Confessions of a CFL detractor

Iraq Nuclear Power Plan targets eight reactors and 11 GW to ease blackouts, curb emissions, and support desalination, with financing via partners like Rosatom and Kepco amid OPEC-linked demand growth and chronic grid shortages.

Key Points

A $40B push to build eight reactors adding 11 GW, easing blackouts, cutting emissions, and supporting desalination.

✅ $40B, 20-year payback via partner financing

✅ Talks with Rosatom, Kepco; U.S. and France consulted

✅ Parallel solar buildout to meet 2030 demand

Iraq is working on a plan to build nuclear reactors as the electricity-starved petrostate seeks to end the widespread blackouts that have sparked social unrest.

OPEC’s No. 2 oil producer – already suffering from power shortages and insufficient investment in aging plants – needs to meet an expected 50% jump in demand by the end of the decade. Building atomic plants could help to close the supply gap, though the country will face significant financial and geopolitical challenges in bringing its plan to fruition.

Iraq seeks to build eight reactors capable of producing about 11 gigawatts, said Kamal Hussain Latif, chairman of the Iraqi Radioactive Sources Regulatory Authority. It would seek funding from prospective partners for the $40 billion plan and pay back the costs over 20 years, he said, adding that the authority had discussed cooperation with Russian and South Korean officials, as Iran-Iraq energy cooperation progresses across the sector.

Plunging crude prices last year deprived Iraq of funds to maintain and expand its long-neglected electricity system, though grid rehabilitation deals have been finalized to support upgrades. The resulting outages triggered protests that threatened to topple the government.

“We have several forecasts that show that without nuclear power by 2030, we will be in big trouble,” Latif said in an interview at his office in Baghdad. Not only is there the power shortage and surge in demand to deal with, but Iraq is also trying to cut emissions and produce more water via desalination — “issues that raise the alarm for me.”

Raising financing will be a major task given that Iraq has suffered budgetary crises amid volatile oil prices. Even with crude at about $70 a barrel now, the country is only just balancing its budget, according to data from the International Monetary Fund.

The government will also have to tackle geopolitical concerns around the safety of atomic energy, which have stymied nuclear ambitions elsewhere in the region, even as Europe's nuclear decline underscores broader energy challenges.

Nuclear power, which doesn’t produce carbon dioxide, would help Gulf states’ efforts to cut emissions as governments worldwide, including India's nuclear push to expand capacity, look to become greener. The technology would also allow them to earmark more of their valuable hydrocarbons for export. Saudi Arabia, which is building a test reactor, burns as much as 1 million barrels of crude a day in power plants during its summer months when temperatures soar beyond 50 degrees Celsius (122 Fahrenheit).

The Iraqi cabinet is reviewing an agreement with Russia’s Rosatom Corp. to cooperate in building reactors, Latif said. South Korean officials this year said they wanted to help build the plants and offered the Iraqis a tour of UAE nuclear reactors run by Korea Electric Power Corp. Latif said the nuclear authority has also spoken with French and U.S. officials about the plan.

Kepco, Rosatom
Kepco, as the Korean energy producer is known, is not aware of Iraq’s nuclear plans and hasn’t been in touch with Iraqi officials or been asked to work on any projects there, a company spokesman said Tuesday. Rosatom didn’t immediately comment when asked about an agreement with Iraq.

Even if Iraq builds the planned number of power stations, that still won’t be sufficient to cover future consumption. The country already faces a 10-gigawatt gap between capacity and demand and expects to need an additional 14 gigawatts this decade, Latif said.

With this in mind, Iraq plans to build enough solar plants to generate a similar amount of power to the nuclear program by the end of the decade.
Iraq currently boasts 18.4 gigawatts of electricity, including 1.2 gigawatts imported from Iran into the grid. Capacity additions mean generation will rise to as much as 22 gigawatts by August, but that’s well short of notional demand that stands at almost 28 gigawatts under normal conditions. Peak usage during the hot summer months of July and August exceeds 30 gigawatts, according to the Electricity Ministry. Demand will hit 42 gigawatts by 2030, Latif said.

The nuclear authority has picked 20 potential sites for the reactors and Latif suggested that the first contracts could be signed in the next year.

