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Manitoba Hydro Privatization Debate centers on subsidiaries, Crown corporation governance, clean energy priorities, and electricity rates, as board terms shift oversight and transparency, sparking concerns about sell-offs and government control.

Key Points

A dispute over Hydro's governance, subsidiaries, electricity rates, and clean energy amid fears of partial privatization.

✅ Rewritten terms allow subsidiaries and shift board duties.

✅ Low rates and clean energy mandates softened in guidance.

✅ Govt cites Hydro Act; NDP warns of sell-off risks.

The board of Manitoba Hydro is being reminded it can divvy up some of the utility's work to subsidiaries — which the NDP is decrying as a step toward privatization. 

A sentence seemingly granting the board permission to create subsidiaries was included in the board's new terms of reference, which the NDP raised during question period Wednesday. 

The document also eliminated references asking Manitoba Hydro to keep electricity rates low, even as rate hike hearings proceed, and supply power in an environmentally-friendly fashion.

NDP raises spectre of Manitoba Hydro's privatization with new CEO
"They're essentially taking the heart out of Manitoba Hydro," NDP leader Wab Kinew said.

Cheap, clean energy is the basis by which the Crown corporation was formed, even as scaled-back rate increases are planned for next year, he said. 

"That's the whole reason we created this utility in the first place."

Another addition to the board's guidelines include stating the corporation is responsible to the government minister, who must be "proactively informed" when significant issues arise. 

The provincial government, however, says the rewritten terms of reference was the directive of the Manitoba Hydro board and not itself.

CBC's requests to the government for an interview were directed to Manitoba Hydro.

In an interview, Manitoba Hydro spokesperson Scott Powell said the energy utility has undergone no legislative changes, and is still governed by the Manitoba Hydro Act. 

The terms of reference were altered to align the board's duties with the new act overseeing Crown corporations, Powell said.

"Whether you have one or two words different in the terms of reference, the essence of the company hasn't changed."

While the new terms of reference no longer instructs the corporation to ensure an "environmentally responsible supply of energy for Manitobans," it encourages the board to "promote economy and efficiency in all phases of power generation and distribution."

On the cost to ratepayers, the updated directions asks the utility to deliver "safe, reliable energy services at a fair price," a standard clarified by a recent appeal court ruling on First Nations rates, but the board is not specifically instructed with keeping electricity rates low. 

Kinew contends the added sentence on subsidiaries permits Hydro to be broken off and sold for parts, although the terms of reference does not specify if any subsidiary would be wholly owned by Hydro or contracted to a private company.

Powell said Manitoba Hydro has been permitted to create subsidiaries since 1997, and nothing has changed since.

Kinew warned about Hydro's privatization last week when Jay Grewal was announced as Hydro's incoming CEO and president.

She was employed with B.C. Hydro when then-premier Gordon Campbell — hired by the Manitoba government to investigate costly overruns on two electricity megaprojects — sold off segments of the utility.

She then became managing director of Accenture, a global management consulting firm, which acquired several B.C. Hydro departments.

During question period Wednesday, Pallister disputed that Manitoba Hydro is bound to be sold.

He slammed the NDP's "Americanization strategy" of producing more electricity than it is capable of selling, which has saddled ratepayers with billions in debt and prompted proposed 2.5% annual increases in coming years. 

The makeup of the Hydro board has undergone a complete turnover in under a year, a contrast to Ontario's Hydro One shakeup vow during that period.

Nine of the 10 members resigned en masse this March over an impasse with the Pallister government. The lone holdover, Cliff Graydon, was dismissed from his post last month after the Progressive Conservatives removed him from caucus. 

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Saamis Solar Park advances Medicine Hat's renewable energy strategy, as DP Energy secures AUC approval for North America's largest urban solar, repurposing contaminated land; capacity phased from 325 MW toward an initial 75 MW.

Key Points

A 325 MW solar project in Medicine Hat, Alberta, repurposing contaminated land; phased to 75 MW under city ownership.

✅ City acquisition scales capacity to 75 MW in phased build

✅ AUC approval enables construction and grid integration

✅ Reuses phosphogypsum-impacted land near fertilizer plant

DP Energy, an Irish renewable energy developer, has finalized the sale of the Saamis Solar Park—a 325 megawatt (MW) solar project—to the City of Medicine Hat in Alberta, Canada. This transaction marks the development of North America's largest urban solar initiative, while mirroring other Canadian clean-energy deals such as Canadian Solar project sales that signal market depth.

