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New Zealand Renewable Energy Strategy examines decarbonisation, GHG emissions, and net energy as electrification accelerates, expanding hydro, geothermal, wind, and solar PV while weighing intermittency, storage, materials, and energy security for a resilient power system.

Key Points

A plan to expand electricity generation, balancing decarbonisation, net energy limits, and energy security.

✅ Distinguishes decarbonisation targets from renewable capacity growth

✅ Highlights net energy limits, intermittency, and storage needs

✅ Addresses materials, GHG build-out costs, and energy security

The Electricity Authority has released a document outlining a plan to achieve the Government’s goal of more than doubling the amount of electricity generated in New Zealand over the next few decades.

This goal is seen as a way of both reducing our greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions overall, as everything becomes electrified, and ensuring we have a 100 percent renewable energy system at our disposal. Often these two goals are seen as being the same – to decarbonise we must transition to more renewable energy to power our society.

But they are quite different goals and should be clearly differentiated. GHG emissions could be controlled very effectively by rationing the use of a fossil fuel lockdown approach, with declining rations being available over a few years. Such a direct method of controlling emissions would ensure we do our bit to remain within a safe carbon budget.

If we took this dramatic step we could stop fretting about how to reduce emissions (that would be guaranteed by the rationing), and instead focus on how to adapt our lives to the absence of fossil fuels.

Again, these may seem like the same task, but they are not. Decarbonising is generally thought of in terms of replacing fossil fuels with some other energy source, signalling that a green recovery must address more than just wind capacity. Adapting our lives to the absence of fossil fuels pushes us to ask more fundamental questions about how much energy we actually need, what we need energy for, and the impact of that energy on our environment.

MBIE data indicate that between 1990 and 2020, New Zealand almost doubled the total amount of energy it produced from renewable energy sources - hydro, geothermal and some solar PV and wind turbines.

Over this same time period our GHG emissions increased by about 25 percent. The increase in renewables didn’t result in less GHG emissions because we increased our total energy use by almost 50 percent, mostly by using fossil fuels. The largest fossil fuel increases were used in transport, agriculture, forestry and fisheries (approximately 60 percent increases for each).

These data clearly demonstrate that increasing renewable energy sources do not necessarily result in reduced GHG emissions.

The same MBIE data indicate that over this same time period, the amount of Losses and Own Use category for energy use more than doubled. As of 2020 almost 30 percent of all energy consumed in New Zealand fell into this category.

These data indicate that more renewable energy sources are historically associated with less energy actually being available to do work in society.

While the category Losses and Own Use is not a net energy analysis, the large increase in this category makes the call for a system-wide net energy analysis all the more urgent.

Net energy is the amount of energy available after the energy inputs to produce and deliver the energy is subtracted. There is considerable data available indicating that solar PV and wind turbines have a much lower net energy surplus than fossil fuels.

And there is further evidence that when the intermittency and storage requirements are engineered into a total renewable energy system, the net energy of the entire system declines sharply. Could the Losses and Other Uses increase over this 30-year period be an indication of things to come?

Despite the importance of net energy analysis in designing a national energy system which is intended to provide energy security and resilience, there is not a single mention of net energy surplus in the EA reference document.

So over the last 30 years, New Zealand has doubled its renewable energy capacity, and at the same time increased its GHG emissions and reduced the overall efficiency of the national energy system.

And we are now planning to more than double our renewable energy system yet again over the next 30 years, even as zero-emissions electricity by 2035 is being debated elsewhere. We need to ask if this is a good idea.

How can we expand New Zealand’s solar PV and wind turbines without using fossil fuels? We can’t.

How could we expand our solar PV and wind turbines without mining rare minerals and the hidden costs of clean energy they entail, further contributing to ecological destruction and often increasing social injustices? We can't.

Even if we could construct, deliver, install and maintain solar PV and wind turbines without generating more GHG emissions and destroying ecosystems and poor communities, this “renewable” infrastructure would have to be replaced in a few decades. But there are at least two major problems with this assumed scenario.

The rare earth minerals required for this replacement will already be exhausted by the initial build out. Recycling will only provide a limited amount of replacements.

The other challenge is that a mostly “renewable” energy system will likely have a considerably lower net energy surplus. So where, in 2060, will the energy come from to either mine or recycle the raw materials, and to rebuild, reinstall and maintain the next iteration of a renewable energy system?

There is currently no plan for this replacement. It is a serious misnomer to call these energy technologies “renewable”. They are not as they rely on considerable raw material inputs and fossil energy for their production and never ending replacement.

New Zealand is, of course, blessed with an unusually high level of hydro electric and geothermal power. New Zealand currently uses over 170 GJ of total energy per capita, 40 percent of which is “renewable”. This provides approximately 70 GJ of “renewable” energy per capita with our current population.

This is the average global per capita energy level from all sources across all nations, as calls for 100% renewable energy globally emphasize. Several nations operate with roughly this amount of total energy per capita that New Zealand can generate just from “renewables”.

