State consider seven coal plants

Ontario Hydro Crisis highlights soaring electricity rates, costly subsidies, nuclear refurbishments, and stalled renewables in Ontario. Policy missteps, weak planning, and rising natural gas emissions burden ratepayers while energy efficiency and storage remain underused.

Key Points

High power costs and subsidies from policy errors, nuclear refurbishments, stalled efficiency and renewables in Ontario.

✅ $5.6B yearly subsidy masks electricity rates and deficits

✅ Nuclear refurbishments embed rising costs for decades

✅ Efficiency, storage, and DERs stalled amid weak planning

By Mark Winfield

While the troubled Site C and Muskrat Falls hydroelectric dam projects in B.C. and Newfoundland and Labrador have drawn a great deal of national attention over the past few months, Ontario has quietly been having a hydro crisis of its own.

One of the central promises in the 2018 platform of the Ontario Progressive Conservative party was to “clean up the hydro mess,” and then-PC leader Doug Ford vowed to fire Hydro One's leadership as part of that effort. There certainly is a mess, with the costs of subsidies taken from general provincial revenues to artificially lower hydro rates nearing $7 billion annually. That is a level approaching the province’s total pre-COVID-19 annual deficit. After only two years, that will also exceed total expected cost overruns of the Site C and Muskrat Falls projects, currently estimated at $12 billion ($6 billion each).

There is no doubt that Doug Ford’s government inherited a significant mess around the province’s electricity system from the previous Liberal governments of former premiers Dalton McGuinty and Kathleen Wynne. But the Ford government has also demonstrated a remarkable capacity for undoing the things its predecessors had managed to get right while doubling down on their mistakes.

The Liberals did have some significant achievements. Most notably: coal-fired electricity generation, which constituted 25 per cent of the province’s electricity supply in the early 2000s, was phased out in 2014. The phaseout dramatically improved air quality in the province. There was also a significant growth in renewable energy production. From  virtually zero in 2003, the province installed 4,500 MW of wind-powered generation, and 450 MW of solar photovoltaic by 2018, a total capacity more than double that of the Sir Adam Beck Generating Stations at Niagara Falls.

At the same time, public concerns over rising hydro rates flowing from a major reconstruction of the province’s electricity system from 2003 onwards became a central political issue in the province. But rather than reconsider the role of the key drivers of the continuing rate increases – namely the massively expensive and risky refurbishments of the Darlington and Bruce nuclear facilities, the Liberals adopted a financially ruinous Fair Hydro Plan. The central feature of the 2017 plan was a short-term 25 per cent reduction in hydro rates, financed by removing the provincial portion of the HST from hydro bills, and by extending the amortization period for capital projects within the system. The total cost of the plan in terms of lost revenues and financing costs has been estimated in excess of $40 billion over 29 years, with the burden largely falling on future ratepayers and taxpayers.

Decision-making around the electricity system became deeply politicized, and a secret cabinet forecast of soaring prices intensified public debate across Ontario. Legislation adopted by the Wynne government in 2016 eliminated the requirement for the development of system plans to be subject to any form of meaningful regulatory oversight or review. Instead, the system was guided through directives from the provincial cabinet. Major investments like the Darlington and Bruce refurbishments proceeded without meaningful, public, external reviews of their feasibility, costs or alternatives.

The Ford government proceeded to add more layers to these troubles. The province’s relatively comprehensive framework for energy efficiency was effectively dismantled in March, 2019, with little meaningful replacement. That was despite strong evidence that energy efficiency offered the most cost-effective strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and electricity costs.

The Ford government basically retained the Fair Hydro Plan and promised further rate reductions, later tabling legislation to lower electricity rates as well. To its credit, the government did take steps to clarify real costs of the plan. Last year, these were revealed to amount to a de facto $5.6 billion-per-year subsidy coming from general revenues, and rising. That constituted the major portion of the province’s $7.4 billion pre-COVID-19 deficit. The financial hole was deepened further through November’s financial statement, with the addition of a further $1.3 billion subsidy to commercial and industrial consumers. The numbers can only get worse as the costs of the Darlington and Bruce refurbishments become embedded more fully into electricity rates.