Project Development and Approval

DP Energy secured development rights for the Saamis Solar Park in 2017 and obtained a development permit in 2021. In 2024, the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) granted approval for construction and operation, reflecting Alberta's solar growth trends in recent years, paving the way for the project's advancement.

Strategic Acquisition by Medicine Hat

The City of Medicine Hat's acquisition of the Saamis Solar Park aligns with its commitment to enhancing renewable energy infrastructure. Initially, the project was slated for a 325 MW capacity, which would significantly bolster the city's energy supply. However, the city has proposed scaling the project to a 75 MW capacity, focusing on a phased development approach, and doing so amid challenges with solar expansion in Alberta that influence siting and timing. This adjustment aims to align the project's scale with the city's current energy needs and strategic objectives.

Utilization of Contaminated Land

An innovative aspect of the Saamis Solar Park is its location on a 1,600-acre site previously affected by industrial activity. The land, near Medicine Hat's fertilizer plant, was previously compromised by phosphogypsum—a byproduct of fertilizer production. DP Energy's decision to develop the solar park on this site exemplifies a productive reuse of contaminated land, transforming it into a source of clean energy.

Benefits to Medicine Hat

The development of the Saamis Solar Park is poised to deliver multiple benefits to Medicine Hat:

• Energy Supply Enhancement: The project will augment the city's energy grid, much like municipal solar projects that provide local power, providing a substantial portion of its electricity needs.

• Economic Advantages: The city anticipates financial savings by reducing carbon tax liabilities, as lower-cost solar contracts have shown competitiveness, through the generation of renewable energy.

• Environmental Impact: By investing in renewable energy, Medicine Hat aims to reduce its carbon footprint and contribute to global sustainability efforts.

DP Energy's Ongoing Commitment

Despite the sale, DP Energy maintains a strong presence in Canada, where Indigenous-led generation is expanding, with a diverse portfolio of renewable energy projects, including solar, onshore wind, storage, and offshore wind initiatives. The company continues to focus on sustainable development practices, striving to minimize environmental impact while maximizing energy production efficiency.

The transfer of the Saamis Solar Park to the City of Medicine Hat represents a significant milestone in renewable energy development. It showcases effective land reutilization, strategic urban planning, and a shared commitment to sustainable energy solutions, aligning with federal green electricity procurement that reinforces market demand. This project not only enhances the city's energy infrastructure but also sets a precedent for integrating large-scale renewable energy projects within urban environments.

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GE Wind Turbine Collapse Brazil raises safety concerns at Omega Energia's Delta VI wind farm in Maranhe3o, with GE Renewable Energy probing root-cause of turbine failure after a worker injury and similar incidents in 2024.

Key Points

An SEO focus on the Brazil GE turbine collapse, its causes, safety investigation, and related 2024 incidents.

✅ Incident at Omega Energia's Delta VI, Maranhao; one worker injured

✅ GE Renewable Energy conducts root-cause investigation and containment

✅ Fifth GE turbine collapse in 2024 across Brazil and the United States

A GE Renewable Energy turbine collapsed at a wind farm in north-east Brazil, injuring a worker and sparking a probe into the fifth such incident this year, the manufacturer confirmed.

One of the manufacturer’s GE 2.72-116 turbines collapsed at Omega Energia’s Delta VI project in Maranhão, which was commissioned in 2018.

Three GE employees were on site at the time of the collapse on Tuesday (3 September), the US manufacturer confirmed, even as U.S. offshore wind developers signal growing competitiveness with gas. 

One worker was injured and is currently receiving medical treatment, GE added.

"We are working to determine the root cause of this incident and to provide proper support as needed," it said

The turbine collapse in Brazil is the fifth such incident involving GE turbines this year, even as the UK's biggest offshore windfarm begins power supply this week, underscoring broader sector momentum.

On 16 February, a turbine collapsed at NextEra Energy Resources’ Casa Mesa wind farm in New Mexico, US, while giant wind components were being transported to a project in Saskatchewan, Canada. The site uses GE’s 2.3-116 and 2.5-127 models.

The New Mexico incident was followed by another collapse in the US — as a Scottish North Sea wind farm resumed construction after Covid-19 — this time a GE 2.4-107 unit at Tradewind Energy’s Chisholm View 2 project in Oklahoma on 21 May.

Two GE turbines then collapsed at projects in July: a 2.5-116 unit at Invenergy’s Upstreamwind farm in Nebraska on 5 July, followed by a 1.7-103 model at the Actis Group-owned Ventos de São Clemente complex in Pernambuco, north-eastern Brazil, even as tidal power in Scotland generated enough electricity to power nearly 4,000 homes.

