Symantec Proves Russian


Electrical Testing & Commissioning of Power Systems

Our customized live online or in‑person group training can be delivered to your staff at your location.

  • Live Online
  • 12 hours Instructor-led
  • Group Training Available
Regular Price:
$599
Coupon Price:
$499
Reserve Your Seat Today

Dragonfly energy sector cyberattacks target ICS and SCADA across critical infrastructure, including the power grid and nuclear facilities, using spearphishing, watering-hole sites, supply-chain compromises, malware, and VPN exploits to gain operational access.

 

Key Points

Dragonfly APT campaigns target energy firms and ICS to gain grid access, risking manipulation and service disruption.

✅ Breaches leveraged spearphishing, watering-hole sites, and supply chains.

✅ Targeted ICS, SCADA, VPNs to pivot into operational networks.

✅ Aimed to enable power grid manipulation and potential outages.

 

An October, 2017 report by researchers at Symantec Corp., cited by the U.S. government, has linked recent US power grid cyber attacks to a group of hackers it had code-named "Dragonfly", and said it found evidence critical infrastructure facilities in Turkey and Switzerland also had been breached.

The Symantec researchers said an earlier wave of attacks by the same group starting in 2011 was used to gather intelligence on companies and their operational systems. The hackers then used that information for a more advanced wave of attacks targeting industrial control systems that, if disabled, leave millions without power or water.

U.S. intelligence officials have long been concerned about the security of the country’s electrical grid. The recent attacks, condemned by the U.S. government, striking almost simultaneously at multiple locations, are testing the government’s ability to coordinate an effective response among several private utilities, state and local officials, and industry regulators.

#google#

While the core of a nuclear generator is heavily protected, a sudden shutdown of the turbine can trigger safety systems. These safety devices are designed to disperse excess heat while the nuclear reaction is halted, but the safety systems themselves may be vulnerable to attack.

The operating systems at nuclear plants also tend to be legacy controls built decades ago and don’t have digital control systems that can be exploited by hackers.

“Since at least March 2016, Russian government cyber actors… targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors,” according to Thursday’s FBI and Department of Homeland Security report. The report did not say how successful the attacks were or specify the targets, but said that the Russian hackers “targeted small commercial facilities’ networks where they staged malware, conducted spearphishing, and gained remote access into energy sector networks.” At least one target of a string of infrastructure attacks last year was a nuclear power facility in Kansas.

Symantec doesn’t typically point fingers at particular nations in its research on cyberattacks, said Eric Chien, technical director of Symantec’s Security Technology and Response division, though he said his team doesn’t see anything it would disagree with in the new federal report. The government report appears to corroborate Symantec’s research, showing that the hackers had penetrated computers and accessed utility control rooms that would let them directly manipulate power systems, he says.

“There were really no more technical hurdles for them to do something like flip off the power,” he said.

And as for the group behind the attacks, Chien said it appears to be relatively dormant for now, but it has gone quiet in the past only to return with new hacks.

“We expect they’re sort of retooling now, and they likely will be back,”

 


 

In some cases, Dragonfly successfully broke into the core systems that control US and European energy companies, Symantec revealed.

“The energy sector has become an area of increased interest to cyber-attackers over the past two years,” Symantec said in its report.

“Most notably, disruptions to Ukraine’s power system in 2015 and 2016 were attributed to a cyberattack and led to power outages affecting hundreds of thousands of people. In recent months, there have also been media reports of attempted attacks on the electricity grids in some European countries, as well as reports of companies that manage nuclear facilities in the US being compromised by hackers.

“The Dragonfly group appears to be interested in both learning how energy facilities operate and also gaining access to operational systems themselves, to the extent that the group now potentially has the ability to sabotage or gain control of these systems should it decide to do so. Symantec customers are protected against the activities of the Dragonfly group.”

In recent weeks, senior US intelligence officials said that the Kremlin believes it can launch hacking operations against the West with impunity, including a cyber weapon that can disrupt power grids, according to assessments.

The DHS and FBI report further elaborated: “This campaign comprises two distinct categories of victims: staging and intended targets. The initial victims are peripheral organisations such as trusted third-party suppliers with less-secure networks, referred to as ‘staging targets’ throughout this alert.