It is worth reflecting on the 170 GJ of total energy use we currently consume. Different studies give very different results regarding what levels are necessary for a good life.

For a complex industrial society such as ours, 100 GJ pc is said to be necessary for a high levels of wellbeing, determined both subjectively (life satisfaction/ happiness measures), and objectively (e.g. infant mortality levels, female morbidity as an index of population health, access to nutritious food and educational and health resources, etc). These studies do not take into account the large amount of energy that is wasted either through inefficient technologies, or frivolous use, which effective decarbonization strategies seek to reduce.

Other studies that consider the minimal energy needed for wellbeing suggest a much lower level of per capita energy consumption is required. These studies take a different approach and focus on ensuring basic wellbeing is maintained, but not necessarily with all the trappings of a complex industrial society. Their results indicate a level of approximately 20 GJ per capita is adequate.

In either case, we in New Zealand are wasting a lot of energy, both in terms of the efficiency of our technologies (see the Losses and Own Use info above), and also in our uses which do not contribute to wellbeing (think of the private vehicle travel that could be done by active or public transport – if we had good infrastructure in place).

We in New Zealand need a national dialogue about our future. And energy availability is only one aspect. We need to discuss what our carrying capacity is, what level of consumption is sustainable for our population, and whether we wish to make adjustments in either our per capita consumption or our population. Both together determine whether we are on the sustainable side of carrying capacity. Currently we are on the unsustainable side, meaning our way of life cannot endure. Not a good look for being a good ancestor.

The current trajectory of the Government and Electricity Authority appears to be grossly unsustainable. At the very least they should be able to answer the questions posed here about the GHG emissions from implementing a totally renewable energy system, the net energy of such a system, and the related environmental and social consequences.

Public dialogue is critical to collectively working out our future. Allowing the current profit-driven trajectory to unfold is a recipe for disasters for our children and grandchildren.

Being silent on these issues amounts to complicity in allowing short-term financial interests and an addiction to convenience jeopardise a genuinely secure and resilient future. Let’s get some answers from the Government and Electricity Authority to critical questions about energy security.

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EPA Telework Policy restricts remote work, balancing work-from-home guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic with flexible schedules, union contracts, OMB guidance, and federal workforce rules, impacting managers, SES staff, and non-bargaining employees nationwide.

Key Points

A directive limiting many EPA staff to two telework days weekly, with pandemic exceptions and flexible schedules.

✅ Limits telework to two days per week for many employees

✅ Allows flexible schedules, including maxiflex, during emergencies

✅ Aligns with OMB, OPM, CDC guidance; honors union agreements

EPA has moved forward on a new policy that would restrict telework even as agency leadership has encouraged staff to work from home during the coronavirus outbreak.

The new EPA order obtained by E&E News would require employees to report to the office at least three days every week.

"Full-time employees are expected to report to the official worksite and duty station a minimum of three (3) days per week," says the order, dated as approved on Feb. 27. It went into effect March 15 — that night, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler authorized telework for the entire agency due to the pandemic.

The order focuses on EPA employees' work schedules and gives them new flexibilities that could come in handy during a public health emergency like the COVID-19 virus, when parts of the power sector consider on-site staffing to ensure continuity.

It also stipulates a deep reduction in EPA employees' capability to work remotely, leaving them with two days of telework per week. An agency order on telework, issued in January 2016, said staff could telework full time.

"The EPA supports the use of telework," said that order. "Regular telework may range from one day per pay period up to full time."

An EPA spokeswoman said the new order doesn't change the agency's guidance to staff to work from home during the pandemic.

"The health and safety of our employees is our top priority, and that is why we have requested that all employees telework, even as residential electricity use increases with more people at home, until at least April 3. There is no provision in the work schedules policy, telework policy or collective bargaining agreement that limits this request," said the spokeswoman.

"While EPA did implement the national work schedule policy effective 3/15/2020, it was implemented in order to provide increased work schedule flexibilities for non-bargaining unit employees who were not previously afforded flexible schedules, including maxiflex," she added.

"The implementation of the policy does not currently impact telework opportunities for EPA employees, and EPA has strongly encouraged all staff to telework," she said.

Still, the new order has caused consternation among EPA employees.

One EPA manager described it as another move by the Trump administration to restrict telework across the government.

"Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, this policy seems particularly ill-timed and unwise. It doesn't even give the administration the chance to evaluate the situation once the COVID-19 pandemic passes," said the manager.

"I think this is a dramatic change in the flexibilities available to the EPA employees without any data to support such a drastic move," the manager said. "It has huge ramifications for employees, many of whom commute over an hour each way to the office, increasing air pollution in the process."

Another EPA staffer said, "I honestly think such an order, given current circumstances, would elicit little more than a scoff and a smirk."

The person added, "How tone-deaf and heavy-handed can one administration be?"

Inside EPA first reported on the new order. E&E News obtained the memo independently.