No employees were injured in the first four turbine collapses of the year, in contrast with concerns at a Hawaii geothermal plant over potential meltdown risk.

In response to the latest incident, GE Renewable Energy added: "It is too early to speculate about the root cause of this week’s turbine collapse.

"Based on our learnings from the previous turbine collapses, we have teams in place focused on containing and resolving these issues quickly, to ensure the safe and reliable operation of our turbines."

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Goreway Power Station Overbilling exposed by Ontario Energy Board shows IESO oversight failures, GCG gaming, and $100M in inappropriate payments at the Brampton natural gas plant, penalized with fines and repayments impacting Ontario ratepayers.

Key Points

Goreway exploited IESO GCG flaws, causing about $100M in improper payouts and fines.

✅ OEB probe flagged $89M in ineligible start-up O&M charges

✅ IESO fined Goreway $10M; majority of excess costs recovered

✅ Audit found $200M in overbilling across nine generators

Hydro customers shelled out about $100 million in "inappropriate" payments to a natural gas plant that exploited flaws in how Ontario manages its private electricity generators, according to the Ontario Energy Board.

The company operating the Goreway Power Station in Brampton "gamed" the system for at least three years, according to an investigation by the provincial energy regulator. 

The investigation also delivers stinging criticism of the provincial government's Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), slamming it for a lack of oversight. The probe by the Ontario Energy Board's market surveillance panel was completed nearly a year ago, but was only made public in November because it was buried on its website without a news release. CBC News is the first media outlet to report on the investigation.  

The excess payments to Goreway Power Station included:

• $89 million in ineligible expenses billed as the costs of firing up power production. 
• $5.6 million paid in three months from a flaw in how IESO calculated top-ups for the company committing to generate power a day in advance.   
• Of $11.2 million paid to compensate the company for IESO ordering it to start or stop generating power, the investigation concluded "a substantial portion ... was the result of gaming."  

Most privately-owned natural gas-fired plants in the province do not generate electricity constantly, but start and stop production in response to fluctuating market demand, even as the energy minister has requested an halt to natural gas generation across the grid.  IESO pays them a premium for the costs of firing up production, through what it calls "generation cost guarantee" programs. 

But the investigation found IESO did little checking into the details of Goreway Power Station's billings. 

Goreway Power Station, located near Highway 407 in Brampton, Ont., is an 875 megawatt natural gas power plant. (Goreway)

"Conservatively, at least $89 million of Goreway's submissions were clearly ineligible by any reasonable measure," concludes the report.

"Goreway routinely submitted what were obviously inappropriate expenses to be reimbursed by the IESO, and ultimately borne by Ontario ratepayers,"

The investigation panel found an "extraordinary pattern" to these billings by Goreway Power Station, suggesting the IESO should have caught on sooner. The company submitted more than $100 million in start-up operating and maintenance costs during the three-year period investigated — more than all other gas-fired generators in the province combined. The company's costs per start-up were more than double the next most expensive power generator. 

"Goreway repeatedly exploited defects in the GCG (generation cost guarantee) program, and in doing so received at least $89 million in gamed GCG payments." 

Company fined $10M

The investigation covered a three-year period from when Goreway Power Station began generating power in June 2009. Investigators said that delays in releasing documents slowed down their probe, and they only obtained all the records they needed in April 2016.

The investigating panel does not have the power to impose penalties on companies it found broke the rules. 

The IESO fined Goreway Power Station $10 million. The company has also repaid IESO "a substantial portion" of the excess payments it received during its first six years of operating, but the exact figure is blacked out in the investigation report that was made public. 

The control room from which the provincial government's Independent Electricity System Operator manages Ontario's power supply. The agency is also responsible for managing contracts with private power producers.(IESO)

"Goreway does not agree with many of the draft report's findings and conclusions, including any suggestion that Goreway engaged in gaming or that it deliberately misled the IESO," writes lawyer George Vegh on behalf of the company in a response to the investigation report, dated Aug. 1.

"Goreway has implemented initiatives designed to ensure that compliance is a chief operating principle."     

The power station, located near Highway 407 in Brampton, is a joint venture between Toyota Tsusho Corp. and JERA Co. Inc. During the period under scrutiny, the project was run by Toyota Tsusho and Chubu Electric Power Inc., both headquartered in Japan. 

Investigators fear 'same situation' exists today

The report blames the provincially-controlled IESO for creating a system with defects that allowed the over-billing. 

"Goreway was able to — and repeatedly did — exploit these defects," says the investigation report. It goes on to explain the flaws "have created opportunities for exploitation, to the serious financial disadvantage of Ontario's ratepayers," even as greening Ontario's grid could entail massive costs.