“The threat actors used the staging targets’ networks as pivot points and malware repositories when targeting their final intended victims. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center and FBI judge the ultimate objective of the actors is to compromise organisational networks, also referred to as the ‘intended target’.”

According to the US alert, hackers used a variety of attack methods, including spear-phishing emails, watering-hole domains, credential gathering, open source and network reconnaissance, host-based exploitation, and deliberate targeting of ICS infrastructure.

The attackers also targeted VPN software and used password cracking tools.

Once inside, the attackers downloaded tools from a remote server and then carried out a number of actions, including modifying key systems to store plaintext credentials in memory, and built web shells to gain command and control of targeted systems.

“This actors’ campaign has affected multiple organisations in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, construction and critical manufacturing sectors, with hundreds of victims across the U.S. power grid confirmed,” the DHS said, before outlining a number of steps that IT managers in infrastructure organisations can take to cleanse their systems and defend against Russian hackers. he said.
 

 

Related News

Related News

Maine Governor calls for 100% renewable electricity

Maine Climate Council Act targets 80% renewable power by 2030 and 100% by 2050, slashing greenhouse gas emissions via clean electricity, grid procurement, long-term contracts, wind and hydro integration, resilience planning, and carbon sequestration.

 

Key Points

A Maine policy forming a Climate Council to reach 80% renewables in 2030 100% in 2050 and cut greenhouse gas emissions.

✅ 80% renewable electricity by 2030; 100% by 2050.

✅ 45% GHG cut by 2030; 80% by 2050.

✅ Utility procurement authority for clean capacity and energy.

 

The winds of change have shifted and are blowing Northward, as Maine’s Governor, Janet T. Mills, has put forth an act establishing a Climate Council to guide the state’s consumption to 80% renewable electricity in 2030 and 100% by 2050, echoing New York's Green New Deal ambitions underway.

The act, LR 2478 (pdf), also sets a goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 45% in 2030 and 80% by 2050. The document will be submitted to the state Legislature for consideration.

The commission would have the authority to direct investor owned transmission and distribution utilities to run competitive procurement processes, and enter into long-term contracts for capacity resources, energy resources, renewable energy credit contracts, and participate in regional programs, as these all lead toward the clean electricity and emissions-reducing goals that mirror California's 100% mandate debates today.

The Climate Council would convene industry working groups, including Scientific and Technical, Transportation, Coastal and Marine, Energy, and Building & Infrastructure working groups, plus others as needed, where examples like New Zealand's electricity transition could inform discussions.

Membership within the council would include two members of the State Senate, two members of the House, a tribal representative, many department commissioners (Education, Defense, Transportation, etc.), multiple directors, business representatives, environmental non-profit members, and climate science and resilience representatives as well.

The council would update the Maine State Climate Plan every four years, and solicit input from the public and report out progress on its goals every two years, similar to planning underway in Minnesota's carbon-free plan framework. The first Climate Action Plan would be submitted to the legislature by December 1, 2020.

Specifically, the responsibilities of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee were laid out. The group would be scheduled to meet at least every six months, beginning no later than October 1, 2019. The group would be tasked with reviewing existing scientific literature, including net-zero electricity pathways research, to use it as guidance, recognizing gaps in the state’s knowledge, and guiding outside experts to ascertain this knowledge.  The group would consider ocean acidification, and climate change effects on the state’s species; establish science-based sea-level rise projections for the state’s coastal regions by December 1, 2020; create a climate risk map for flooding and extreme weather events; and consider carbon sequestration via biomass growth.

The state’s largest power plants (above image), generate about 31% from gas, 28% from wood and 41% from hydro+wind. Already, the state has a very clean electricity profile, much like efforts to decarbonize Canada's power sector continue apace. Below, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) notes that 51% of electricity generation within the state comes from mostly wind+hydro, with a small touch from solar power. The state also gets 24% from wood and other biomass, which would lead some to argue that the state is already at 75% “renewable electricity”. The Governor’s document does reference wind power specifically as a renewable, however, no other specific electricity source. And there is much reference to forestry, agriculture, and logging – specifically noting carbon sequestration – but nothing regarding electricity.

The state’s final 25% of electricity mostly comes from natural gas, even as renewable electricity momentum builds across North America, with this author choosing to put “other” under the fossil percentage noted above.