The government also quietly dispensed with the last public vestige of an energy planning framework, relieving itself of the requirement to produce a Long-Term Energy Plan every three years. The next plan would normally have been due next month, in February.

Even the gains from the 2014 phaseout of coal-fired electricity are at risk. Major increases are projected in emissions of greenhouse gases, smog-causing nitrogen oxides and particulate matter from natural gas-fired power plants as the plants are run to cover electricity needs during the Bruce and Darlington refurbishments over the next decade. These developments could erode as much as 40 per cent of the improvements in air quality and greenhouse gas emission gained through the coal phaseout.

The province’s activities around renewable energy, energy storage and distributed energy resources are at a standstill, with exception of a few experimental “sandbox” projects, while other jurisdictions face profound electricity-sector change and adapt. Globally, these technologies are seen as the leading edge of energy-system development and decarbonization. Ontario seems to have chosen to make itself an energy innovation wasteland instead.

The overall result is a system with little or no space for innovation that is embedding ever-higher costs while trying to disguise those costs at enormous expense to the provincial treasury and still failing to provide effective relief to low-income electricity consumers.

The decline in electricity demand associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the introduction of a temporary recovery rate for electricity, gives the province an opportunity to step back and consider its next steps with the electricity system. A phaseout of the Fair Hydro Plan electricity-rate reduction and its replacement with a more cost-effective strategy of targeted relief aimed at those most heavily burdened by rising hydro rates, particularly rural and low-income consumers, as reconnection efforts for nonpayment have underscored the hardship faced by many households, would be a good place to start.

Next, the province needs to conduct a comprehensive, public review of electricity options available to it, including additional renewables – the costs of which have fallen dramatically over the past decade – distributed energy resources, hydro imports from Quebec and energy efficiency before proceeding with further nuclear refurbishments.

In the longer term, a transparent, evidence-based process for electricity system planning needs to be established – one that is subject to substantive public and regulatory oversight and review. Finally, the province needs to establish a new organization to be called Energy Efficiency Ontario to revive its efforts around energy efficiency, developing a comprehensive energy-efficiency strategy for the province, covering electricity and natural gas use, and addressing the needs of marginalized communities.

Without these kinds of steps, the province seems destined to continue to lurch from contradictory decision after contradictory decision as the economic and environmental costs of the system’s existing trajectory continue to rise.

Mark Winfield is a professor of environmental studies at York University and co-chair of the university’s Sustainable Energy Initiative.

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COP24 Climate Talks in Poland gather nearly 200 nations to finalize the Paris Agreement rulebook, advance the Talanoa Dialogue, strengthen emissions reporting and transparency, and align finance, technology transfer, and IPCC science for urgent mitigation.

Key Points

UNFCCC summit in Katowice to finalize Paris rules, enhance transparency, and drive stronger emissions cuts.

✅ Paris rulebook on reporting, transparency, markets, and timelines

✅ Talanoa Dialogue to assess gaps and raise ambition by 2020

✅ Finance and tech transfer for developing countries under UNFCCC

Delegates from nearly 200 countries have assembled this month in Katowice, Poland — the heart of coal country — to try to move the ball forward on battling climate change.

It’s now the 24th annual meeting, or “COP” — conference of the parties — under the landmark U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which the United States signed under then-President George H.W. Bush in 1992. More significantly, it’s the third such meeting since nations adopted the Paris climate agreement in 2015, widely seen at the time as a landmark moment in which, at last, developed and developing countries would share a path toward cutting greenhouse gas emissions, as Obama's clean energy push sought to lock in momentum.

But the surge of optimism that came with Paris has faded lately. The United States, the second largest greenhouse gas emitter, said it would withdraw from the agreement, though it has not formally done so yet. Many other countries are off target when it comes to meeting their initial round of Paris promises — promises that are widely acknowledged to be too weak to begin with. And emissions have begun to rise after a brief hiatus that had lent some hope of progress.

The latest science, meanwhile, is pointing toward increasingly dire outcomes. The amount of global warming that the world already has seen — 1 degree Celsius, 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit — has upended the Arctic, is killing coral reefs and may have begun to destabilize a massive part of Antarctica. A new report from the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), requested by the countries that assembled in Paris to be timed for this year’s meeting, finds a variety of increasingly severe effects as soon as a rise of 1.5 degrees Celsius arrives — an outcome that can’t be avoided without emissions cuts so steep that they would require societal transformations without any known historical parallel, the panel found.