It won’t be Iraq’s first attempt to go nuclear. Four decades ago, an Israeli air strike destroyed a reactor under construction south of Baghdad. The Israelis alleged the facility, called Osirak, was aimed at producing nuclear weapons for use against them. Iraq suffered more than a decade of violence and upheaval after the 2003 U.S. invasion, which was also motivated by allegations that Iraq wanted to develop weapons.

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Australia Clean Energy Target drives renewables in the National Electricity Market, with RepuTex modelling and the Finkel Review showing lower wholesale prices and emissions as gas generators set prices less often under ambitious targets.

Key Points

Policy boosting low emissions generation to cut electricity emissions and lower wholesale prices across Australia.

✅ Ambitious targets lower wholesale prices through added generation

✅ RepuTex modelling shows renewables displace costly gas peakers

✅ Finkel Review suggests CET cuts emissions and boosts reliability

The more ambitious a clean energy target is, the lower Australian wholesale electricity prices will be, according to new modelling by energy analysis firm RepuTex.

The Finkel review, released last month recommended the government introduce a clean energy target (CET), which it found would cut emissions from the national electricity market and put downward pressure on both wholesale and retail prices, aligning with calls to favor consumers over generators in market design.

The Finkel review only modelled a CET that would cut emissions from the electricity sector by 28% below 2005 levels by 2030. But all available analysis has demonstrated that such a cut would not be enough to meet Australia’s overall emissions reductions made as part of the Paris agreement, which themselves were too weak to help meet the central aim of that agreement – to keep global warming to “well below 2C”.

RepuTex modelled the effect of a CET that cut emissions from the electricity sector by 28% – like that modelled in the Finkel Review – as well as one it said was consistent with 2C of global warming, which would cut emissions from electricity by 45% below 2005 levels by 2030.

It found both scenarios caused wholesale prices to drop significantly compared to doing nothing, despite IEA warnings on falling energy investment that could lead to shortages, with the more ambitious scenario resulting in lower wholesale prices between 2025 and 2030.

In the “business as usual scenario”, RepuTex found wholesale prices would hover roughly around the current price of $100 per MWh.

Under a CET that reduced electricity emissions by 28%, prices would drop to under $40 around 2023, and then rise to nearly $60 by 2030.

The more ambitious CET had a broadly similar effect on wholesale prices. But RepuTex found it would drive prices down a little slower, but then keep them down for longer, stabilising at about $40 to $50 for most of the 2020s.

It found a CET would drive prices down by incentivising more generation into the market. The more ambitious CET would further suppress prices by introducing more renewable energy, resulting in expensive gas generators less often being able to set the price of electricity in the wholesale market, a dynamic seen with UK natural gas price pressures recently.

The downward pressure of a CET on wholesale prices was more dramatic in the RepuTex report than in Finkel’s own modelling. But that was largely because, as Alan Finkel himself acknowledged, the estimates of the costs of renewable energy in the Finkel review modelling were conservative.

Speaking at the National Press Club, Finkel said: “We were conservative in our estimates of wind and large-scale solar generator prices. Indeed, in recent months the prices for wind generation have already come in lower than what we modelled.”

The RepuTex modelling also found the economics of the national electricity market no longer supported traditional baseload generation – such as coal power plants that were unable to respond flexibly to demand, with debates over power market overhauls in Alberta underscoring similar tensions – and so they would not be built without the government distorting the market.

“With a premium placed on flexible generation that can ramp up or down, baseload only generation – irrespective of how clean or dirty it is – is likely to be too inflexible to compete in Australia’s future electricity system,” the report said.

“In this context, renewable energy remains attractive to the market given it is able to deliver energy reliability, with no emissions, at low cost prices, with clean grid and battery trends in Canada informing the shift for policymakers. This affirms that renewables are a lay down misere to out-compete traditionally fossil-fuel sources in Australia for the foreseeable future.”

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Hedonistic Sustainability turns Copenhagen's ARC waste-to-energy plant into a public playground, blending ski slope, climbing wall, and trails with carbon-neutral heating, renewables, circular economy design, and green growth for climate action and liveability.

Key Points

A design approach fusing public recreation with clean-energy infrastructure to drive carbon-neutral, livable urban growth.