 

Related News

View more

Why Is Georgia Importing So Much Electricity?

Georgia Electricity Imports October 2017 surged as hydropower output fell and thermal power plants underperformed; ESCO balanced demand via low-cost imports, mainly from Azerbaijan, amid rising tariffs, kWh consumption growth, and a widening generation-consumption gap.

 

Key Points

They mark a record import surge due to costly local generation, lower hydropower, ESCO balancing costs, and rising demand.

✅ Imports rose 832% YoY to 157 mln kWh, mainly from Azerbaijan

✅ TPP output fell despite capacity; only low-tariff plants ran

✅ Balancing price 13.8 tetri/kWh signaled costly domestic PPAs

 

In October 2017, Georgian power plants generated 828 mln. KWh of electricity, marginally up (+0.79%) compared to September. Following the traditional seasonal pattern and amid European concerns over dispatchable power shortages affecting markets, the share of electricity produced by renewable sources declined to 71% of total generation (87% in September), while thermal power generation’s share increased, accounting for 29% of total generation (compared to 13% in September). When we compare last October’s total generation with the total generation of October 2016, however, we observe an 8.7% decrease in total generation (in October 2016, total generation was 907 mln. kWh). The overall decline in generation with respect to the previous year is due to a simultaneous decline in both thermal power and hydro power generation. 

Consumption of electricity on the local market in the same period was 949 mln. kWh (+7% compared to October 2016, and +3% with respect to September 2017), and reflected global trends such as India's electricity growth in recent years. The gap between consumption and generation increased to 121 mln. kWh (15% of the amount generated in October), up from 100 mln. kWh in September. Even more importantly, the situation was radically different with respect to the prior year, when generation exceeded consumption.

The import figure for October was by far the highest from the last 12 years (since ESCO was established), occurring as Ukraine electricity exports resumed regionally, highlighting wider cross-border dynamics. In October 2017, Georgia imported 157 mln. kWh of electricity (for 5.2 ¢/kWh – 13 tetri/kWh). This constituted an 832% increase compared to October 2016, and is about 50% larger than the second largest import figure (104.2 mln. kWh in October 2014). Most of the October 2017 imports (99.6%) came from Azerbaijan, with the remaining 0.04% coming from Russia.

The main question that comes to mind when observing these statistics is: why did Georgia import so much? One might argue that this is just the result of a bad year for hydropower generation and increased demand. This argument, however, is not fully convincing. While it is true that hydropower generation declined and demand increased, the country’s excess demand could have been easily satisfied by its existing thermal power plants, even as imported coal volumes rose in regional markets. Instead of increasing, however, the electricity coming from thermal power plants declined as well. Therefore, that cannot be the reason, and another must be found. The first that comes to mind is that importing electricity may have been cheaper than buying it from local TPPs, or from other generators selling electricity to ESCO under power purchase agreements (PPAs). We can test the first part of this hypothesis by comparing the average price of imported electricity to the price ceiling on the tariff that TPPs can charge for the electricity they sell. Looking at the trade statistics from Geostat, the average price for imported electricity in October 2017 remained stable with respect to the same month of the previous year, at 5.2 ¢ (13 tetri) per kWh. Only two thermal power plants (Gardabani and Mtkvari) had a price ceiling below 13 tetri per kWh. Observing the electricity balance of Georgia, we see that indeed more than 98% of the electricity generated by TPPs in October 2017 was generated by those two power plants.

What about other potential sources of electricity amid Central Asia's power shortages at the time? To answer this question, we can use the information derived from the weighted average price of balancing electricity. Why balancing electricity? Because it allows us to reconstruct the costs the market operator (ESCO) faced during the month of October to make sure demand and supply were balanced, and it allows us to gain an insight about the price of electricity sold through PPAs.

ESCO reports that the weighted average price of balancing electricity in October 2017 was 13.8 tetri/kWh, (25% higher than in October 2016, when it was below the average weighted cost of imports – 11 vs. 13 – and when the quantity of imported electricity was substantially smaller). Knowing that in October 2017, 61% of balancing electricity came from imports, while 39% came from hydropower and wind power plants selling electricity to ESCO under their PPAs, we can deduce that in this case, internal generation was (on average) also substantially more expensive than imports. Therefore, the high cost of internally generated electricity, rather than the technical impossibility of generating enough electricity to satisfy electricity demand, indeed appears to be one the main reasons why electricity imports spiked in October 2017.