It’s in this context that countries are meeting in Poland, with expectations and stakes high.

So what’s on the agenda in Poland?

The answer starts with the Paris agreement, which was negotiated three years ago, has been signed by 197 countries and is a mere 27 pages long. It covers a lot, laying out a huge new regime not only for the world as a whole to cut its greenhouse gas emissions, but for each individual country to regularly make new emissions-cutting pledges, strengthen them over time, report emissions to the rest of the world and much more. It also addresses financial obligations that developed countries have to developing countries, including how to achieve clean and universal electricity at scale, and how technologies will be transferred to help that.

But those 27 pages leave open to interpretation many fine points for how it will all work. So in Poland, countries are performing a detailed annotation of the Paris agreement, drafting a “rule book” that will span hundreds of pages.

That may sound bureaucratic, but it’s key to addressing many of the flash points. For instance, it will be hard for countries to trust that their fellow nations are cutting emissions without clear standards for reporting and vetting. Not everybody is ready to accept a process like the one followed in the United States, which not only publishes its emissions totals but also has an independent review of the findings.

“A number of the developing countries are resisting that kind of model for themselves. They see it as an intrusion on their sovereignty,” said Alden Meyer, director of strategy and policy at the Union of Concerned Scientists and one of the many participants in Poland this week. “That’s going to be a pretty tough issue at the end of the day.”

It’s hardly the only one. Also unclear is what countries will do after the time frames on their current emissions-cutting promises are up, which for many is 2025 or 2030. Will all countries then start reporting newer and more ambitious promises every five years? Every 10 years?

That really matters when five years of greenhouse gas emissions — currently about 40 billion tons of carbon dioxide annually — are capable of directly affecting the planet’s temperature.

What can we expect each day?

The conference is in its second week, when higher-level players — basically, the equivalent of cabinet-level leaders in the United States — are in Katowice to advance the negotiations.

As this happens, several big events are on the agenda. On Tuesday and Wednesday is the “Talanoa Dialogue,” which will bring together world leaders in a series of group meetings to discuss these key questions: “Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?”

Friday is the last day of the conference, but pros know these events tend to run long. On Friday — or after — we will be waiting for an overall statement or decision from the meeting which may signal how much has been achieved.

What is the “Talanoa Dialogue”?

“Talanoa” is a word used in Fiji and in many other Pacific islands to refer to “the sharing of ideas, skills and experience through storytelling.” This is the process that organizers settled on to fulfill a plan formed in Paris in 2015.

That year, along with signing the Paris agreement, nations released a decision that in 2018 there should be a “facilitative dialogue" among the countries “to take stock” of where their efforts stood to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This was important because going into that Paris meeting, it was already clear that countries' promises were not strong enough to hold global warming below a rise of 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial temperatures.

This dialogue, in the Talanoa process, was meant to prompt reflection and maybe even soul searching about what more would have to be done. Throughout the year, “inputs” to the Talanoa dialogue — most prominently, the recent report by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the meaning and consequences of 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming —have been compiled and synthesized. Now, over two days in Poland, countries' ministers will assemble to share stories in small groups about what is working and what is not and to assess where the world as a whole is on achieving the required greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

What remains to be seen is whether this process will culminate in any kind of product or statement that calls clearly for immediate, strong ramping up of climate change promises across the world.

With the clock ticking, will countries do anything to increase their ambition at this meeting?

If negotiating the Paris rule book sounds disappointingly technical, well, you’re not the only one feeling that way. Pressure is mounting for countries to accomplish something more than that in Poland — to at minimum give a strong signal that they understand that the science is looking worse and worse, and the world’s progress on the global energy transition isn’t matching that outlook.

“The bigger issue is how we’re going to get to an outcome on greater ambition,” said Lou Leonard, senior vice president for climate and energy at the World Wildlife Fund, who is in Poland observing the talks. “And I think the first week was not kind on moving that part of the agenda forward.”