The investigation suggests IESO hasn't made adequate changes to ensure it won't happen again, at a time when an analysis of a dirtier grid is raising concerns.   

"Goreway stands as a clear example of how generators are able to exploit the generation costs guarantee regime," says the report.

"The Panel is concerned that the same situation remains in place today." 

PC energy critic Todd Smith raised CBC News' report on the Goreway Power Station in Tuesday's question period. (Ontario Legislature)

After CBC News broke the story Tuesday, the provincial government was forced to respond in question period, amid a broader push for new gas plants to boost electricity production. 

"Here we have yet another gas plant scandal in Peel region that's costing electricity customers over $100 million," said PC energy critic Todd Smith. He slammed "the incompetence of a government that once again failed to look out for electricity customers." 

Economic Development Minister Brad Duguid said: "There is no excuse for any company in this province to ever game the system."

Nine companies overbilled $200M: audit 

The IESO found out about the overbilling "some time ago," said Duguid.

"They fully investigated, they've recovered most of the cost, they delivered a $10 million fine — the biggest fine on record."

The program that Goreway exploited became the subject of an audit that the IESO launched in 2011. The agency uncovered $200 million in ineligible billings by nine power producers, wrote the IESO vice president for policy Terry Young in an email to CBC News.

The IESO has recovered up to 85 per cent of those ineligible costs, Young noted.

Reforms to the design of the the program have removed the potential for overpayments and made it more efficient, he said, even as Ontario weighs embracing clean power more broadly. Last year, its total annual costs dropped to $23 million, down from $61 million in 2014.

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Texas Blackout Liability Ruling clarifies appellate court findings in Houston, citing deregulated energy markets, ERCOT immunity, wholesale generators, retail providers, and 2021 winter storm lawsuits over grid failures and wrongful deaths.

Key Points

Houston judges held wholesale generators owe no duty to retail customers, limiting liability for 2021 blackout lawsuits.

✅ Court cites deregulated market and lack of privity to consumers

✅ Ruling shields generators from 2021 winter storm civil suits

✅ Plaintiffs plan appeals; legislature may address liability

Nearly three years after the devastating Texas blackout of 2021, a panel of judges from the First Court of Appeals in Houston has determined that major power companies cannot be held accountable for their failure to deliver electricity during the power grid crisis that unfolded, citing Texas' deregulated energy market as the reason.

This ruling appears likely to shield these companies from lawsuits that were filed against them in the aftermath of the blackout, leaving the families of those affected uncertain about where to seek justice.

In February 2021, a severe cold front swept over Texas, bringing extended periods of ice and snow. The extreme weather conditions increased energy demand while simultaneously reducing supply by causing power generators and the state's natural gas supply chain to freeze. This led to a blackout that left millions of Texans without power and water for nearly a week.

The state officially reported that almost 250 people lost their lives during the winter storm and subsequent blackout, although some analysts argue that this is a significant undercount and warn of blackout risks across the U.S. during severe heat as well.

In the wake of the storm, Texans affected by the energy system's failure began filing lawsuits, and lawmakers proposed a market bailout as political debate intensified. Some of these legal actions were directed against power generators whose plants either ceased to function during the storm or ran out of fuel for electricity generation.

After several years of legal proceedings, a three-judge panel was convened to evaluate the merits of these lawsuits.

This week, Chief Justice Terry Adams issued a unanimous opinion on behalf of the panel, stating, "Texas does not currently recognize a legal duty owed by wholesale power generators to retail customers to provide continuous electricity to the electric grid, and ultimately to the retail customers."

The opinion further clarified that major power generators "are now statutorily precluded by the legislature from having any direct relationship with retail customers of electricity."

This separation of power generation from transmission and retail electric sales in many parts of Texas resulted from energy market deregulation in the early 2000s, with the goal of reducing energy costs, and prompted electricity market reforms aimed at avoiding future blackouts.

Under the previous system, power companies were "vertically integrated," controlling generators, transmission lines, and selling the energy they produced directly to regional customers. However, in deregulated areas of Texas, competition was introduced, creating competing energy-generating companies and retail electric providers that purchase power wholesale and then sell it to residential consumers; meanwhile, electric cooperatives in other parts of the state remained member-owned providers.

Tré Fischer, a partner at the Jackson Walker law firm representing the power companies, explained, "One consequence of that was, because of the unbundling and the separation, you also don't have the same duties and obligations [to consumers]. The structure just doesn't allow for that direct relationship and correspondingly a direct obligation to continually supply the electricity even if there's a natural disaster or catastrophic event."

