacks on Ukraine's power grids, are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission.

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