Most countries are not likely to make new emissions-cutting promises this week. But there are two ways that the meeting could give a strong statement that countries should — or will — come up with new promises at least by 2020. That’s when extremely dramatic emissions cuts would have to start, including progress toward net-zero electricity by mid-century, according to the recent report on 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming.

The first is the aforementioned “Talanoa dialogue” (see above). It’s possible that the outcome of the dialogue could be a statement acknowledging that the world isn’t nearly far enough along and calling for much stronger steps.

There will also be a decision text released for the meeting as a whole, which could potentially send a signal. Leonard said he hopes that would include details for the next steps that will put the world on a better course.

“We have to create milestones, and the politics around it that will pressure countries to do something that quite frankly they don’t want to do,” he said. “It’s not going to be easy. That’s why we need a process that will help make it happen. And make the most of the IPCC report that was designed to come out right now so it could do this for us. That’s why we have it, and it needs to serve that role.”

The United States says it will withdraw from the agreement, so what role is it playing in Poland?

Despite President Trump’s pledge to withdraw, the United States remains in the Paris agreement (for now) and has sent a delegation of 44 people to Poland, largely from the State Department but also from the Environmental Protection Agency, Energy Department and even the White House, while domestically a historic U.S. climate law has recently passed to accelerate clean energy. Many of these career government officials remain deeply engaged in hashing out details of the agreement.

Still, the country as a whole is being cast in an antagonistic role in the talks.

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EV Subsidies in Canada influence greenhouse-gas emissions based on electricity grid mix; in Ontario and Quebec they reduce pollution, while fossil-fuel grids blunt benefits. Compare costs per tonne with carbon tax and renewable energy policies.

Key Points

Government rebates for electric vehicles, whose emissions impact and cost-effectiveness depend on provincial grid mix.

✅ Impact varies by grid emissions; clean hydro-nuclear cuts CO2.

✅ MEI estimates up to $523 per tonne vs $50 carbon price.

✅ Best value: tax carbon; target renewables, efficiency, hybrids.

Bad ideas sometimes look better, and sell better, than good ones – as with the proclaimed electric-car revolution that policymakers tout today. Not always, or else Canada wouldn’t be the mostly well-run place that it is. But sometimes politicians embrace a less-than-best policy – because its attractive appearance may make it more likely to win the popularity contest, right now, even though it will fail in the long run.

The most seasoned political advisers know it. Pollsters too. Voters, in contrast, don’t know what they don’t know, which is why bad policy often triumphs. At first glance, the wrong sometimes looks like it must be right, while better and best give the appearance of being bad and worst.

This week, the Montreal Economic Institute put out a study on the costs and benefits of taxpayer subsidies for electric cars. They considered the logic of the huge amounts of money being offered to purchasers in the country’s two largest provinces. In Quebec, if you buy an electric vehicle, the government will give you up to $8,000; in Ontario, buying an electric car or truck entitles you to a cheque from the taxpayer of between $6,000 and $14,000. The subsidies are rich because the cars aren’t cheap.

Will putting more electric cars on the road lower greenhouse-gas emissions? Yes – in some provinces, where they can be better for the planet when the grid is clean. But it all depends on how a province generates electricity. In places like Alberta, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and Nunavut territory, where most electricity comes from burning fossil fuels, an electric car may actually generate more greenhouse gases than one running on traditional gasoline. The tailpipe of an electric vehicle may not have any emissions. But quite a lot of emissions may have been generated to produce the power that went to the socket that charged it.

A few years ago, University of Toronto engineering professor Christopher Kennedy estimated that electric cars are only less polluting than the gasoline vehicles they replace when the local electrical grid produces a good chunk of its power from renewable sources – thereby lowering emissions to less than roughly 600 tonnes of CO2 per gigawatt hour.

Unfortunately, the electricity-generating systems in lots of places – from India to China to many American states – are well above that threshold. In those jurisdictions, an electric car will be powered in whole or in large part by electricity created from the burning of a fossil fuel, such as coal. As a result, that car, though carrying the green monicker of “electric,” is likely to be more polluting than a less costly model with an internal combustion or hybrid engine.