In the opinion, Justice Adams noted that when designing the Texas energy market, amid renewed interest in ways to improve electricity reliability across the grid, state lawmakers "could have codified the retail customers' asserted duty of continuous electricity on the part of wholesale power generators into law."

The recent ruling applies to five representative cases chosen by the panel out of hundreds filed after the blackout. Due to this decision, it is improbable that any of the lawsuits against power companies will succeed, according to the court's interpretation.

However, plaintiffs' attorneys have indicated their intention to appeal. They may request a review of the panel's opinion by the entire First Court of Appeals or appeal directly to the state supreme court.

The state Supreme Court had previously ruled that the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the state's power grid operator, enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued over the blackout.

This latest opinion raises the question of who, if anyone, can be held responsible for deaths and losses resulting from the blackout, a question left unaddressed by the court. Fischer commented, "If anything [the judges] were saying that is a question for the Texas legislature."

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Commercial Electric Tariffs explain utility rate structures, peak demand charges, kWh vs kW pricing, time-of-use periods, voltage, delivery, capacity ratchets, and riders, guiding facility managers in tariff analysis for accurate energy savings.

Key Points

Commercial electric tariffs define utility pricing for energy, demand, delivery, time-of-use periods, riders, and ratchet charges.

✅ Separate kWh charges from kW peak demand fees.

✅ Verify time-of-use windows and demand interval length.

✅ Review riders, capacity ratchets, and minimum demand clauses.

Especially during these tough economic times, as major changes to electric bills are debated in some states, facility executives who don’t understand how their power is priced have been disappointed when their energy projects failed to produce expected dollar savings. Here’s how not to be one of them.

Your electric rate is spelled out in a document called a “tariff” that can be downloaded from your utility’s web page. A tariff should clearly spell out the costs for each component that is part of your rate, reflecting cost allocation practices in your region. Don’t be surprised to learn that it contains a bunch of them. Unlike residential electric rates, commercial electric bills are not based solely on the quantity of kilowatt-hours (kWh) consumed in a billing period (in the United States, that’s a month). Instead, different rates may apply to how your power is supplied, how it is delivered via electricity delivery charges, when it was consumed, its voltage, how fast it was used (in kW), and other factors.

If a tariff’s lingo and word structure are too opaque, spend some time with a utility account rep to translate it. Many state utility commissions also have customer advocates that may assist as they explore new utility rate designs that affect customers. Alternatively, for a fee, facility managers can privately chat with an energy consultant.

Common mistakes

Many facility managers try to estimate savings based on an averaged electric rate, i.e., annual electric spend divided by annual kWh. However, in markets where electricity demand is flat, such a number may obscure the fastest rising cost component: monthly peak demand charges, measured in dollars per kW (or kilo-volt-amperes, kVA).

This charge is like a monthly speeding ticket, based solely on the highest speed you drove during that time. In some areas, peak demand charges now account for 30 to 60 percent of a facility’s annual electric spend. When projecting energy cost savings, failing to separately account for kW peak demand and kWh consumption may result in erroneous results, and a lot of questions from the C-suite.

How peak demand charges are calculated varies among utilities. Some base it on the highest average speed of use across one hour in a month, while others may use the highest average speed during a 15- or 30-minute period. Others may average several of the highest speeds within a defined time period (for example, 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekdays). It is whatever your tariff says it is.

Because some power-consuming (or producing) devices, including those tied to smart home electricity networks, vary in their operation or abilities, they may save money on a few — but not all — of those rate components. If an equipment vendor calculates savings from its product by using an average electric rate, take pause. Tell the vendor to return after the proposal has been redone using tariff-based numbers.

When a vendor is the only person calculating potential savings from using a product, there’s also a built-in conflict of interest: The person profiting from an equipment sale should not also be the one calculating its expected financial return. Before signing any energy project contracts, it’s essential that someone independent of the deal reviews projected savings. That person (typically an energy or engineering consultant) should be quite familiar with your facility’s electric tariff, including any special provisions, riders, discounts, etc., that may pertain. When this doesn’t happen, savings often don’t occur as planned. 

For example, some utilities add another form of demand charge, based on the highest kW in a year. It has various names: capacity, contract demand, or the generic term “ratchet charge.” Some utilities also have a minimum ratchet charge which may be based on a percent of a facility’s annual kW peak. It ensures collection of sufficient utility revenue to cover the cost of installed transmission and distribution even when a customer significantly cuts its peak demand.

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