The recently issued policy applies only to non-bargaining-unit employees, including "full-time and part-time" agency staff as well as "supervisors and managers in the competitive, excepted, Senior Level, Scientific and Professional, and Senior Executive Service positions."

In addition, the order covers "Public Health Service Officers, Schedule C, Administratively Determined employees and non-EPA employees serving on Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments to EPA."

Nevertheless, EPA employees covered under union contracts must adhere to those contracts if the policy runs counter to them.

"If provisions of this order conflict with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, the provisions of the agreement must be applied," the order says.

EPA has taken a more restrictive approach with the agency's largest union, American Federation of Government Employees Council 238, which represents about 7,500 EPA employees. EPA imposed a contract on the council's bargaining unit employees last July that limited them to one day of telework per week, among other changes that triggered union protests.

EPA and AFGE have since relaunched contract negotiations, and how to handle telework is one of the issues under discussion. Both sides committed to complete those bargaining talks by April 15 and work with the Federal Service Impasses Panel if needed (Greenwire, Feb. 27).

Both sides of the telework debate
EPA's new order has been under consideration for some time.

E&E News obtained a draft version last year. The agency had circulated it for comment in July, noting the proposal "limits the number of days an employee may telework per week," among other changes (Greenwire, Sept. 12, 2019).

EPA, like other federal agencies under the Trump administration, has sought to reduce employees' telework. That effort, though, has run into the headwinds of a global pandemic, with a U.S. grid warning highlighting broader risks, leading agency leaders to reverse course and now encourage staff to work remotely in order to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus.

Wheeler in an email last week told staff that he authorized telework for employees across the country. Federal worker unions had sought the opportunity for remote work on behalf of EPA employees, and the agency had already relaxed telework policies at various offices the prior week where the coronavirus had begun to take hold.

The EPA spokeswoman said the agency moved toward telework after guidance from other agencies.

"Consistent with [Office of Management and Budget], [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] and [Office of Personnel Management] guidance, along with state and local directives, we have taken swift action in regions and at headquarters to implement telework for all employees. We continue to tell all employees to telework," said the spokeswoman.

Wheeler said in a later video message that his expectation was most EPA employees were working from home.

"I understand that this is a difficult and scary time for all of us," said the EPA administrator.

The coronavirus has become a real challenge for EPA, and utilities like BC Hydro Site C updates illustrate broader operational adjustments.

Agency staff have been exposed to the virus while some have tested positive, and nuclear plant workers have raised similar concerns, according to internal emails. That has led to employees self-quarantining while their colleagues worry they may next fall ill (Greenwire, March 20).

One employee said that since EPA's operations have been maintained with staff working from home, even as household electricity bills rise for many, it's harder for the Trump administration to justify restricting remote work.

"With the current climate, I think employees have shown we can keep the agency going with nearly 95% teleworking full time. It makes their argument hard to justify in light of things," said the EPA employee.

The Trump administration overall has pushed for more remote work by the federal workforce in the battle with the COVID-19 virus. The Office of Management and Budget issued guidance to agencies last week "to minimize face-to-face interactions" and "maximize telework across the nation."

Lawmakers have also pushed to expand telework for federal workers due to the virus.

Democratic senators sent a letter last week urging President Trump to issue an executive order directing agencies to use telework.

In addition, Sens. James Lankford (R-Okla.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) introduced legislation that would allow federal employees to telework full time during the pandemic.

Some worry EPA's new order could further sour morale at the agency after the pandemic passes, as other utilities consider measures like unpaid days off to trim costs. Employees may leave if they can't work from home more.

"People will quit EPA over something like this. Maybe that's the goal," said the EPA manager.

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Oil and Gas Profitability Decline reflects shale-driven oversupply, OPEC-Russia dynamics, LNG exports, renewables growth, and weak demand, signaling compressed margins for producers, stressed petrodollar budgets, and shifting energy markets post-Covid.

Key Points

A sustained squeeze on hydrocarbon margins from agile shale supply, weaker OPEC leverage, and expanding renewables.

✅ Shale responsiveness caps prices and erodes industry rents

✅ OPEC-Russia cuts face limited impact versus US supply

✅ Renewables and EVs slow long-term oil and gas demand

The oil-price crash of March 2020 will probably not last long. As in 2014, when the oil price dropped below $50 from $110 in a few weeks, this one will trigger a temporary collapse of the US shale industry. Unless the coronavirus outbreak causes Armageddon, cheap oil will also support policymakers’ efforts to help the global economy.

But there will be at least one important and lasting difference this time round — and it has major market and geopolitical implications.

The oil price crash is a foretaste of where the whole energy sector was going anyway — and that is down.

It may not look that way at first. Saudi Arabia will soon realise, as it did in 2015, that its lethal decision to pump more oil is not only killing US shale but its public finances as well. Riyadh will soon knock on Moscow’s door again. Once American shale supplies collapse, Russia will resume co-operation with Saudi Arabia.