The same goes for the Canadian juridictions mentioned above. Their electricity is dirtier, so operating an electric car there won’t be very green. Alberta, for example, is aiming to generate 30 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030 – which means that the other 70 per cent of its electricity will still come from fossil fuels. (Today, the figure is even higher.) An Albertan trading in a gasoline car for an electric vehicle is making a statement – just not the one he or she likely has in mind.

In Ontario and Quebec, however, most electricity is generated from non-polluting sources, even though Canada still produced 18% from fossil fuels in 2019 overall. Nearly all of Quebec’s power comes from hydro, and more than 90 per cent of Ontario’s electricity is from zero-emission generation, mainly hydro and nuclear. British Columbia, Manitoba and Newfoundland and Labrador also produce the bulk of their electricity from hydro. Electric cars in those provinces, powered as they are by mostly clean electricity, should reduce emissions, relative to gas-powered cars.

But here’s the rub: Electric cars are currently expensive, and, as a recent survey shows, consequently not all that popular. Ontario and Quebec introduced those big subsidies in an attempt to get people to buy them. Those subsidies will surely put more electric cars on the road and in the driveways of (mostly wealthy) people. It will be a very visible policy – hey, look at all those electrics on the highway and at the mall!

However, that result will be achieved at great cost. According to the MEI, for Ontario to reach its goal of electrics constituting 5 per cent of new vehicles sold, the province will have to dish out up to $8.6-billion in subsidies over the next 13 years.

And the environmental benefits achieved? Again, according to the MEI estimate, that huge sum will lower the province’s greenhouse-gas emissions by just 2.4 per cent. If the MEI’s estimate is right, that’s far too many bucks for far too small an environmental bang.

Here’s another way to look at it: How much does it cost to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by other means? Well, B.C.’s current carbon tax is $30 a tonne, or a little less than 7 cents on a litre of gasoline. It has caused GHG emissions per unit of GDP to fall in small but meaningful ways, thanks to consumers and businesses making millions of little, unspectacular decisions to reduce their energy costs. The federal government wants all provinces to impose a cost equivalent to $50 a tonne – and every economic model says that extra cost will make a dent in greenhouse-gas emissions, though in ways that will not involve politicians getting to cut any ribbons or hold parades.

What’s the effective cost of Ontario’s subsidy for electric cars? The MEI pegs it at $523 per tonne. Yes, that subsidy will lower emissions. It just does so in what appears to be the most expensive and inefficient way possible, rather than the cheapest way, namely a simple, boring and mildly painful carbon tax.

Electric vehicles are an amazing technology. But they’ve also become a way of expressing something that’s come to be known as “virtue signalling.” A government that wants to look green sees logic in throwing money at such an obvious, on-brand symbol, or touting a 2035 EV mandate as evidence of ambition. But the result is an off-target policy – and a signal that is mostly noise.

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Tesla Supercharger Billing Update details kWh-based pricing that now includes HVAC, battery thermal management, and other HV loads during charging sessions, improving cost transparency across pay-per-use markets and extreme climate scenarios.

Key Points

Tesla's update bills for kWh used by HVAC, battery heating, and HV loads during charging, reflecting true energy costs.

✅ kWh charges now include HVAC and battery thermal management

✅ Expect 10-25 kWh increases in extreme climates during sessions

✅ Some regions still bill per minute due to regulations

Tesla has updated its Supercharger billing policy to add the cost of electricity use for things other than charging, like HVAC, battery thermal management, etc, while charging at a Supercharger station, a shift that impacts overall EV charging costs for drivers. 

For a long time, Tesla’s Superchargers were free to use, or rather the use was included in the price of its vehicles. But the automaker has been moving to a pay-to-use model over the last two years in order to finance the growth of the charging network amid the Biden-era charging expansion in the United States.

Not charging owners for the electricity enabled Tesla to wait on developing a payment system for its Supercharger network.

It didn’t need one for the first five years of the network, and now the automaker has been fine-tuning its approach to charge owners for the electricity they consume as part of building better charging networks across markets.

At first, it meant fluctuating prices, and now Tesla is also adjusting how it calculates the total power consumption.