✅ Waste-to-energy plant doubles as recreation hub

✅ Supports carbon-neutral heating and renewables

✅ Stakeholder-driven, scalable urban climate model

“We call it hedonistic sustainability,” says Jacob Simonsen of the decision to put an artificial ski slope on the roof of the £485m Amager Resource Centre (Arc), Copenhagen’s cutting-edge new waste-to-energy power plant that feeds the city’s district heating network as well. “It’s not just good for the environment, it’s good for life.”

Skiing is just one of the activities that Simonsen, Arc’s chief executive, and Bjarke Ingels, its lead architect, hope will enhance the latest jewel in Copenhagen’s sustainability crown. The incinerator building also incorporates hiking and running trails, a street fitness gym and the world’s highest outdoor climbing wall, an 85-metre “natural mountain” complete with overhangs that rises the full height of the main structure.

In Copenhagen, green transformation goes hand-in-hand with job creation, a growing economy and a better quality of life

Frank Jensen, lord mayor

It’s all part of Copenhagen’s plan to be net carbon-neutral by 2025. Even now, after a summer that saw wildfires ravagethe Arctic Circle and ice sheets in Greenland suffer near-record levels of melt, the goal seems ambitious. In 2009, when the project was formulated, it was positively revolutionary.

“A green, smart, carbon-neutral city,” declared the cover of the climate action plan, aligning with a broader electric planet vision, before detailing the scale of the challenge: 100 new wind turbines; a 20% reduction in both heat and commercial electricity consumption; 75% of all journeys to be by bike, on foot, or by public transport; the biogas-ification of all organic waste; 60,000 sq metres of new solar panels; and 100% of the city’s heating requirements to be met by renewables.

Radical and far-reaching, the scheme dared to rethink the very infrastructure underpinning the city. There’s still not a climate project anywhere else in the world that comes close, even as leaders elsewhere champion a fully renewable grid by 2030.

And, so far, it’s working. CO2 emissions have been reduced by 42% since 2005, and while challenges around mobility and energy consumption remain (new technologies such as better batteries and carbon capture are being implemented, and global calls for clean electricity investment grow), the city says it is on track to achieve its ultimate goal.

More significant still is that Copenhagen has achieved this while continuing to grow in traditional economic terms. Even as some commentators insist that nothing short of a total rethink of free-market economics and corporate structures is required to stave off global catastrophe, the Danish capital’s carbon transformation has happened alongside a 25% growth in its economy over two decades. Copenhagen’s experience will be a model for other world cities as the global energy transition unfolds.

The sentiment that lies behind Arc’s conception as a multi-use public good – “hedonistic sustainability” – is echoed by Bo Asmus Kjeldgaard, former mayor of Copenhagen for the environment and the man originally tasked, back in 2010, with making the plan a reality.

“We combined life quality with sustainability and called it ‘liveability’,” says Kjeldgaard, now CEO of his own climate adaptation company, Greenovation. “We succeeded in building a good narrative around this, one that everybody could believe in.”

The idea was first floated in the late 1990s, when the newly elected Kjeldgaard had a vision of Copenhagen as the environmental capital of Europe. His enthusiasm ran into political intransigence, however, and despite some success, a lack of budget meant most of his work became “just another branding exercise – it was greenwashing”.

We’re such a rich country – change should be easy for us

Claus Nielsen, furniture maker and designer

But after stints as mayor of family and the labour market, and children and young people, he ended up back at environment in 2010 with renewed determination and, crucially, a broader mandate from the city council. “I said: ‘This time, we have to do it right,’” he recalls, “so we made detailed, concrete plans for every area, set the carbon target, and demanded the money and the manpower to make it a reality.”

He brought on board more than 200 stakeholders, from businesses to academia to citizen representatives, and helped them develop 22 specific business plans and 65 separate projects. So far the plan appears on track: there has been a 15% reduction in heat consumption, 66% of all trips in the city are now by bike, on foot or public transport, and 51% of heat and power comes from renewable electricity sources.

The onus placed on ordinary Copenhageners to walk and cycle more, pay higher taxes (especially on cars) and put up with the inconvenience of infrastructure construction has generally been met with understanding and good grace. And while some people remain critical of the fact that Copenhagen airport is not factored into the CO2 calculations – it lies beyond the city’s boundaries – and grumble about precise definitions and formulae, dissent has been rare.

This relative lack of nimbyism and carping about change can, says Frank Jensen, the city’s lord mayor, be traced to longstanding political traditions.