With the world economy recovering from the Covid-19 crisis by then, and with electricity demand during COVID-19 shifting, moderate supply cuts by both countries will accelerate oil market recovery. In time, US shale producers will return too.

Yet this inevitable bounceback should not distract from two fundamental factors that were already remaking oil and gas markets. First, the shale revolution has fundamentally eroded industry profitability. Second, the renewables’ revolution will continue to depress growth in demand.

The combined result has put the profitability of the entire global hydrocarbon industry under pressure. That means fewer petrodollars to support oil-producing countries’ national budgets, including Canada's oil sector exposures. It also means less profitable oil companies, which traditionally make up a large segment of stock markets, an important component of so many western pension funds.

Start with the first factor to see why this is so. Historically, the geological advantages that made oil from countries such as Saudi Arabia so cheap to produce were unique. Because oil and gas were produced at costs far below the market price, the excess profits, or “rent”, enjoyed by the industry were very large.

Furthermore, collusion among low-cost producers has been a winning strategy. The loss of market share through output cuts was more than compensated by immediately higher prices. It was the raison d’être of Opec.

The US shale revolution changed all this, exposing the limits of U.S. energy dominance narratives. A large oil-producing region emerged with a remarkable ability to respond quickly to price changes and shrink its costs over time. Cutting back cheap Opec oil now only increases US supplies, with little effect on world prices.

That is why Russia refused to cut production this month. Even if its cuts did boost world prices — doubtful given the coronavirus outbreak’s huge shock to demand — that would slow the shrinkage of US shale that Moscow wants.

Shale has affected the natural gas industry even more. Exports of US liquefied natural gas now put an effective ceiling on global prices, and debates over a clean electricity push have intensified when gas prices spike.

On top of all this, there is also the renewables’ revolution, though a green revolution has not been guaranteed in the near term. Around the world, wind and solar have become ever-cheaper options to generate electricity. Storage costs have also dropped and network management improved. Even in the US, renewables are displacing coal and gas. Electrification of vehicle fleets will damp demand further, as U.S. electricity, gas, and EVs face evolving pressures.

Eliminating fossil fuel consumption completely would require sustained and costly government intervention, and reliability challenges such as coal and nuclear disruptions add to the complexity. That is far from certain. Meanwhile, though, market forces are depressing the sector’s usual profitability.

The end of oil and gas is not immediately around the corner. Still, the end of hydrocarbons as a lucrative industry is a distinct possibility. We are seeing that in dramatic form in the current oil price crash. But this collapse is merely a message from the future.

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SM-1A Nuclear Plant Decommissioning details the US Army Corps of Engineers' removal of the Fort Greely reactor, Cold War facility dismantling, environmental monitoring, remote-site power history, and timeline to 2026 under a deactivated nuclear program.

Key Points

Army Corps plan to dismantle Fort Greely's SM-1A reactor and complete decommissioning of remaining systems by 2026.

✅ Built for remote Arctic radar support during the Cold War

✅ High costs beat diesel; program later deemed impractical

✅ Reactor parts removed; residuals monitored; removal by 2026

The US Army Corps of Engineers has begun decommissioning Alaska’s only nuclear power plant, SM-1A, which is located at Fort Greely, even as new US reactors continue to take shape nationwide. The $17m plant closed in 1972 after ten years of sporadic operation. It was out of commission from 1967 to 1969 for extensive repairs. Much of has already been dismantled and sent for disposal, and the rest, which is encased in concrete, is now to be removed.

The plant was built as part of an experimental programme to determine whether nuclear facilities, akin to next-generation nuclear concepts, could be built and operated at remote sites more cheaply than diesel-fuelled plants.

"The main approach was to reduce significant fuel-transportation costs by having a nuclear reactor that could operate for long terms, a concept echoed in the NuScale SMR safety evaluation process, with just one nuclear core," Brian Hearty said. Hearty manages the Army Corps of Engineers’ Deactivated Nuclear Power Plant Program.

#google#

He said the Army built SM-1A in 1962 hoping to provide power reliably at remote Arctic radar sites, where in similarly isolated regions today new US coal plants may still be considered, intended to detect incoming missiles from the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. He added that the programme worked but not as well as Pentagon officials had hoped. While SM-1A could be built and operated in a cold and remote location, its upfront costs were much higher than anticipated, and it costs more to maintain than a diesel power plant. Moreover, the programme became irrelevant because of advances in Soviet rocket science and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Hearty said the reactor was partially dismantled soon after it was shut down. “All of the fuel in the reactor core was removed and shipped back to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for them to either reprocess or dispose of,” he noted. “The highly activated control and absorber rods were also removed and shipped back to the AEC.”

The SM-1A plant produced 1.8MWe and 20MWt, including steam, which was used to heat the post. Because that part of the system was still needed, Army officials removed most of the nuclear-power system and linked the heat and steam components to a diesel-fired boiler. However, several parts of the nuclear system remained, including the reactor pressure vessel and reactor coolant pumps. “Those were either kept in place, or they were cut off and laid down in the tall vapour-containment building there,” Hearty said. “And then they were grouted and concreted in place.” The Corps of Engineers wants to remove all that remains of the plant, but it is as yet unclear whether that will be feasible.