Last weekend, Tesla sent a memo to its staff to inform them that they are updating the calculation used to bill Supercharging sessions in order to take into account all the electricity used:

The calculation used to bill for Supercharging has been updated. Owners will also be billed for kWhs consumed by the car going toward the HVAC system, battery heater, and other HV loads during the session. Previously, owners were only billed for the energy used to charge the battery during the charging session.

Tesla says that the new method should more “accurately reflect the value delivered to the customer and the cost incurred by Tesla,” which mirrors recent moves in its solar and home battery pricing strategy as well.

The automaker says that customers in “extreme climates” could see a difference of 10 to 25 kWh for the energy consumed during a charging session:

Owners may see a noticeable increase in billed kWh if they are using energy-consuming features while charging, e.g., air conditioning, heating etc. This is more likely in extreme climates and could be a 10-25 kWh difference from what a customer experienced previously, as states like California explore grid-stability uses for EVs during peak events.

Of course, this is applicable where Tesla is able to charge by the kWh for charging sessions. In some markets, regulations push Tesla to charge by the minute amid ongoing fights over charging control between utilities and private operators.

Electrek’s Take
It actually looks like an oversight from Tesla in the first place. It’s fair to charge for the total electricity used during a session, and not just what was used to charge your battery pack, since Tesla is paying for both, even as some states add EV ownership fees like the Texas EV fee that further shape costs.

However, I wish Tesla would have a clearer way to break down the charging sessions and their costs.

There have been some complaints about Tesla wrongly billing owners for charging sessions, and this is bound to create more confusion if people see a difference between the kWhs gained during charging and what is shown on the bill.

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Germany Energy Transition faces offshore wind expansion, grid bottlenecks, and North-South transmission delays, while Nord Stream 2 boosts Russian gas reliance and lignite coal persists amid a nuclear phaseout and rising re-dispatch costs.

Key Points

Germanys shift to renewables faces grid delays, boosting gas via Nord Stream 2 and extending lignite coal use.

✅ Offshore wind grows, but grid congestion curtails turbines.

✅ Nord Stream 2 expands Russian gas supply to German industry.

✅ Lignite coal persists, raising emissions amid nuclear exit.

On a blazing hot August day on Germany’s Baltic Sea coast, a few hundred tourists skip the beach to visit the “Fascination Offshore Wind” exhibition, held in the port of Mukran at the Arkona wind park. They stand facing the sea, gawking at white fiberglass blades, which at 250 feet are longer than the wingspan of a 747 aircraft. Those blades, they’re told, will soon be spinning atop 60 wind-turbine towers bolted to concrete pilings driven deep into the seabed 20 miles offshore. By early 2019, Arkona is expected to generate 385 megawatts, enough electricity to power 400,000 homes.

“We really would like to give the public an idea of what we are going to do here,” says Silke Steen, a manager at Arkona. “To let them say, ‘Wow, impressive!’”

Had the tourists turned their backs to the sea and faced inland, they would have taken in an equally monumental sight, though this one isn’t on the day’s agenda: giant steel pipes coated in gray concrete, stacked five high and laid out in long rows on a stretch of dirt. The port manager tells me that the rows of 40-foot-long, 4-foot-thick pipes are so big that they can be seen from outer space. They are destined for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, a colossus that, when completed next year, will extend nearly 800 miles from Russia to Germany, bringing twice the amount of gas that a current pipeline carries.

The two projects, whose cargo yards are within a few hundred feet of each other, provide a contrast between Germany’s dream of renewable energy and the political realities of cheap Russian gas. In 2010, Germany announced an ambitious goal of generating 80 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2050. In 2011, it doubled down on the commitment by deciding to shut down every last nuclear power plant in the country by 2022, as part of a broader coal and nuclear phaseout strategy embraced by policymakers. The German government has paid more than $600 billion to citizens and companies that generate solar and wind power. As a result, the generating capacity from renewable sources has soared: In 2017, a third of the nation’s electricity came from wind, solar, hydropower and biogas, up from 3.6 percent in 1990.

But Germany’s lofty vision has run into a gritty reality: Replacing fossil fuels and nuclear power in one of the largest industrial nations in the world is politically more difficult and expensive than planners thought. It has forced Germany to put the brakes on its ambitious renewables program, ramp up its investments in fossil fuels, amid a renewed nuclear option debate over climate strategy, and, to some extent, put its leadership role in the fight against climate change on hold.