“Caring for the environment and taking responsibility for society in general has been an integral part of the upbringing of many Danes,” he says. “Moreover, there is a general awareness that climate change now calls for immediate, ambitious and collective action.” A 2018 survey by Concito, a thinktank, found that such action was a top priority for voters.

Jensen is keen to stress the cooperative nature of the plan and says “our visions have to be grounded in the everyday lives of people to be politically feasible”. Indeed, involving so many stakeholders, and allowing them to actively help shape both the ends and the means, has been key to the plan’s success so far and the continued goodwill it enjoys. “It’s so important to note that we [the authorities] cannot do this alone,” says Jørgen Abildgaard, Copenhagen’s executive climate programme director.

Many businesses around the world have typically been reluctant to embrace sustainability when a dip in profits or inconvenience might be the result, but not in Copenhagen. Martin Manthorpe, director of strategy, business development and public affairs at NCC, one of Scandinavia’s largest construction and industrial groups, was brought in early on by Abildgaard to represent industry on the municipality’s climate panel, and to facilitate discussions with the wider business community. He thinks there are several reasons why.

“The Danes have a trading mindset, meaning ‘What will I have to sell tomorrow?’ is just as important as ‘What am I producing today?’” he says. “Also, many big Danish companies are still ultimately family-owned, so the culture leans more towards long-term thinking.”

It is, he says, natural for business to be concerned with issues around sustainability and be willing to endure short-term pain: “To do responsible, long-term business, you need to see yourself as part of the larger puzzle that is called ‘society’.”

Furthermore, in Denmark climate change denial is given extremely short shrift. “We believe in the science,” says Anders Haugaard, a local entrepreneur. “Why wouldn’t you? We’re told sustainability brings only benefits and we’ve got no reason to be suspicious.”

“No one would dare argue against the environment,” says his friend Claus Nielsen, a furniture maker and designer. “We’re such a rich country – change should be easy for us.” Nielsen talks about how enlightened his kids are – “my 11-year-old daughter is now a flexitarian ” – and says that nowadays he mainly buys organic; Haugaard doesn’t see a problem with getting rid of petrol cars (the whole country is aiming to be fossil fuel-free by 2050 as the EU electricity use by 2050 is expected to double).

Above all, there’s a belief that sustainability need not make the city poorer: that innovation and “green growth” can be lucrative in and of themselves. “In Copenhagen, green transformation goes hand-in-hand with job creation, a growing economy and a better quality of life,” says Jensen. “We have also shown that it’s possible to combine this transition with economic growth and market opportunities for businesses, and I think that other countries can learn from our example.”

Besides, as Jensen notes, there is little alternative, and even less time: “National states have failed to take enough responsibility, but cities have the power and will to create concrete solutions. We need to start accelerating their implementation – we need to act now.”

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IESO Fictitious Demand Error inflated HOEP in the Ontario electricity market, after embedded generation was mis-modeled; the OEB says double-counted load lifted wholesale prices and shifted costs via the Global Adjustment.

Key Points

An IESO modeling flaw that double-counted load, inflating HOEP and charges in Ontario's wholesale market.

✅ Double-counted unmetered load from embedded generation

✅ Inflated HOEP; shifted costs via Global Adjustment

✅ OEB flagged transparency; exporters paid more

For almost a year, the operator of Ontario’s electricity system erroneously counted enough phantom demand to power a small city, causing prices to spike and hundreds of millions of dollars in extra charges to consumers, according to the provincial energy regulator.

The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) also failed to tell anyone about the error once it noticed and fixed it.

The error likely added between $450 million and $560 million to hourly rates and other charges before it was fixed in April 2017, according to a report released this month by the Ontario Energy Board’s Market Surveillance Panel.

It did this by adding as much as 220 MW of “fictitious demand” to the market starting in May 2016, when the IESO started paying consumers who reduced their demand for power during peak periods. This involved the integration of small-scale embedded generation (largely made up of solar) into its wholesale model for the first time.

The mistake assumed maximum consumption at such sites without meters, and double-counted that consumption.

The OEB said the mistake particularly hurt exporters and some end-users, who did not benefit from a related reduction of a global adjustment rate applicable to other customers.