Meanwhile, monitoring for radioactivity around the facility shows that it remains at acceptable levels. “It would be safe to say there’s no threat to human health in the environment,” said Brenda Barber, project manager for the decommissioning. Work is still in its early stages and is due to be completed in 2026 at the earliest. Barber said the Corps awarded the $4.6m contract in December to a Virginia-based firm to develop a long-range plan for the project, similar in scope to large reactor refurbishment efforts elsewhere. Among other things, this will help officials determine how much of the SM-1A will remain after it’s decommissioned. “There will still be buildings there,” she said. “There will still be components of some of the old structure there that may likely remain.”

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Bitcoin Energy Debate examines electricity usage, mining costs, environmental impact, and blockchain efficiency, weighing renewable power, carbon footprint, scalability, and transaction throughput to clarify stakeholder claims from Tesla, Square, academics, and policymakers.

Key Points

Debate on Bitcoin mining's power use, environmental impact, efficiency, and scalability versus alternative blockchains.

✅ Compares energy intensity with transaction throughput and system outputs.

✅ Weighs renewables, stranded power, and carbon footprint in mining.

✅ Assesses PoS blockchains, stablecoins, and scalability tradeoffs.

There is a great debate underway about the electricity required to process Bitcoin transactions. The debate is significant, the stakes are high, the views are diverse, and there are smart people on both sides. Bitcoin generates a lot of emotion, thereby producing too much heat and not enough light. In this post, I explain the importance of identifying the key issues in the debate, and of understanding the nature and extent of disagreement about how much electrical energy Bitcoin consumes.

Consider the background against which the debate is taking place. Because of its unstable price, Bitcoin cannot serve as a global mainstream medium of exchange. The instability is apparent. On January 1, 2021, Bitcoin’s dollar price was just over $29,000. Its price rose above $63,000 in mid-April, and then fell below $35,000, where it has traded recently. Now the financial media is asking whether we are about to experience another “cyber winter” as the prices of cryptocurrencies continue their dramatic declines.

Central banks warns of bubble on bitcoins as it skyrockets
As bitcoins skyrocket to more than $12 000 for one BTC, many central banks as ECB or US Federal ... [+] NURPHOTO VIA GETTY IMAGES
Bitcoin is a high sentiment beta asset, and unless that changes, Bitcoin cannot serve as a global mainstream medium of exchange. Being a high sentiment beta asset means that Bitcoin’s market price is driven much more by investor psychology than by underlying fundamentals.

As a general matter, high sentiment beta assets are difficult to value and difficult to arbitrage. Bitcoin qualifies in this regard. As a general matter, there is great disagreement among investors about the fair values of high sentiment beta assets. Bitcoin qualifies in this regard.

One major disagreement about Bitcoin involves the very high demand for electrical power associated with Bitcoin transaction processing, an issue that came to light several years ago. In recent months, the issue has surfaced again, in a drama featuring disagreement between two prominent industry leaders, Elon Musk (from Tesla and SpaceX) and Jack Dorsey (from Square).

On one side of the argument, Musk contends that Bitcoin’s great need for electrical power is detrimental to the environment, especially amid disruptions in U.S. coal and nuclear power that increase supply strain.  On the other side, Dorsey argues that Bitcoin’s electricity profile is a benefit to the environment, in part because it provides a reliable customer base for clean electric power. This might make sense, in the absence of other motives for generating clean power; however, it seems to me that there has been a surge in investment in alternative technologies for producing electricity that has nothing to do with cryptocurrency. So I am not sure that the argument is especially strong, but will leave it there. In any event, this is a demand side argument.

A supply side argument favoring Bitcoin is that the processing of Bitcoin transactions, known as “Bitcoin mining,” already uses clean electrical power, power which has already been produced, as in hydroelectric plants at night, but not otherwise consumed in an era of flat electricity demand across mature markets.

Both Musk and Dorsey are serious Bitcoin investors. Earlier this year, Tesla purchased $1.5 billion of Bitcoin, agreed to accept Bitcoin as payment for automobile sales, and then reversed itself. This reversal appears to have pricked an expanding Bitcoin bubble. Square is a digital transaction processing firm, and Bitcoin is part of its long-term strategy.

Consider two big questions at the heart of the digital revolution in finance. First, to what degree will blockchain replace conventional transaction technologies? Second, to what degree will competing blockchain based digital assets, which are more efficient than Bitcoin, overcome Bitcoin’s first mover advantage as the first cryptocurrency?

To gain some insight about possible answers to these questions, and the nature of the issues related to the disagreement between Dorsey and Musk, I emailed a series of academics and/or authors who have expertise in blockchain technology.