The trouble lies with Germany’s electricity grid. Solar and wind power call for more complex and expensive distribution networks than conventional large power plants do. “What the Germans were good at was getting new technology into the market, like wind and solar power,” said Arne Jungjohann, author of Energy Democracy: Germany’s ENERGIEWENDE to Renewables. To achieve its goals, “Germany needs to overhaul its whole grid.”

The North-South Conundrum

The boom in wind power has created an unanticipated mismatch between supply and demand. Big wind turbines, especially offshore plants such as Arkona, produce powerful, concentrated gusts of energy. That’s good when the factory that needs that energy is nearby and the wind kicks up during working hours. It’s another matter when factories are hundreds of miles away. In Germany, wind farms tend to be located in the blustery north. Many of the nation’s big factories lie in the south, which also happens to be where most of the country’s nuclear plants are being mothballed.

Getting that power from north to south is problematic. On windy days, northern wind farms generate too much energy for the grid to handle. Power lines get overloaded. To cope, grid operators ask wind farms to disconnect their turbines from the grid—those elegant blades that tourists so admired sit idle. To ensure a supply of power, operators employ backup generators at great expense. These so-called re-dispatching costs ran to 1.4 billion euros ($1.6 billion) last year.

The solution is to build more power transmission lines to take the excess wind from northern wind farms to southern factories. A grid expansion project is underway to do exactly that. Nearly 5,000 miles of new transmission lines, at a cost of billions of euros, will be paid for by utility customers. So far, less than a fifth of the lines have been built.

The grid expansion is “catastrophically behind schedule,” Energy Minister Peter Altmaier told the Handelsblatt business newspaper in August. Among the setbacks: citizens living along the route of four high-voltage power lines have demanded the cables be buried underground, which has added to the time and expense. The lines won’t be finished before 2025—three years after Germany’s nuclear shutdown is due to be completed.

With this backlog, the government has put the brakes on wind power, reducing the number of new contracts for farms and curtailing the amount it pays for renewable energy. “In the past, we have focused too much on the mere expansion of renewable energy capacity,” Joachim Pfeiffer, a spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union, wrote to Newsweek. “We failed to synchronize this expansion of generation with grid expansion.”

Advocates of renewables are up in arms, accusing the government of suffocating their industry and making planning impossible. Thousands of people lost their jobs in the wind industry, according to Wolfram Axthelm, CEO of the German Wind Energy Association. “For 2019 and 2020, we see a highly problematic situation for the industry,” he wrote in an email.

Fueling the Gap

Nord Stream 2, by contrast, is proceeding according to schedule. A beige and black barge, Castoro 10, hauls dozens of lengths of giant pipe off Germany’s Baltic Sea coast, where a welding machine connects them for lowering onto the seabed. The $11 billion project is funded by Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom and five European investors, at no direct cost to the German taxpayer. It is slated to cross the territorial waters of five countries—Germany, Russia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. All but Denmark have approved the route. “We have good reason to believe that after four governments said yes, that Denmark will also approve the pipeline,” says Nord Stream 2 spokesman Jens Mueller.

Construction of the pipeline off Finland began in September, and the gas is expected to start flowing in late 2019, giving Russia leverage to increase its share of the European gas market. It already provides a third of the gas used in the EU and will likely provide more after the Netherlands stops its gas production in 2030. President Donald Trump has called the pipeline “a very bad thing for NATO” and said that “Germany is totally controlled by Russia.” U.S. senators have threatened sanctions against companies involved in the project. Ukraine and Poland are concerned the new pipeline will make older pipelines in their territories irrelevant.

German leaders are also wary of dependence on Russia but are under considerable pressure to deliver energy to industry. Indeed, among the pipeline’s investors are German companies that want to run their factories, like BASF’s Wintershall subsidiary and Uniper, the German utility. “It’s not that Germany is naive,” says Kirsten Westphal, an energy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. It’s just pragmatic. “Economically, the judgment is that yes, this gas will be needed, we have an import gap to fill.”