 

Related News

View more

EU Smart Meters Spur Growth in the Customer Analytics Market

EU Smart Meter Analytics integrates AMI data with grid edge platforms, enabling back-office efficiency, revenue assurance, and customer insights via cloud and PaaS solutions, while system integration cuts costs and improves utility performance.

 

Key Points

EU smart meter analytics uses AMI data and cloud to improve utility performance, revenue assurance, and outcomes.

✅ AMI underpins grid edge analytics and utility IT/OT integration

✅ Cloud and PaaS reduce costs and scale data-driven applications

✅ Focus shifts from meter rollout to back-office and revenue analytics

 

Europe's investment in smart meters has begun to open up the market for analytics that benefit both utilities and customers.

Two new reports from GTM Research demonstrate the substantial investment in both advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and specific customer analytics segments -- the first report analyzes the progress of AMI deployment in Europe, while the second is a comprehensive assessment of analytics use cases, including AI in utility operations, enabled by or interacting with AMI.

The Third Energy Package mandated EU member states to perform a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the economic viability of deploying smart meters and broader grid modernization costs across member states. Two-thirds of the member states found there was a net positive result, while seven members found negative or inconclusive results.

“The mandate spurred AMI deployment in the EU, but all member states are deploying some AMI. Even without an overall positive cost-benefit outcome, utilities found pockets of customers where there is a positive business case for AMI,” said Paulina Tarrant, research associate at GTM Research and lead author of “Racing to 2020: European Policy, Deployment and Market Share Primer.”

Annual AMI contracting peaked in 2013 -- two years after the mandate -- with 29 million contracted that year. Today, 100 million meters have been contracted overall. As member states reach their respective targets, the AMI market will cool in Europe and spending on analytics and applications will continue to ramp up, aligning with efforts to invest in smarter infrastructure across the sector, Tarrant noted.

Between 2017 and 2021, more than $30 billion will be spent on utility back-office and revenue-assurance analytics in the EU, reflecting the shift toward the digital grid architecture, according to GTM Research’s Grid Edge Customer Utility Analytics Ecosystems: Competitive Analysis, Forecasts and Case Studies.

The report examines the broad landscape of customer analytics showing how AMI interacts with the larger IT/OT environment of a utility.

“The benefits of AMI expand beyond revenue assurance -- in fact, AMI represents the backbone of many customer utility analytics and grid edge solutions,” said Timotej Gavrilovic, author of the Grid Edge Customer Utility Ecosystems report.

Integration is key, according to the report.

“Technology providers are integrating data sets, solutions and systems and partnering with others to provide a one-stop shop serving broad utility needs, increasing efficiencies and reducing costs,” Gavrilovic said. “Cloud-based deployments and platform-as-a-service offerings are becoming commonplace, creating an opportunity for utilities to balance the cost versus performance tradeoff to optimize their analytics systems and applications.”

A diverse array of customer analytics applications is a critical foundation for demonstrating the positive cost-benefit of AMI.

“Advanced analytics and applications are key to ensuring that AMI investments provide a positive return after smart meters are initiated,” said Tarrant. “Improved billing and revenue assurance was not enough everywhere to show customer benefit -- these analytics packages will leverage the distributed network infrastructure, including advanced inverters used with distributed energy resources, and subsequent increased data access, uniting the electricity markets of the EU.”

 

Related News

View more

Illinois electric utility publishes online map of potential solar capacity

ComEd Hosting Capacity Map helps Illinois communities assess photovoltaic capacity, distributed energy resources, interconnection limits, and grid planning needs, guiding developers and policymakers on siting solar, net metering feasibility, and RPS-aligned deployment by circuit.

 

Key Points

An online tool showing circuit-level DER capacity, PV limits, and interconnection readiness across ComEd.

✅ Circuit-level estimates of solar hosting capacity

✅ Guides siting, interconnection, and net metering

✅ Supports RPS goals with grid planning insights

 

As the Illinois solar market grows from the Future Energy Jobs Act, the largest utility in the state has posted a planning tool to identify potential PV capacity in their service territory. ComEd, a Northern Illinois subsidiary of Exelon, has a hosting capacity website for its communities indicating how much photovoltaic capacity can be sited in given areas, based on the existing electrical infrastructure, as utilities pilot virtual power plant programs that leverage distributed resources.