David Yermack, a financial economist at New York University, has written and lectured extensively on blockchains. In 2019, Yermack wrote the following: “While Bitcoin and successor cryptocurrencies have grown remarkably, data indicates that many of their users have not tried to participate in the mainstream financial system. Instead they have deliberately avoided it in order to transact in black markets for drugs and other contraband … or evade capital controls in countries such as China.” In this regard, cyber-criminals demanding ransom for locking up their targets information systems often require payment in Bitcoin. Recent examples of cyber-criminal activity are not difficult to find, such as incidents involving Kaseya and Colonial Pipeline.

David Yermack continues: “However, the potential benefits of blockchain for improving data security and solving moral hazard problems throughout the financial system have become widely apparent as cryptocurrencies have grown.” In his recent correspondence with me, he argues that the electrical power issue associated with Bitcoin “mining,” is relatively minor because Bitcoin miners are incentivized to seek out cheap electric power, and patterns shifted as COVID-19 changed U.S. electricity consumption across sectors.

Thomas Philippon, also a financial economist at NYU, has done important work characterizing the impact of technology on the resource requirements of the financial sector. He has argued that historically, the financial sector has comprised about 6-to-7% of the economy on average, with variability over time. Unit costs, as a percentage of assets, have consistently been about 2%, even with technological advances. In respect to Bitcoin, he writes in his correspondence with me that Bitcoin is too energy inefficient to generate net positive social benefits, and that energy crisis pressures on U.S. electricity and fuels complicate the picture, but acknowledges that over time positive benefits might be possible.

Emin Gün Sirer is a computer scientist at Cornell University, whose venture AVA Labs has been developing alternative blockchain technology for the financial sector. In his correspondence with me, he writes that he rejects the argument that Bitcoin will spur investment in renewable energy relative to other stimuli. He also questions the social value of maintaining a fairly centralized ledger largely created by miners that had been in China and are now migrating to other locations such as El Salvador.

Bob Seeman is an engineer, lawyer, and businessman, who has written a book entitled Bitcoin: The Mother of All Scams. In his correspondence with me, he writes that his professional experience with Bitcoin led him to conclude that Bitcoin is nothing more than unlicensed gambling, a point he makes in his book.

David Gautschi is an academic at Fordham University with expertise in global energy. I asked him about studies that compare Bitcoin’s use of energy with that of the U.S. financial sector. In correspondence with me, he cautioned that the issues are complex, and noted that online technology generally consumes a lot of power, with electricity demand during COVID-19 highlighting shifting load profiles.

My question to David Gautschi was prompted by a study undertaken by the cryptocurrency firm Galaxy Digital. This study found that the financial sector together with the gold industry consumes twice as much electrical power as Bitcoin transaction processing. The claim by Galaxy is that Bitcoin’s electrical power needs are “at least two times lower than the total energy consumed by the banking system as well as the gold industry on an annual basis.”

Galaxy’s analysis is detailed and bottom up based. In order to assess the plausibility of its claims, I did a rough top down analysis whose results were roughly consistent with the claims in the Galaxy study. For sake of disclosure, I placed the heuristic calculations I ran in a footnote.1 If we accept the Galaxy numbers, there remains the question of understanding the outputs produced by the electrical consumption associated with both Bitcoin mining and U.S. banks’ production of financial services. I did not see that the Galaxy study addresses the output issue, and it is important.

Consider some quick statistics which relate to the issue of outputs. The total market for global financial services was about $20 trillion in 2020. The number of Bitcoin transactions processed per day was about 330,000 in December 2020, and about 400,000 in January 2021. The corresponding number for Bitcoin’s digital rival Ethereum during this time was about 1.1 million transactions per day. In contrast, the global number of credit card transactions per day in 2018 was about 1 billion.2

Bitcoin Value Falls
LONDON, ENGLAND - NOVEMBER 20: A visual representation of the cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ethereum ... [+] GETTY IMAGES
These numbers tell us that Bitcoin transactions comprise a small share, on the order of 0.04%, of global transactions, but use something like a third of the electricity needed for these transactions. That said, the associated costs of processing Bitcoin transactions relate to tying blocks of transactions together in a blockchain, not to the number of transactions. Nevertheless, even if the financial sector does indeed consume twice as much electrical power as Bitcoin, the disparity between Bitcoin and traditional financial technology is striking, and the experience of Texas grid reliability underscores system constraints when it comes to output relative to input.  This, I suggest, weakens the argument that Bitcoin’s electricity demand profile is inconsequential because Bitcoin mining uses slack electricity.

A big question is how much electrical power Bitcoin mining would require, if Bitcoin were to capture a major share of the transactions involved in world commerce. Certainly much more than it does today; but how much more?

Given that Bitcoin is a high sentiment beta asset, there will be a lot of disagreement about the answers to these two questions. Eventually we might get answers.

At the same time, a high sentiment beta asset is ill suited to being a medium of exchange and a store of value. This is why stablecoins have emerged, such as Diem, Tether, USD Coin, and Dai. Increased use of these stable alternatives might prevent Bitcoin from ever achieving a major share of the transactions involved in world commerce.