The electricity transmission problem has also opened an opportunity for lignite coal, as coal generation in Germany remains significant, the most carbon-intensive fuel available and the source for nearly a quarter of Germany’s power. Mining companies are expanding their operations in coal-rich regions to strip out the fuel while it is still relevant. In the village of Pödelwitz, 155 miles south of Berlin, most houses feature a white sign with the logo of Mibrag, the German mining giant, which has paid nearly all the 130 residents to relocate. The company plans to level the village and scrape lignite that lies below the soil.

A resurgence in coal helped raise carbon emissions in 2015 and 2016 (2017 saw a slight decline), maintaining Germany’s place as Europe’s largest carbon emitter. Chancellor Angela Merkel has scrapped her pledge to slash carbon emissions to 40 percent of 1990 levels by the year 2020. Several members have threatened to resign from her policy commission on coal if the government allows utility company RWE to mine for lignite in Hambach Forest.

Only a few years ago, during the Paris climate talks, Germany led the EU in pushing for ambitious plans to curb emissions. Now, it seems to be having second thoughts. Recently, the European Union’s climate chief, Miguel Arias Cañete, suggested EU nations step up their commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 45 percent of 1990 levels instead of 40 percent by 2030. “I think we should first stick to the goals we have already set ourselves,” Merkel replied, even as a possible nuclear phaseout U-turn is debated, “I don’t think permanently setting ourselves new goals makes any sense.”

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U.S. Residential Electricity Bills rose on stronger demand, inflation, and fuel costs, with higher retail prices, kWh consumption, and extreme weather driving 2022 spikes; forecasts point to stable summer usage and slight price increases.

Key Points

They are average household power costs shaped by prices, kWh use, weather, and upstream fuel costs.

✅ 2022 bills up 13% nominal, 5% real vs. 2021

✅ Retail price rose 11%; consumption up 2% to 907 kWh

✅ Fuel costs to plants up 34%, pressuring rates

In nominal terms, the average monthly electricity bill for residential customers in the United States increased 13% from 2021 to 2022, rising from $121 a month to $137 a month. After adjusting for inflation—which reached 8% in 2022, a 40-year high—electricity bills increased 5%. Last year had the largest annual increase in average residential electricity spending since we began calculating it in 1984. The increase was driven by a combination of more extreme temperatures, which increased U.S. consumption of electricity for both heating and cooling, and higher fuel costs for power plants, which drove up retail electricity prices nationwide.

Residential electricity customers’ monthly electricity bills are based on the amount of electricity consumed and the retail electricity price. Average U.S. monthly electricity consumption per residential customer increased from 886 kilowatthours (kWh) in 2021 to 907 kWh in 2022, even as U.S. electricity sales have declined over the past seven years. Both a colder winter and a hotter summer contributed to the 2% increase in average monthly electricity consumption per residential customer in 2022 because customers used more space heating during the winter and more air conditioning during the summer, with some states, such as Pennsylvania, facing sharp winter rate increases.

Although we don’t directly collect retail electricity prices, we do collect revenues from electricity providers that allow us to determine prices by dividing by consumption, and industry reports show major utilities spending more on electricity delivery than on power production. In 2022, the average U.S. residential retail electricity price was 15.12 cents/kWh, an 11% increase from 13.66 cents/kWh in 2021. After adjusting for inflation, U.S. residential electricity prices went up by 2.5%.

Higher fuel costs for power plants drove the increase in residential retail electricity prices. The cost of fossil fuels—including natural gas prices, coal, and petroleum—delivered to U.S. power plants increased 34%, from $3.82 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in 2021 to $5.13/MMBtu in 2022. The higher fuel costs were passed along to residential customers and contributed to higher retail electricity prices, and Germany power prices nearly doubled over a year in a related trend.

In the first three months of 2023, the average U.S. residential monthly electricity bill was $133, or 5% higher than for the same time last year, according to data from our Electric Power Monthly. The increase was driven by a 13% increase in the average U.S. residential retail electricity price, which was partly offset by a 7% decrease in average monthly electricity consumption per residential customer, and industry outlooks also see U.S. power demand sliding 1% on milder weather. This summer, we expect that typical household electricity bills will be similar to last year’s, with customers paying about 2% more on average. The slight increase in electricity costs forecast for this summer stems from higher retail electricity prices but similar consumption levels as last summer.
 

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