According to ComEd’s description, “Hosting Capacity is an estimate of the amount of DER [distributed energy resources] that may be accommodated under current configurations at the overall circuit level without significant system upgrades to address adverse impacts to power quality or reliability.” This website will enable developers and local decision makers to estimate how much solar could be installed by township, sections and fractions of sections as small as ½ mile by ½ mile and to gauge EV charging impacts with NREL's projection tool for distribution planning. The map sections indicate potential capacity by AC kilowatts with a link to to ComEd’s recently upgraded Interconnection and Net Metering homepage.

The Hosting Map can provide insight into how much solar can be installed in which locations in order to help solar reach a significant portion of the Illinois Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) of 25% electricity from renewable sources by 2025, and to plan for transportation electrification as EV charging infrastructure scales across utility territories. For example, the 18 sections of Oak Park Township capacity range from 612 to 909 kW, and total 13,260 kW of photovoltaic power. That could potentially generate around 20 million kWh, and policy actions such as the CPUC-approved PG&E EV program illustrate how electrification initiatives may influence future demand. Oak Park, according to the PlanItGreen Report Card, a joint project of the Oak Park River Forest Community Foundation and Seven Generations Ahead, uses about 325 million kWh.

Based on ComEd’s Hosting Capacity, Oak Park could generate about 6% of its electricity from solar power located within its borders. Going significantly beyond this amount would likely require a combination of upgrades by ComEd’s infrastructure, potentially higher interconnection costs and deployment of technologies like energy storage solutions. What this does indicate is that a densely populated community like Oak Park would most likely have to get the majority of its solar and renewable electricity from outside its boundaries to reach the statewide RPS goal of 25%. The Hosting Capacity Map shows a considerable disparity among communities in ½ mile by ½ mile sections with some able to host only 100-200 kWs to some with capacities of over 3,000 kW.

 

Related News

View more

A Snapshot of the US Market for Smart Solar Inverters

Smart solar inverters anchor DER communications and control, meeting IEEE 1547 and California Rule 21 for volt/VAR, reactive power, and ride-through, expanding hosting capacity and enabling grid services via secure real-time telemetry and commands.

 

Key Points

Smart solar inverters use IEEE 1547, volt/VAR and reactive power to stabilize circuits and integrate DER safely.

✅ Meet IEEE 1547, Rule 21 ride-through and volt/VAR functions

✅ Support reactive power to manage voltage and hosting capacity

✅ Enable utility communications, telemetry, and grid services

 

Advanced solar inverters could be one of the biggest distributed energy resource communications and control points out there someday. With California now requiring at least early-stage “smart” capabilities from all new solar projects — and a standards road map for next-stage efforts like real-time communications and active controls — this future now has a template.

There are still a lot of unanswered questions about how smart inverters will be used.

That was the consensus at Intersolar this week, where experts discussed the latest developments on the U.S. smart solar inverter front. After years of pilot projects, multi-stakeholder technical working groups, and slow and steady standards development, solar smart inverters are finally starting to hit the market en masse — even if it’s not yet clear just what will be done with them once they’re installed.

“From the technical perspective, the standards are firm,” Roger Salas, distribution engineering manager for Southern California Edison, said. In September of last year, his utility started requiring that all new solar installations come with “Phase 1" advanced inverter functionality, as defined under the state’s Rule 21.

Later this month, it’s going to start requiring “reactive power priority” for these inverters, and in February 2019, it’s going to start requiring that inverters support the communications capabilities described in “Phase 2,” as well as some more advanced “Phase 3” capabilities.

 

Increasing hosting capacity: A win-win for solar and utilities

Each of these phases aligns with a different value proposition for smart inverters. The first phase is largely preventative, aimed at solving the kinds of problems that have forced costly upgrades to how inverters operate in solar-heavy Germany and Hawaii.

The key standard in question in the U.S. is IEEE 1547, which sets the rules for what grid-connected DERs must do to stay safe, such as trip offline when the grid goes down, or avoid overloading local transformers or circuits.

The old version of the standard, however, had a lot of restrictive rules on tripping off during relatively common voltage excursions, which could cause real problems on circuits with a lot of solar dropping off all at once.