“The most direct impact of the increase in HOEP (Hourly Ontario Energy Price) was felt by Ontario consumers and exporters of electricity, who paid an artificially high HOEP, to the benefit of generators and importers,” the OEB said.

The mix-up did not result in an equivalent increase in total system costs, because changes to the HOEP are offset by inverse changes to a electricity cost allocation mechanism such as the Global Adjustment rate, the OEB noted.

A chart from the OEB's report shows the time of day when fictitious demand was added to the system, and its influence on hourly rates.

Peak time spikes
The OEB said that the fictitious demand “regularly inflated” the hourly price of energy and other costs calculated as a direct function of it.

For almost a year, Ontario's electricity system operator @IESO_Tweets erroneously counted enough phantom demand to power a small city, causing price spikes and hundreds of millions in charges to consumers, @OntEnergyBoard says. @5thEstate reports.

It estimated the average increase to the HOEP was as much as $4.50/MWh, but that price spikes, compounded by scheduled OEB rate changes, would have been much higher during busier times, such as the mid-morning and early evening.

“In times of tight supply, the addition of fictitious demand often had a dramatic inflationary impact on the HOEP,” the report said.

That meant on one summer evening in 2016 the hourly rate jumped to $1,619/MWh, it said, which was the fourth highest in the history of the Ontario wholesale electricity market.

“Additional demand is met by scheduling increasingly expensive supply, thus increasing the market price. In instances where supply is tight and the supply stack is steep, small increases in demand can cause significant increases in the market price.

The OEB questioned why, as of September this year, the IESO had failed to notify its customers or the broader public, amid a broader auditor-regulator dispute that drew political attention, about the mistake and its effect on prices.

“It's time for greater transparency on where electricity costs are really coming from,” said Sarah Buchanan, clean energy program manager at Environmental Defence.

“Ontario will be making big decisions in the coming years about whether to keep our electricity grid clean, or burn more fossil fuels to keep the lights on,” she added. “These decisions need to be informed by the best possible evidence, and that can't happen if critical information is hidden.”

In a response to the OEB report on Monday, the IESO said its own initial analysis found that the error likely pushed wholesale electricity payments up by $225 million. That calculation assumed that the higher prices would have changed consumer behaviour, while upcoming electricity auctions were cited as a way to lower costs, it said.

In response to questions, a spokesperson said residential and small commercial consumers would have saved $11 million in electricity costs over the 11-month period, even as a typical bill increase loomed province-wide, while larger consumers would have paid an extra $14 million.

That is because residential and small commercial customers pay some costs via time-of-use rates, including a temporary recovery rate framework, the IESO said, while larger customers pay them in a way that reflects their share of overall electricity use during the five highest demand hours of the year.

The IESO said it could not compensate those that had paid too much, given the complexity of the system, and that the modelling error did not have a significant impact on ratepayers.

While acknowledging the effects of the mistake would vary among its customers, the IESO said the net market impact was less than $10 million, amid ongoing legislation to lower electricity rates in Ontario.

It said it would improve testing of its processes prior to deployment and agreed to publicly disclose errors that significantly affect the wholesale market in the future.

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Central Asia power shortages strain grids across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, driven by drought-hit hydropower, aging coal and gas plants, rising demand, cryptomining loads, and winter peak consumption risks.

Key Points

Regionwide blackouts from drought, aging plants and grids, rising demand, and winter peaks stressing Central Asia.

✅ Drought slashes hydropower in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

✅ Aging coal and gas TPPs and weak grids cause frequent outages

✅ Cryptomining loads and winter heating spike demand and stress supply

Central Asians from western Kazakhstan to southern Tajikistan are suffering from power and energy shortages that have caused hardship and emergency situations affecting the lives of millions of people.

On October 14, several units at three power plants in northeastern Kazakhstan were shut down in an emergency that resulted in a loss of more than 1,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity.

It serves as an example of the kind of power failures that plague the region 30 years after the Central Asian countries gained independence and despite hundreds of millions of dollars being invested in energy infrastructure and power grids, and echo risks seen in other advanced markets such as Japan's near-blackouts during recent cold snaps.

Some of the reasons for these problems are clear, but with all the money these countries have allocated to their energy sectors and financial help they have received from international financial institutions, it is curious the situation is already so desperate with winter officially still weeks away.