We shall see what the future brings. Certainly El Salvador’s recent decision to make Bitcoin its legal tender, and to become a leader in Bitcoin mining, is something to watch carefully. Just keep in mind that there is significant downside to experiencing foreign exchange rate volatility. This is why global financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF do not support El Salvador’s decision; and as I keep saying, Bitcoin is a very high sentiment beta asset.

In the past I suggested that Bitcoin bubble would burst when Bitcoin investors conclude that its associated processing is too energy inefficient. Of course, many Bitcoin investors are passionate devotees, who are vulnerable to the psychological bias known as motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning-based sentiment, featuring denial,3 can keep a bubble from bursting, or generate a series of bubbles, a pattern we can see from Bitcoin’s history.

I find the argument that Bitcoin is necessary to provide the right incentives for the development of clean alternatives for generating electricity to be interesting, but less than compelling. Are there no other incentives, such as evolving utility trends, or more efficient blockchain technologies? Bitcoin does have a first mover advantage relative to other cryptocurrencies. I just think we need to be concerned about getting locked into an technologically inferior solution because of switching costs.

There is an argument to made that decisions, such as how to use electric power, are made in markets with self-interested agents properly evaluating the tradeoffs. That said, think about why most of the world adopted the Windows operating system in the 1980s over the superior Mac operating system offered by Apple. Yes, we left it to markets to determine the outcome. People did make choices; and it took years for Windows to catch up with the Mac’s operating system.

My experience as a behavioral economist has taught me that the world is far from perfect, to expect to be surprised, and to expect people to make mistakes. We shall see what happens with Bitcoin going forward.

As things stand now, Bitcoin is well suited as an asset for fulfilling some people’s urge to engage in high stakes gambling. Indeed, many people have a strong need to engage in gambling. Last year, per capita expenditure on lottery tickets in Massachusetts was the highest in the U.S. at over $930.

High sentiment beta assets offer lottery-like payoffs. While Bitcoin certainly does a good job of that, it cannot simultaneously serve as an effective medium of exchange and reliable store of value, even setting aside the issue at the heart of the electricity debate.

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Europe's Nuclear Energy Policy shapes responses to the energy crisis, soaring gas prices, EU taxonomy rules, net-zero goals, renewables integration, baseload security, SMRs, and Russia-Ukraine geopolitics, exposing cultural, financial, and environmental divides.

Key Points

A policy guiding nuclear exits or expansion to balance energy security, net-zero goals, costs, and EU taxonomy.

✅ Divergent national stances: phase-outs vs. new builds

✅ Costs, delays, and waste challenge large reactors

✅ SMRs, renewables, and gas shape net-zero pathways

As the Fukushima disaster unfolded in Japan in 2011, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a dramatic decision that delighted her country’s anti-nuclear movement: all reactors would be ditched.

What couldn’t have been predicted was that Europe would find itself mired in one of the worst energy crises in its history. A decade later, the continent’s biggest economy has shut down almost all its capacity already. The rest will be switched off at the end of 2022 — at the worst possible time.

Wholesale power prices are more than four times what they were at the start of the coronavirus pandemic. Governments are having to take emergency action to support domestic and industrial consumers faced with crippling bills, which could rise higher if the tension over Ukraine escalates. The crunch has not only exposed Europe’s supply vulnerabilities, but also the entrenched cultural and political divisions over the nuclear industry and a failure to forge a collective vision. 

Other regions meanwhile are cracking on, challenging the idea that nuclear power is in decline worldwide. China is moving fast on nuclear to try to clean up its air quality. Its suite of reactors is on track to surpass that of the U.S., the world’s largest, by as soon as the middle of this decade. Russia is moving forward with new stations at home and has more than 20 reactors confirmed or planned for export construction, according to the World Nuclear Association.

“I don’t think we’re ever going to see consensus across Europe with regards to the continued running of existing assets, let alone the construction of new ones,” said Peter Osbaldstone, research director for power and renewables at Wood Mackenzie Group Ltd. in the U.K. “It’s such a massive polarizer of opinions that national energy policy is required in strength over a sustained period to support new nuclear investment.” 

France, Europe’s most prolific nuclear energy producer, is promising an atomic renaissance as its output becomes less reliable. Britain plans to replace aging plants in the quest for cleaner, more reliable energy sources. The Netherlands wants to add more capacity, Poland also is seeking to join the nuclear club, and Finland is starting to produce electricity later this month from its first new plant in four decades. 

Belgium and Spain, meanwhile, are following Germany’s lead in abandoning nuclear, albeit on different timeframes. Austria rejected it in a referendum in 1978.

Nuclear power is seen by its proponents as vital to reaching net-zero targets worldwide. Once built, reactors supply low-carbon electricity all the time, unlike intermittent wind or solar.

Plants, though, take a decade or more to construct at best and the risk is high of running over time and over budget. Finland’s new Olkiluoto-3 unit is coming on line after a 12-year delay and billions of euros in financial overruns. 