Phase 1 implementation of IEEE 1547 is all about removing these barriers, Salas said. “They need to be stable, they need to be connected, they need to be able to support the grid.”

This should increase hosting capacity on circuits that would have otherwise been constrained by these unwelcome behaviors, he said.

 

Reactive power: Where utility and solar imperatives collide

The old versions of IEEE 1547 also didn’t provide rules for how inverters could use one of their more flexible capabilities: the ability to inject or absorb reactive power to mitigate voltage fluctuations, including those that may be caused by the PV itself. The new version opens up this capability, which could allow for an active application of reactive power to further increase hosting capacity, as well as solve other grid edge challenges for utilities.

But where utilities see opportunity, the solar industry sees a threat. Every unit of reactive power comes at the cost of a reduction in the real power output of solar inverters — and almost every solar installation out there is paid based on the real power it produces.

“If you’re tasked to do things that rob your energy sales, that will reduce compensation,” noted Ric O'Connell, executive director of the Oakland, Calif.-based GridLab. “And a lot of systems have third-party owners — the Sunruns, the Teslas — with growing Powerwall fleets — that have contracts, performance guarantees, and they want to get those financed. It’s harder to do that if there’s uncertainty in the future with curtailment."

“That’s the bottleneck right now,” said Daniel Munoz-Alvarez, a GTM Research grid edge analyst. “As we develop markets on the retail end for ...volt/VAR control to be compensated on the grid edge and that is compensated back to the customer, then the customer will be more willing to allow the utility to control their smart inverters or to allow some automation.”

But first, he said, “We need some agreed-upon functions.”

 

The future: Communications, controls and DER integration

The next stage of smart inverter functionality is establishing communications with the utility. After that, utilities will be able use them to monitor key DER data, or issue disconnect and reconnect commands in emergencies, as well as actively orchestrate other utility devices and systems through emerging virtual power plant strategies across their service areas.

This last area is where Salas sees the greatest opportunity to putting mass-market smart solar inverters to use. “If you want to maximize the DERs and what they can do, the need information from the grid. And DERs provide operational and capability information to the utility.”

Inverter makers have already been forced by California to enable the latest IEEE 1547 capabilities into their existing controls systems — but they are clearly embracing the role that their devices can play on the grid as well. Microinverter maker Enphase leveraged its work in Hawaii into a grid services business, seeking to provide data to utilities where they already had a significant number of installations. While Enphase has since scaled back dramatically, its main rival SolarEdge has taken up the same challenge, launching its own grid services arm earlier this summer.

Inverters have been technically capable of doing most of these things for a long time. But utilities and regulators have been waiting for the completion of IEEE 1547 to move forward decisively. Patrick Dalton, senior engineer for Xcel Energy, said his company’s utilities in Colorado and Minnesota are still several years away from mandating advanced inverter capabilities and are waiting for California’s energy transition example in order to choose a path forward.

In the meantime, it’s possible that Xcel's front-of-meter volt/VAR optimization investments in Colorado, including grid edge devices from startup Varentec, could solve many of the issues that have been addressed by smart inverter efforts in Hawaii and California, he noted.

The broader landscape for rolling out smart inverters for solar installations hasn’t changed much, with Hawaii and California still out ahead of the pack, while territories such as Puerto Rico microgrid rules evolve to support resilience. Arizona is the next most important state, with a high penetration of distributed solar, a contentious policy climate surrounding its proper treatment in future years, and a big smart inverter pilot from utility Arizona Public Service to inform stakeholders.

All told, eight separate smart inverter pilots are underway across eight states at present, according to GTM Research: Pacific Gas & Electric and San Diego Gas & Electric in California; APS and Salt River Project in Arizona; Hawaiian Electric in Hawaii; Duke Energy in North Carolina; Con Edison in New York; and a three-state pilot funded by the Department of Energy’s SunShot program and led by the Electric Power Research Institute.

 

Related News

View more

After alert on Russian hacking, a renewed focus on protecting U.S. power grid

U.S. Power Grid Cybersecurity combats DHS-FBI flagged threats to energy infrastructure, with PJM Interconnection using ICS/SCADA segmentation, phishing defenses, incident response, and resilience exercises against Russia-linked attacks and pipeline intrusions.