The Current Problems
Three power plants were affected in the October 14 shutdowns of units: Ekibastuz-1, Ekibastuz-2, and the Aksu power plant.

Ekibastuz-1 is the largest power plant in Kazakhstan, capable of generating some 4,000 MW, roughly 13 percent of Kazakhstan’s total power output.

The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) explained the problems resulted partially from malfunctions and repair work, but also from overuse of the system that the government would later say was due to cryptominers, a large number of whom have moved to Kazakhstan recently from China after Beijing banned the mining needed by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, amid its own China's power cuts across several provinces in 2021.

But between November 8 and 9, rolling blackouts were reported in the East Kazakhstan, North Kazakhstan, and Kyzylorda provinces, as well as the area around Almaty, Kazakhstan’s biggest city, and Shymkent, its third largest city.

People in Uzbekistan say they, too, are facing blackouts that the Energy Ministry described as “short-term outages,” even as authorities have looked to export electricity to Afghanistan to support regional demand, though it has been clear for several weeks that the country will have problems with natural gas supplies this winter.

Power lines in Uzbekistan
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov continues to say there won't be any power rationing in Kyrgyzstan this winter, but at the end of September the National Energy Holding Company ordered “restrictions on the lighting of secondary streets, advertisements, and facades of shops, cafes, and other nonresidential customers.”

Many parts of Tajikistan are already experiencing intermittent supplies of electricity.

Even in Turkmenistan, a country with the fourth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world, there were reports of problems with electricity and heating in the capital, Ashgabat.

What Is Going On?
The causes of some of these problems are easy to see.

The population of the region has grown significantly, with the population of Central Asia when the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991 being some 50 million and today about 75 million.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are mountainous countries that have long been touted for their hydropower potential and some 90 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s domestically produced electricity and 98 percent of Tajikistan’s come from hydropower.

But a severe drought that struck Central Asia this year has resulted in less hydropower and, in general, less energy for the region, similar to constraints seen in Europe's reduced hydro and nuclear output this year.

Tajik authorities have not reported how low the water in the country’s key reservoirs is, but Kyrgyzstan has reported the water level in the reservoir at its Toktogul hydropower plant (HPP) is 11.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), the lowest level in years and far less than the 14.7 bcm of water it had in November 2020.

The Toktogul HPP, with an installed capacity of 1,200 MW, provides some 40 percent of the country's domestically produced electricity, but operating the HPP this winter to generate desperately needed energy brings the risk of leaving water levels at the reservoir critically low next spring and summer when the water is also needed for agricultural purposes.

This year’s drought is something Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will have to take into consideration as they plan how to provide power for their growing populations in the future. Hydropower is a desirable option but may be less reliable with the onset of climate change, prompting interest in alternatives such as Ukraine's wind power to diversify generation.

Uzbekistan is also feeling the effects of this year’s drought, and, like the South Caucasus where Georgia's electricity imports have increased, supply shortfalls are testing grids.

According to the International Energy Agency, HPPs account for some 12 percent of Uzbekistan’s generating capacity.

Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry attributed low water levels at HPPs that have caused a 23 percent decrease in hydropower generation this year.

A reservoir in Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the most populous Central Asian countries, and both depend on thermal power plants (TPP) for generating most of their electricity.

Most of the TPPs in Kazakhstan are coal-fired, while most of the TPPs in Uzbekistan are gas-fired.

Kazakhstan has 68 power plants, 80 percent of which are coal-fired TPPs, and most are in the northern part of the country where the largest deposits of coal are located. Kazakhstan has the world's 10th largest reserves of coal.

About 88 percent of Uzbekistan’s electricity comes from TTPs, most of which use natural gas.

Uzbekistan’s proven reserves are some 800 billion cubic meters, but gas production in Uzbekistan has been decreasing.

In December 2020, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev ordered a halt to the country’s gas exports and instructed that gas to be redirected for domestic use. Mirziyoev has already given similar instructions for this coming winter.

How Did It Come To This?
The biggest problem with the energy infrastructure in Central Asia is that it is generally very old. Nearly all of its power plants date back to the Soviet era -- and some well back into the Soviet period.

The use of power plants and transmission lines that some describe as “obsolete” and a few call “decrepit” has unfortunately been a necessity in Central Asia, even as regional players pursue new interconnections like Iran's plan to transmit electricity to Europe as a power hub.