Then there’s the waste, which stays hazardous for 100,000 years. For those reasons European Union members are still quarreling over whether nuclear even counts as sustainable.

Electorates are also split. Polling by YouGov Plc published in December found that Danes, Germans and Italians were far more nuclear-skeptic than the French, British or Spanish. 

“It comes down to politics,” said Vince Zabielski, partner at New York-based law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, who was a nuclear engineer for 15 years. “Everything political ebbs and flows, but when the lights start going off people have a completely different perspective.”

What’s Behind Europe’s Skyrocketing Energy Prices

Indeed, there’s a risk of rolling blackouts this winter. Supply concerns plaguing Europe have sent gas and electricity prices to record levels and inflation has ballooned. There’s also mounting tension with Russia over a possible invasion of Ukraine, which could lead to disrupted supplies of gas. All this is strengthening the argument that Europe needs to reduce its dependence on international sources of gas.

Europe will need to invest 500 billion euros ($568 billion) in nuclear over the next 30 years to meet growing demand for electricity and achieve its carbon reduction targets, according to Thierry Breton, the EU’s internal market commissioner. His comments come after the bloc unveiled plans last month to allow certain natural gas and nuclear energy projects to be classified as sustainable investments. 

“Nuclear power is a very long-term investment and investors need some kind of guarantee that it will generate a payoff,” said Elina Brutschin at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. In order to survive in liberalized economies like the EU, the technology needs policy support to help protect investors, she said.

That already looks like a tall order. The European Commission has been told by a key expert group that the labeling risks raising greenhouse gas emissions and undermining the bloc’s reputation as a bastion for environmentally friendly finance.

Austria has threatened to sue the European Commission over attempts to label atomic energy as green. The nation previously attempted a legal challenge, when the U.K. was still an EU member, to stop the construction of Electricite de France SA’s Hinkley Point C plant, in the west of England. It has also commenced litigation against new Russia-backed projects in neighboring Hungary.

Germany, which has missed its carbon emissions targets for the past two years, has been criticized by some environmentalists and climate scientists for shutting down a supply of clean power at the worst time, despite arguments for a nuclear option for climate policy. Its final three reactors will be halted this year. Yet that was never going to be reversed with the Greens part of the new coalition government. 

The contribution of renewables in Germany has almost tripled since the year before Fukushima, and was 42% of supply last year. That’s a drop from 46% from the year before and means the country’s new government will have to install some 3 gigawatts of renewables — equivalent to the generating capacity of three nuclear reactors — every year this decade to hit the country's 80% goal.

“Other countries don’t have this strong political background that goes back to three decades of anti-nuclear protests,” said Manuel Koehler, managing director of Aurora Energy Research Ltd., a company analyzing power markets and founded by Oxford University academics. 

At the heart of the issue is that countries with a history of nuclear weapons will be more likely to use the fuel for power generation. They will also have built an industry and jobs in civil engineering around that.

Germany’s Greens grew out of anti-nuclear protest movements against the stationing of U.S. nuclear missiles in West Germany. The 1986 Chernobyl meltdown, which sent plumes of radioactive fallout wafting over parts of western Europe, helped galvanize the broader population. Nuclear phase-out plans were originally laid out in 2002, but were put on hold by the country's conservative governments. The 2011 Fukushima meltdowns reinvigorated public debate, ultimately prompting Merkel to implement them.

It’s not easy to undo that commitment, said Mark Hibbs, a Bonn, Germany-based nuclear analyst at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, or to envision any resurgence of nuclear in Germany soon: “These are strategic decisions, that have been taken long in advance.”

In France, President Emmanuel Macron is about to embark on a renewed embrace of nuclear power, even as a Franco-German nuclear dispute complicates the debate. The nation produces about two-thirds of its power from reactors and is the biggest exporter of electricity in Europe. Notably, that includes anti-nuclear Germany and Austria.

EDF, the world’s biggest nuclear plant operator, is urging the French government to support construction of six new large-scale reactors at an estimated cost of about 50 billion euros. The first of them would start generating in 2035.

But even France has faced setbacks. Development of new projects has been put on hold after years of technical issues at the Flamanville-3 project in Normandy. The plant is now scheduled to be completed next year. 

In the U.K., Business Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng said that the global gas price crisis underscores the need for more home-generated clean power. By 2024, five of Britain’s eight plants will be shuttered because they are too old. Hinkley Point C is due to be finished in 2026 and the government will make a final decision on another station before an election due in 2024. 

One solution is to build small modular reactors, or SMRs, which are quicker to construct and cheaper. The U.S. is at the forefront of efforts to design smaller nuclear systems with plans also underway in the U.K. and France. Yet they too have faced delays. SMR designs have existed for decades though face the same challenging economic metrics and safety and security regulations of big plants.

The trouble, as ever, is time. “Any investment decisions you make now aren’t going to come to fruition until the 2030s,” said Osbaldstone, the research director at Wood Mackenzie. “Nuclear isn’t an answer to the current energy crisis.”

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