 

Key Points

Strategies, controls, and training that protect U.S. electric infrastructure from cyber threats and disruptions.

✅ ICS/SCADA network segmentation and zero-trust architecture

✅ Employee phishing drills and incident response playbooks

✅ DOE-led grid exercises and threat intelligence sharing

 

The joint alert from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security last month warning that Russia was hacking into critical U.S. energy infrastructure, as outlined in six essential reads on Russian hacks from recent coverage, came as no surprise to the nation’s largest grid operator, PJM Interconnection.

“You will never stop people from trying to get into your systems. That isn’t even something we try to do.” said PJM Chief Information Officer, Tom O’Brien. “People will always try to get into your systems. The question is, what controls do you have to not allow them to penetrate? And how do you respond in the event they actually do get into your system?”

PJM is the regional transmission organization for 65 million people, covering 13 states, including Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C.

On a rainy day in early April, about 10 people were working inside PJM’s main control center, outside Philadelphia, closely monitoring floor-to-ceiling digital displays showing real-time information from the electric power sector throughout PJM’s territory in the mid-Atlantic and parts of the midwest, amid reports that hackers accessed control rooms at U.S. utilities.

#google#

Donnie Bielak, a reliability engineering manager, was overseeing things from his office, perched one floor up.

“This is a very large, orchestrated effort that goes unnoticed most of the time,” Bielak said. “That’s a good thing.”

But the industry certainly did take notice in late 2015 and early 2016, when hackers successfully disrupted power to the Ukrainian grid. The outages lasted a few hours and affected about 225,000 customers. It was the first publicly-known case of a cyber attack causing major disruptions to a power grid. It was widely blamed on Russia.

One of the many lessons of the Ukraine attacks was a reminder to people who work on critical infrastructure to keep an eye out for odd communications.

“A very large percentage of entry points to attacks are coming through emails,” O’Brien said. “That’s why PJM, as well as many others, have aggressive phishing campaigns. We’re training our employees.”

O’Brien doesn’t want to get into specifics about how PJM deals with cyber threats. But one common way to limit exposure is by having separate systems: For example, industrial controls in a power plant are not connected to corporate business networks, a separation underscored after breaches at U.S. power plants prompted reviews across the sector.

Since 2011, North American grid operators and government agencies have also done large, security exercises every two years. Thousands of people practice how they’d respond to a coordinated physical or cyber event, including rising substation attacks that highlight resilience gaps.

So far, nothing like that has happened in the U.S. It’s possible, but not likely, according to Robert M. Lee, a former military intelligence analyst, who runs the industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos.

“The more complex the system, the harder it is to have a scalable attack,” said Lee, who co-authored a report analyzing the Ukraine attacks. “If you wanted to take out a power generation station– that isn’t the most complex thing. Let’s say you cause an hour of outage. But now you want to cause two months of outages? That’s an exponential increase in effort required.”

For example, he said, it would very difficult for hackers to knock out power to the entire east coast for a long time. But briefly disrupting a major city is easier. That’s the sort of thing that keeps him up at night.

“I worry about an adversary getting into, maybe, Washington D.C.’s portion of the grid, taking down power for 30 minutes,” he said.

The Department of Energy is creating a new office focused on cybersecurity and emergency response, following the U.S. government’s condemnation of power grid hacking by Russia.

Deterrence may be one reason why there has not yet been a major attack on the U.S. grid, said John MacWilliams, a former senior DOE official who’s now a fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

“That’s obviously an act of war,” he said. “We have the capability of responding either through cyber mechanisms or kinetic military.”

In the meantime, small-scale incidents keep happening.

This spring, another cyber attack targeted natural gas pipelines. Four companies shut down their computer systems, just in case, but they say no service was disrupted.

 

Related News

View more

Sign Up for Electricity Forum’s Newsletter

Stay informed with our FREE Newsletter — get the latest news, breakthrough technologies, and expert insights, delivered straight to your inbox.

Electricity Today T&D Magazine Subscribe for FREE

Stay informed with the latest T&D policies and technologies.
  • Timely insights from industry experts
  • Practical solutions T&D engineers
  • Free access to every issue

Download the 2025 Electrical Training Catalog

Explore 50+ live, expert-led electrical training courses –

  • Interactive
  • Flexible
  • CEU-cerified