Reporting on Kazakhstan in September 2016, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) said, “70 percent of the power generation infrastructure is in need of rehabilitation.”

The Ekibastuz-1 TPP is relatively new by the power-plant standards of Central Asia. The first unit of the eight units of the TPP was commissioned in 1980.

The first unit at the AKSU TPP was commissioned in 1968, and the first unit of the gas- and fuel-fired TPP in southern Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Province was commissioned in 1967.

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Oil and Gas Profitability Decline reflects shale-driven oversupply, OPEC-Russia dynamics, LNG exports, renewables growth, and weak demand, signaling compressed margins for producers, stressed petrodollar budgets, and shifting energy markets post-Covid.

Key Points

A sustained squeeze on hydrocarbon margins from agile shale supply, weaker OPEC leverage, and expanding renewables.

✅ Shale responsiveness caps prices and erodes industry rents

✅ OPEC-Russia cuts face limited impact versus US supply

✅ Renewables and EVs slow long-term oil and gas demand

The oil-price crash of March 2020 will probably not last long. As in 2014, when the oil price dropped below $50 from $110 in a few weeks, this one will trigger a temporary collapse of the US shale industry. Unless the coronavirus outbreak causes Armageddon, cheap oil will also support policymakers’ efforts to help the global economy.

But there will be at least one important and lasting difference this time round — and it has major market and geopolitical implications.

The oil price crash is a foretaste of where the whole energy sector was going anyway — and that is down.

It may not look that way at first. Saudi Arabia will soon realise, as it did in 2015, that its lethal decision to pump more oil is not only killing US shale but its public finances as well. Riyadh will soon knock on Moscow’s door again. Once American shale supplies collapse, Russia will resume co-operation with Saudi Arabia.

With the world economy recovering from the Covid-19 crisis by then, and with electricity demand during COVID-19 shifting, moderate supply cuts by both countries will accelerate oil market recovery. In time, US shale producers will return too.

Yet this inevitable bounceback should not distract from two fundamental factors that were already remaking oil and gas markets. First, the shale revolution has fundamentally eroded industry profitability. Second, the renewables’ revolution will continue to depress growth in demand.

The combined result has put the profitability of the entire global hydrocarbon industry under pressure. That means fewer petrodollars to support oil-producing countries’ national budgets, including Canada's oil sector exposures. It also means less profitable oil companies, which traditionally make up a large segment of stock markets, an important component of so many western pension funds.

Start with the first factor to see why this is so. Historically, the geological advantages that made oil from countries such as Saudi Arabia so cheap to produce were unique. Because oil and gas were produced at costs far below the market price, the excess profits, or “rent”, enjoyed by the industry were very large.

Furthermore, collusion among low-cost producers has been a winning strategy. The loss of market share through output cuts was more than compensated by immediately higher prices. It was the raison d’être of Opec.

The US shale revolution changed all this, exposing the limits of U.S. energy dominance narratives. A large oil-producing region emerged with a remarkable ability to respond quickly to price changes and shrink its costs over time. Cutting back cheap Opec oil now only increases US supplies, with little effect on world prices.

That is why Russia refused to cut production this month. Even if its cuts did boost world prices — doubtful given the coronavirus outbreak’s huge shock to demand — that would slow the shrinkage of US shale that Moscow wants.

Shale has affected the natural gas industry even more. Exports of US liquefied natural gas now put an effective ceiling on global prices, and debates over a clean electricity push have intensified when gas prices spike.

On top of all this, there is also the renewables’ revolution, though a green revolution has not been guaranteed in the near term. Around the world, wind and solar have become ever-cheaper options to generate electricity. Storage costs have also dropped and network management improved. Even in the US, renewables are displacing coal and gas. Electrification of vehicle fleets will damp demand further, as U.S. electricity, gas, and EVs face evolving pressures.

Eliminating fossil fuel consumption completely would require sustained and costly government intervention, and reliability challenges such as coal and nuclear disruptions add to the complexity. That is far from certain. Meanwhile, though, market forces are depressing the sector’s usual profitability.

The end of oil and gas is not immediately around the corner. Still, the end of hydrocarbons as a lucrative industry is a distinct possibility. We are seeing that in dramatic form in the current oil price crash. But this collapse is merely a message from the future.

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